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INTRODUCTION

Justice, later Chief Justice, William H. Rehnquist had a long 1 and
sometimes controversial 2 career as a jurist. A book edited by Craig
Bradley, The Rehnquist Legacy, 3 is an excellent introduction to the stillgrowing literature. 4 The author has a quibble with Professor Geoffrey R.
Stone’s article therein, The Hustler: Justice Rehnquist and “The Freedom
of Speech, or of the Press.” 5 Professor Stone does an elaborate, statistical
analysis of Justice Rehnquist’s voting patterns and concludes that he was
“no friend” 6 of the First Amendment, his jurisprudence “cannot be
defended as principled, coherent, or even-handed,” 7 and that he has left no
“meaningful legacy” 8 in First Amendment jurisprudence. Professor
Stone’s and other critics’ conclusions are moulded, as are the author’s, by
what philosopher Richard M. Weaver called one’s “metaphysical dream.” 9

1. Replacing Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Rehnquist took his oath of
office January 7, 1972, and died September 3, 2005. Craig M. Bradley, William
Hubbs Rehnquist, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT
418, 418 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006).
2. See generally THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig Bradley, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Hustler: Justice Rehnquist and ‘The
Freedom of Speech, or of the Press’, in id.; Bradley, William Hubbs Rehnquist,
supra note 1, at 427–28 (bibliographical note to Bradley essay).
3. THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 2.
4. See Bradley, supra note 1; see also infra text accompanying notes 5–8,
16, 20, 22, 243, 399, 802, 884, 914, 1013.
5. Stone, supra note 2, at 11–25.
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id. at 21 (“[Rehnquist’s] inclination to sustain First Amendment claims
only when they involve commercial advertising, campaign expenditures, religious
expression, or the right of the Boy Scouts to exclude homosexuals belies any
restraint, or principled constitutional interpretation.”). Id.
8. Id. at 25.
9. RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 18 (1948) (One’s
“metaphysical dream of the world” is the “intuitive feeling about the immanent
nature of reality . . . the sanction to which both ideas and beliefs are ultimately
referred for verification.”).

2022]

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

131

Readers who share Professor Stone’s First Amendment perspective
are likely to agree with him. As a libel scholar, the author would like to
suggest that in the discrete realm of defamation-First Amendment
jurisprudence Justice Rehnquist left a distinguished legacy in a self-styled
attempt to “hold[] the balance true” 10 between interests of equivalent
constitutional stature: the quasi-constitutional interest in reputation and the
fundamental constitutional interests in free expression. 11 Of course, this
value-equivalence doctrine, one that Justice Rehnquist persuaded the
Court as a whole to adopt, 12 will and does affront almost all media lawyers
and many First Amendment scholars, including probably Professor
Stone, 13 because it declines to treat expression as hierarchically superior
to reputation and mandates a close assessment of the competing values,
including recognition of reputation as a basic value, 14 one most state
constitutions specifically recognized. 15
Much has been written about how many Rehnquist Courts there have
been. 16 The author will not engage in that debate because it is not relevant
to the underlying theses: that Justice Rehnquist was the most dominant
voice on defamation on the Court in the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
counter-revolutionary era 17 and that his influential presence in the Court’s

10. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 43–44, 93–94, 167–69, 1020.
12. See infra text accompanying note 94.
13. See supra text accompanying notes 5–8; see also infra text accompanying
notes 21–23, 1000–80.
14. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12; infra text accompanying notes
27, 44–45, 93–94, 102–03, 135, 154,168–69, 257, 450, 565, 599–600, 858, 868–
903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
15. Michael B. Allport & Stephen C. Baldwin, Defamation and State
Constitutions: The Search for a State Law Based Standard After Gertz, 19
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 665, 665 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 564–66.
16. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003); Linda Greenhouse, Foreword:
The Third Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 2, at xiii.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 25–68.
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majority 18 and as author of many of its pivotal opinions 19 rightfully
justifies treating his long tenure as the “Rehnquist Era Court.” As
Professor Craig Bradley counters, any criticism of Justice Rehnquist’s
jurisprudence in First Amendment cases—and, the author would add,
particularly as to First Amendment entrenchments on the law of
defamation—should and must acknowledge that expanded rights of free
expression “come at a cost.” 20 These competing interests will be
18. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Cantrell v. Forest
City Publ’g Co., 418 U.S. 909 (1974); Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 429
U.S. 1037 (1977); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985); Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657 (1989); Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
19. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Wolston v. Reader’s Dig.
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 771 (1984);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988);
Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Troy v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734
(2005). See also Coughlan v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187
(1986); Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist’s dissents from
denial of certiorari petitions).
20. Bradley, supra note 1, at 424 (“Rehnquist’s work does not reflect
skepticism or hostility toward the core values protected by the free speech clause . .
. but instead reveals a careful appreciation of the fact that the translation and
reduction of so many policy questions to free speech problems comes at a cost. After
all, as the civic, social, and political territory covered by the free speech clause
grows, the amount shrinks that is governed democratically and experimentally by
the people and their representatives or that is left under the direction of private
persons, groups, and institutions. One implication of the free speech takeover,
Rehnquist seems to be warning us, is that difficult policy and other decisions depend
increasingly on judges’ evaluation of the abstract weight or worthiness of the
government’s interests, rather than on deliberation, compromise, and trial-and-error
by and among citizens and politically accountable public officials.” (emphasis
added)). See Richard W. Garnett, Less Is More: Justice Rehnquist, The Freedom of
Speech, and Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 2, at 26, 28;
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist: Prizing People,
Place, and History, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1702 (2006) (noting that Justice
Rehnquist’s favorite aphorism was that of Holmes—“a page of history is worth a
volume of logic”—and concluding that Rehnquist’s “work, jurisprudence, and
scholarship [taught us] that addressing place and history is critical to understanding
the problems [of] the nation, as well as the world, faces”); Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N.
Samahon, William Rehnquist, The Separation of Powers, and the Riddle of the
Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1761 (2006) (concluding that Justice Rehnquist’s
freedom of speech cases “reflect an inductive case-by-case, common law approach
to constitutional adjudication” viewing “precedent and practice . . . as much the law
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developed and analyzed in the substantive sections below. In a lengthy
conclusion, the author will draw the component threads together and
suggest that Professor Stone and others with parallel views owe Justice
Rehnquist some grudging respect and perhaps a modest partial apology.
Professor Stone’s sarcastic interpretation of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell 21—as based wholly in the author’s fascination with cartoons 22—
bears another broader, powerful, pro-First Amendment thrust that
Professor Stone does not deign to recognize: 23 Chief Justice Rehnquist
viewed Hustler Magazine, Inc. as a necessary accommodation to ensure
that politically incorrect speech remains protected by the First
Amendment. 24
I. THE GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC. COUNTER-REVOLUTION
The seemingly ever-expanding swath of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan reached its non-absolutist zenith 25 in media protection in
as the text of the Constitution itself.”); D.F.B. TUCKER, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 16 (1995) (noting that conservatives view “American intellectuals
[as] need[ing] to reconnect with European democratic ideals that draw on legal
positivism, constrained pragmatism or on common law doctrines”); id. at 74
(suggesting that the “Reagan agenda” was to motivate the Court “to identify what
is sensible and sustainable in the past and to endorse measured changes that reflected
the values of the American people”); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING
THE REAGAN REVOLUTIONA FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 70 (1991) (suggesting the
Reagan agenda view of judicial restraint was “no more than a project to reintroduce
a conception of law disciplined by a respect for tradition, professionalism, and
careful, candid reasoning”). Cf. John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism
and Common Law in Justice White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1471, 1489 (2003) (noting that Justice White “sought to direct his colleagues’
attentions away from lofty, overbroad generalizations about ‘rights’ and ‘free
speech’ toward case law, legal concepts, and a realistic view of the conduct that the
Court was immunizing from liability.”); id. at 1506 (concluding that Justice White
tried to persuade his fellow Justices of the “real costs associated” with New York
Times v. Sullivan and “reasons to hesitate before expanding it.”). Much recent and
compelling scholarship and some judicial commentary appear to be receptive to the
idea that New York Times and its progeny require rethinking. See infra text
accompanying notes 1017–81.
21. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 22–23,
85, 571, 576, 634–36, 773, 1000–17.
22. Stone, supra note 2, at 22–25.
23. Id.; but cf. infra text accompanying notes 1000–17.
24. See infra the detailed discussion in the text accompanying notes 1003–17.
25. The Court has repeatedly rejected absolutism in its defamation
jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes 28, 53–57, 129–44, 789–881.
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 26 with its almost all-encompassing public
or general interest 27 plurality opinion 28 applying the demanding standards

26. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
27. As Justice Douglas conceded in dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the concept of public interest is media self-defining and media manipulative:
“Indeed, any matter of sufficient general interest to prompt media coverage may
be said to be a public affair.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 501 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall discussing his views about society’s legitimate
interest in protecting private persons from being involuntarily thrust into the
public domain via “the distorting light of defamation”: “This danger exists since
all human events are arguably within the area of ‘public or general concern.’”
(emphasis added)); David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment:
In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 206 (1976) (noting
Rosenbloom “became a virtual carte blanche for the media”). See the scathing
critique of a proposed broad “public interest” privilege for the media by the
Supreme Court of California in Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. Brown v. Kelly
Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 406, 413 (Cal. 1989) (explaining that it would be the “rare
case” where media defendants would not claim such a privilege since “the
practical result” sought by them was to equate publication with privilege, noting
that amici curiae had provided no exemplars of what would not be privileged, and
referencing the proposed privilege’s “bootstrap[ping]” potential and concomitant
debilitating impact on reputation—the “more sensational and hence injurious a
statement is, the more ‘public interest’ it generates”); see also infra text
accompanying note 403.
28. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30–32, 40–54. Note that recent scholarship
discloses that Blackmun’s notes during the Court’s discussion of Gertz quote
Powell as saying “the Rosenbloom standard ‘[t]urns it over to the press. The press
can make it a matter of public interest, per se.’” Stephen Wermiel & Lee Levine,
The Making of Modern Libel Law: A Glimpse Behind the Scenes, 29 COMMC’NS
LAW. 1, 41 (2012) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan wrote
his Rosenbloom opinion with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
concurring. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30. Justice Blackmun defected three years
later. See infra text accompanying note 31, providing the fifth vote for overruling
Rosenbloom. Two members of the Rosenbloom Court concurred in the result on
other grounds. Justice Black concurred on absolutist grounds, at least as to matters
of public interest or concern. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
Justice White concurred on a very narrow ground, i.e., that New York Times
protected the media’s report about public officials’ official activities, which pull
in or involve private persons. Id. at 59–62 (White, J., concurring). As to Justice
White’s opinion and the dubious involuntary-public-figure concept, see infra text
accompanying notes 359–88.
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of New York Times regardless of status. 29 Two developments then
intervened. One was the unsurprising near desuetude of the law of
defamation during the thankfully brief Robespierean reign of
Rosenbloom. 30 The other was the changed composition of the Court, with
the appointment of Justices Lewis Powell and William H. Rehnquist. 31 A
short three years later, the Court revisited Rosenbloom and effectively
overruled Rosenbloom in the immensely important decision of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 32 which involved Gertz, a well-reputed, well-known
attorney, who filed a wrongful death action against a police officer. 33 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Gertz
could not prove constitutional malice under the Rosenbloom-New York

29. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30–32, 40–54 (plurality opinion). The plurality
found that the self-censorship interest was one of those “important social goals”
to which reputation had to yield. Id. at 49–50. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337–39, 343–
52 for a discussion of Rosenbloom.
30. See Robertson, supra note 27, at 208 (noting the “preemptive effect of
Rosenbloom” and the “litigation of hopeless causes”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 875 (2d ed. 1988) (interpreting Gertz as
viewing the New York Times standard’s impact as “defeat[ing] recovery in nearly
all litigated cases” in which it applied); Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical
Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1403 (1975) (“Rosenbloom had nearly destroyed
the law of defamation”). See also infra text accompanying note 73. Other scholars
view New York Times as effectively controlling in almost all cases post-Gertz and
as providing a near immunity from libel liability in all cases. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 915–23, 1017–81.
31. Justices Rehnquist and Powell replaced Justices John M. Harlan and
Hugo L. Black, respectively. This was a net gain of one for a more balanced view.
Justice Blackmun provided the fifth vote. See infra text accompanying note 32;
supra text accompanying note 1; Henry J. Abraham, Lewis Franklin Powell, in
Bradley, supra note 1, at 402.
32. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the Court in
which Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 324.
Justice Blackmun filed a concurrence. Id. at 353–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Although he had joined in the Rosenbloom plurality, he was willing to join the
Powell opinion for two reasons: (1) the elimination of presumed and punitive
damages absent compliance with the New York Times standard; and (2) the
exceptional need for a definitive majority view to replace the Court’s “sadly
fractionated” Rosenbloom opinion. Id. at 354; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30. He
stated that the Court’s new view would have “little, if any, practical effect on . . .
responsible journalism.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325–36, 351–52.
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Times incestuous dynamic duo 34 for the devastating portrayal in
defendant’s despicable publication American Opinion. 35
Drawing heavily on the dissenting views of Justices Harlan, Marshall,
and Stewart in Rosenbloom, 36 Justice Powell in his majority opinion
crafted an alternative to the absolutist and non-absolutist Rosenbloom
options. Private persons 37 could seek actual damages 38 under a lower
standard than Rosenbloom-New York Times as long as liability without
fault—or common-law strict liability—was not imposed. 39 This meant
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 805–08 (7th Cir. 1972). The
court applied a “significant public interest” standard to distinguish protected
matter from “mere public curiosity about private matters . . . .” Id. at 805 n.8
(emphasis added). Later, Justice John Stevens wrote the opinion. On the publicconcern or purely private-concern issue, see infra text accompanying notes 389–
511, 938–68.
35. As part of defendant Robert Welch, Inc.’s attempt to alert the public to
the supposed dangers of a nationwide law-enforcement force supplanting local
police—and, thus, providing support of a Communist dictatorship—the managereditor of its monthly periodical, American Opinion, hired a regular contractor to
do a piece on the criminal murder trial of Officer Nuncio. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
The result was an article, FRAME-UP: Richard Nuncio and The War on Police.
Id. at 325–26. Defendant’s publication portrayed plaintiff-lawyer Gertz as a major
engineer of the “frame-up,” and the article pilloried Gertz with a host of
defamatory charges, almost all false. See id. at 325–27. These libelous statements
included the following: a charge that plaintiff’s police file took “a big, Irish cop
to lift”; that he had been an officer in the “Marxist League for Industrial
Democracy” that espoused violent overthrow of the government; that he was a
member of the National Lawyers Guild—a Communist entity which was more
than likely the most important group in planning “the Communist attack” on the
police during the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention; and that he was a
“Leninist” and “Communist-Fronter.” As the Court indicated, the charges were
materially false. Id. at 326. Clearly, the Court did not view these statements as
protected opinion.
36. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337–39, 342–52. Justice Harlan disagreed with Justices
Marshall and Stewart only as to the issue of the constitutional permissibility of
punitive damages. See infra text accompanying notes 730–34.
37. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–52.
38. Id. at 349–50; see infra text accompanying notes 743–48 for a discussion
of Gertz’s impact.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–48. Recent scholarship using notes and records of
Court conferences indicate that Rehnquist later stated in discussions about Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders that he viewed Gertz as “‘a last minute
compromise,’ which he said he would not join again [and that he] did not wish to
extend any further.” Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, Case Study and
Commentaries, The Landmark That Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five Acts,
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negligence, 40 as all Court members agreed. 41 The Court used the word a
single time in the majority opinion.42 This negligence option provided a
better balance between the countervailing factors at issue: freedom of
expression from chilling-effect-self-censorship 43 and the states’ “strong
and legitimate” 44 interest in protecting and redressing injuries to private
88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2013). Justice Powell, author of the Gertz majority
opinion, “regretted what he described as the ‘unnecessarily broad language’ that
he had employed in Gertz.” He also said that his sins in Gertz had returned to
haunt him. Having reevaluated the issue, Powell now concluded, according to
Brennan’s notes, “that ‘Gertz must be read in’ and limited to the ‘context of media
defendants.’” Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). Powell’s notes later evidenced that he
“now harbored doubts about his own decision in Gertz” and that it was
indefensible to “‘constitutionaliz[e]’ the entire law of libel.” Id. at 29. Further,
Justice Powell suspected that Brennan’s draft would have just that effect. Id. See
infra text accompanying notes 418, 446, 451, 474.
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (distinguishing a scenario where a defamation per
quod statement did not provide notice to “a reasonably prudent editor or
broadcaster” of its defamatory nature or potential); id. at 349–50 (distinguishing
the justification for compensatory as juxtaposed to presumed and punitive
damages); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 355 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 376, 392, 395–96 (White,
J., dissenting); id. at 366–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The standard of evidence
would be a preponderance. Id. at 366–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White
found this repudiation of the common law in favor of a negligence standard an
unacceptable shift of risk of harm to the “wholly innocent victim.” Id. at 392
(White, J., dissenting). Defendant had, after all, published a defamatory falsehood
that it was under no duty to publish. Id.
41. See id. at 350.
42. See supra text accompanying note 40.
43. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340–49; but cf. id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Justice Brennan’s argument that the negligence standard would “exacerbate the
rule of self-censorship”). For increasingly vociferous attacks on chilling-effectself-censorship as a controlling value in defamation-First Amendment
jurisprudence, see infra text accompanying notes 50–51, 167, 880–903, 925,
1017–81.
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. The Court quoted Justice Stewart’s concurrence
in an earlier opinion suggesting that protection of reputation reflects “our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being” an interest
primarily delegated to the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which
was nonetheless “a basic of our constitutional system.” Id. at 341 (quoting
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Note what
the most widely read legal commentator said about reputation approximately
contemporaneously with the adoption of the Bill of Rights. WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
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persons. 45 The new negligence standard did not permit either presumed or
punitive damages. 46 These were available only if plaintiff met the New
York Times threshold. 47
In reaching this “more equitable boundary” 48 according states
“substantial latitude” to fashion reputation remedies, 49 the Court took a

STATES, AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. G at 29 (St. George
Tucker ed. 2000) (1803) (“The right of character is a sacred and invaluable right
. . . .”). See supra text accompanying notes 10–12, 14; infra text accompanying
notes 68, 93–94, 102–03, 135, 154, 168–69, 257, 599–600, 858, 868–903, 972–
73, 1023, 1041.
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
46. Id. at 349–50. On the damages and remedies issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 730–50. One commentator elaborately defends the Gertz
construct as a “penalty-sensitive rule—that is, a rule that could accommodate the
state’s interest in making victims whole, while staving off the specter of” selfcensorship—“designed to limit chilling effects on constitutionally valuable
speech.” Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive
Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1007, 1033 (2012).
See also id. at 996, 1002, 1005–07, 1033–34, 1051.
47. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349–50. The Rosenbloom standard ill-served both
values. In public-interest cases a private plaintiff confronted the “rigorous
requirements of New York Times” despite the varying state interests in public and
private-person cases. Id. at 346. By contrast, under Rosenbloom a private person
in a non-public-interest claim could get damages absent any fault, and these could
substantially exceed any actual injury via presumed and punitive damages. Id.
48. Id. at 347–48.
49. Id. at 345–46.
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fresh-air look at the non-empirically based, 50 or even verifiable, 51
argument that the potential for liability precipitated news media self50. See the strong criticism by Justice White: “The press today is vigorous
and robust. To me, it is quite incredible to suggest that threats of libel suits from
private citizens are causing the press to refrain from publishing the truth. I know
of no hard facts to support that proposition, and the Court furnishes none.” Id. at
390 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that the communications media
had become increasingly concentrated, was very lucrative, and that individual
elements thereof were not “easily intimidated.” Id. at 390–91. Demanding that
they pay for occasional harm to reputation would not substantially affect their
continued existence or performance. Id. Either the media should bear this burden,
or the public should do so as a “public benefit derived at private expense.” Id. at
392. See Justice White’s reference to a leading contemporary analyst of New York
Times, who seriously doubted whether a good-faith privilege for defamatory
falsehoods rather than the strict-liability rule would “greatly affect the course of
public discussion,” citing the experience of the majority view of the pre-1964
common-law versus the minority view where the good faith view predominated.
Id. at 399 n.41 (quoting Willard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of
Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 601–02
(1964)). Justice White also quoted a leading liberal constitutionalist, Professor
Thomas Emerson, to the effect that “on the whole the role of libel law in the
system of freedom of expression has been relatively minor and essentially
erratic.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 399–400 n.41 (quoting THOMAS EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 519 (1970)). For Justice White’s parallel
views on this issue, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971)
(White, J., concurring). Many others have agreed. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern,
Of Libel, Language and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68
N.C. L. REV. 273, 315–16 (1990) (finding “no clear evidence” justifying an
American chilling-effect constitutionalization of defamation law and citing the
“notoriously unchilled” English experience (citation omitted)); BRUCE E. FEIN,
NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: AN OBSTACLE TO ENLIGHTENED PUBLIC
DISCOURSE AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO THE PEOPLE 5 (1984) (citing
the British and European media and concluding that no cogent evidence exists
that media or other defendants were intimidated or reticent regarding public
officials prior to New York Times); Richard Epstein, Was New York Times v.
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 791 (1986) (citing the common law’s
“deep conviction” about the importance of expression and the “general
satisfaction” with libel law at the time of New York Times).
51. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s
Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 442 (2016)
(“Chilling effect” has “an unbounded quality . . . that renders much of the law of
defamation (and privacy and IIED) incompatible with the First Amendment.”);
Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1633, 1665–91, 1668 n.164 (2013) (Referencing “various empirical investigations
[that] fail to confirm the wisdom of the actual malice standard” in causing a
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censorship. 52 As the Gertz majority said, were that the only option, it
would have adopted the Black-Douglas “unconditional and indefeasible
immunity” 53 that mandated a “total sacrifice” 54 of the traditionally
reputation-protective law of defamation. The Court had never adopted
such a position. 55 In cases of public persons—public officials and public
figures—the Court had previously adopted New York Times’ “extremely
powerful antidote” strategically protecting the media from self-censorship
despite the “correspondingly high price” 56 such a standard taxed the
personalities of public persons. The Gertz majority reaffirmed prior
precedent in this regard as valid and defensible. 57
The Court’s jurisprudence as to public persons did not, however,
justify a parallel accommodation in the private-person setting. 58 Two
chilling effect, the author concludes that the Court “founded the chilling effect on
nothing more than unpersuasive empirical guesswork” and that “other aspects of
defamation law seem equally reasonable candidates for chilling analysis,” such as
defense-of-litigation costs; indeed, the “extremely fact-intensive, discoveryintensive . . . very costly” constitutional-malice criterion “encourages plaintiffs to
seek extensive discovery,” which may “chill more expression that the regime it
was designed to remedy.”); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 532–33 (1991) (concluding that constitutional defamation
law “rests on the unproven assumption” of a chilling effect that has “never been
demonstrated empirically,” and based on “an intuition no one seriously
challenges,” but finding it “no more compelling intuitively” than the deterrence
to participation in public life from such constitutionalization) [hereinafter
Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?].
52. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340–41. For other critiques of the chilling-effect-selfcensorship rationale, see infra text accompanying notes 167, 339, 453, 880–903,
925, 1019–36, 1017–81.
53. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
54. Id.
55. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 129–44, 789–881.
56. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (“Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some
intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of . . . [New
York Times] . . . .”).
57. Id. at 342–43. For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist’s general philosophy
thereon, see infra text accompanying notes 70–161. For his inconsistent positions
on the continuing validity of New York Times in public person cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 77–85, 446.
58. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–48, 351–52. Rosenbloom’s plurality would also
pose the difficulty of judges resolving ad hoc what fell within or without the
“general or public interest . . . what information is relevant to self-government”
test. Id. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). The Gertz Court “doubt[ed] the wisdom” of entrusting
such an obligation to judges. Id. The Court later retrenched from this dictum in
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considerations dictated a different result. A minor or subsidiary factor was
the difference in correlative rights of response or self-help of public and
private persons. 59 The “[m]ore important” factor was the “compelling
normative consideration” that public persons “voluntarily expose[]
themselves to increase[d] risk” of damage from defamatorily false
statements.60 In essence, the Court majority circumscribed the burgeoning
and almost limitless effect of the media breast-beating chilling-effect-selfcensorship mantra. 61 Instead, it attempted to construct a modest
compromise between the two interests that approximated Harry S.
Truman’s famous aphorism: “If you can’t stand the heat you better get out
of the kitchen.” 62 This attempt at providing a “rough sense of justice”
based in “practical politics” 63 for private persons also necessitated the
Court’s very close, if not jaundiced, scrutiny of attempts to resuscitate
Rosenbloom in the guise of expansive subject-matter subsets 64 or broadly
defined, even self-defining, categories of public persons. 65 As to the latter,
this ensured that only those who have truly “accepted public office” 66 or
recognizing the implicit public-concern holding of Gertz. See infra text
accompanying notes 412–24.
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9. See infra text accompanying notes 170–72,
225–26, 262, 313–14, 330, 343, 349.
60. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45. For further Court discussions of this
justification, see infra text accompanying notes 173–76, 178–224, 227–40, 262,
313, 315, 332–33, 339–40, 344, 348–49.
61. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that both the competing
values involved “necessarily uncertain assumptions about human behavior”).
62. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 868 (Una
McGovern ed., 2005). See infra text accompanying note 165; see also HarteHanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687 (1989) (A candidate who
“enters the political arena . . . ‘must expect that the debate will sometimes be
rough and personal . . . .’”) (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002) (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)).
63. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (adopting a plaintiff-oriented and jury-deferential rule
regarding proximate causation). Gertz allowed Justice Powell to eliminate a
“living fossil” and “accomplish a certain type of taxonomic neatening” by using
the First Amendment to bring defamation law in line with modern tort theory with
its “familiar conceptual contours of negligence.” Goldberg, supra note 20, at
1510. Justices Powell and Rehnquist later expressed varying forms of regret about
the Gertz decision. See infra text accompanying notes 446, 450–51.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 95, 99–104.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 79–83, 96–98, 120–21, 162–388, 429–
35, 498, 929–34, 939, 953–68, 987–93, 1018, 1061–66.
66. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; id. at 344 (Those who “seek governmental office
must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.
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“assume[] an influential role in ordering society” 67 are subsumed under
the reputation-eviscerating rule of New York Times. 68
II. REHNQUIST’S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF DEFAMATION
JURISPRUDENCE: “HOLD[] THE BALANCE TRUE” 69
Justice Rehnquist joined the Court a year after a Court plurality
extended the broadest swath of New York Times in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 70 which required all plaintiffs, regardless of status, to
meet the “exceedingly generous” 71 protections of New York Times in all
matters of public or general interest or concern. 72 Few plaintiffs could or
did survive this reputation-savaging standard. 73 Justice Rehnquist became
the controlling vote in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.’s 74 repudiation of
Rosenbloom a short three years later 75 and helped officially inaugurate a
calculated, counter-revolutionary movement to, as he later stated, “hold[]
the balance true.” 76
As will be demonstrated herein, Justice Rehnquist was quite pragmatic
in this regard post-Gertz. Only on one very sympathetic occasion 77 did he
. . . the risk of closer public scrutiny . . . .”); id. at 345 (As to those who have “not
accepted public office,” no assumption can be made that they “voluntarily
expose[] themselves to increased risk of injury . . . .”). For strong criticism of this
assumption-of-risk justification, see supra text accompanying note 61; infra text
accompanying notes 67, 92, 227–40, 262, 313, 339–40, 344, 348–49, 363, 365–
88, 930, 993, 963–68, 993, 1061–68.
67. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
68. See supra text accompanying note 56; infra text accompanying notes 72–
73, 78, 104, 133, 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–18, 924–25, 994, 1020,
1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
69. Milkovich v. Loraine J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
71. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 192 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 30–39; infra text accompanying notes
74–75.
73. See supra text accompanying note 30.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 30–39, 74–75.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 29–68; see also Milkovich v. Loraine
J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
77. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting). Coughlin involved broadcast of a
surreptitious videotape and ambush interview with plaintiff-rookie police officer,
which portrayed him as taking a bribe at a bar. Id. at 1187. According to petitioner,
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explicitly and publicly espouse—like Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White—a broad retrenchment to a negligence standard for public
persons. 78 Otherwise, and particularly after he became Chief Justice,
Justice Rehnquist was content to freeze the swath of New York Times into
its pre-1971 Rosenbloom moose tracks—to public persons 79 (public
officials, 80 public figures, 81 candidates for public office 82) and to
“even a minimal investigation” would have disclosed he was involved in an
investigation of a vandalism allegation and that the envelope was his incident
report book. Id. at 1187–88. The courts below found the matter defamatory but
made without constitutional malice. Id. at 1188. The dissenters cited the district
court’s conclusion that the broadcaster with “a minimum of effort, could have
discovered the truth,” and an appellate judge’s characterization of the scenario as
one where “any fair observer must agree is egregious conduct” by the broadcaster.
Id. (citing Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 388
(E.D. Pa. 1985)); id. (citing Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 780
F.2d 340, 349 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., concurring)). The dissenters would have
scheduled argument as to whether the New York Times “‘mandate’ remains an
appropriate one.” Id. Coughlin is the prototype of misapplication of the New York
Times Co. standard. See infra text accompanying notes 251–301, 989.
78. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 764
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice White and recalling “an
aphorism of journalism that ‘too much checking on the facts has ruined many a
good news story.’”); id. at 768–69 (White, J., concurring) (Allowing no remedy
for error avoidable by a reasonable investigation ill serves First Amendment
values by allowing a non-remediable dissemination of false statements about
public officials; permitting “[t]he lie [to] stand . . . [lets] the public continue to be
misinformed about public matters.”). Justice White characterized the prevailing
New York Times standard as a burden of “an almost impossible level . . . .” Id. at
771. Most scholars and judges agree with Justice White’s assessment. See supra
text accompanying note 68; infra text accompanying notes 104, 130, 133, 806–
07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–18, 924–25, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1077.
79. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (reasoning that New York
Times has been “repeatedly affirmed as the appropriate First Amendment
standard” for all public persons).
80. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14–15; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 334–35 n.6, 342–45, 348, 351 (1974). This rule applies beyond the “formal
discharge of official duties” to “‘anything which might touch on an official’s
fitness for office . . . .’” id. at 344–45 (quoting Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 77
(1964)). On the latter issue, see infra text accompanying notes 953–58.
81. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14–15; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335–39, 342–45,
348, 351–52.
82. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686–87
(1989) (affirming that candidates are “probably the strongest possible case” for
applying the New York Times standard).
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concomitantly severely constrict the realms of public-status criteria and
their application. 83
Unlike Justice White, 84 with the single aberrational exception
discussed above, Justice Rehnquist never aggressively and explicitly
publicly challenged New York Times’s and progeny’s non-empirically
based article of faith that adequate breathing space to avoid the supposed
horror of chilling-effect-self-censorship necessitated New York Times
level protection for public persons. 85 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist had
critically recognized that the Court had so deferentially valued free
expression that it tended to adopt “virtually any contention” 86 supported
by speech and press claims. In the defamation setting, Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that the balancing of the competing interests in freedom of
expression and protection of reputation justified differing standards when
private persons were involved in matters of public concern and 87 again
later where private persons were involved in purely private 88 matters.
These different accommodations, while drawing sometimes fierce public
criticism from other Court members,89 implemented what might be viewed
as Justice Rehnquist’s calculus of a new set of more “equitable
bound[aries]” 90 as a matter of “practical politics” and “a rough sense of

83. See infra text accompanying notes 96–98, 120–21, 162–388. For a
summary of Justice Rehnquist’s private statements during Court discussions of Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, see infra text accompanying note 446.
84. See supra text accompanying note 50; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 772 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (noting the
difficulty in arguing that the country did not have a pre-New York Times “free and
vigorous press” and that he had come to question the “easy assumption” the
common law would “muzzle the press”); infra text accompanying notes 1019–36.
85. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–43 (reaffirming the New York Times standard as
an appropriate and “extremely powerful antidote” to induced self-censorship
precipitated by common-law defamation strict liability due to the “limited state
interest” in public-person libel cases); Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51–
52 (1988); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14–17, 20 (referring to New York Times and
progeny as “established safeguards”). For criticisms of the chilling-effect-selfcensorship justification, see supra text accompanying notes 50–52; infra text
accompanying notes 167, 339, 453, 880–93, 925, 1019–36, 1056–57, 1060, 1067.
86. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 162–289.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 402–511, 580, 938–68, 1026.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 454–65, 474–79.
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48 (describing the minimal fault standard
applicable to private plaintiffs).
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justice,” 91 where legitimate public persons are accorded that “common
understanding” that they assume the risk of “rough treatment” or “public
bumping” as the corollary of their public involvement. 92
Three specific aspects of Justice Rehnquist’s extensive defamation
jurisprudence are pivotal to an understanding of his First Amendment
metaphysical dream in evaluating press-speech protections.

91. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting). See also infra text accompanying notes 165–69.
92. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002, 1004–05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring). But cf. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51,
at 527 (agreeing with Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom that the self-help, waiver,
or assumption-of-risk criteria were not persuasive in most cases). For other
criticisms of this rationale and the problems posed thereby, see supra text
accompanying notes 61, 66–67; infra text accompanying notes 173–74, 227–40,
262, 313, 339–40, 344, 348–49, 363, 365–88, 930, 963–68, 993, 1061–67. Note
that the political-arena doctrine espoused by Judge Bork was expanded to provide
absolute cover for opinion. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S
GUIDE § 8:4 (2003) (Supp. 2022) [hereinafter ELDER, DEFAMATION]. Of course,
neither this author nor the Court would countenance such a greatly extended
opinion rule modernly. See infra text accompanying notes 512–619.
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First, Justice Rehnquist accorded free expression and state protection
of reputation, an interest of almost constitutional, 93 equivalent stature.
Both were “equally compelling need[s] . . . .” 94
93. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Paul v. Davis, which held that
the interest in reputation alone was not a protected liberty or property interest
protected by the Constitution for §1983 purposes. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
694–714 (1976). The Court found no constitutional tort based on plaintiff’s very
public defamation by ranking local law-enforcement officers as an active
shoplifter, concerned that allowing a constitutional tort would make §1983 an
unlimited “font of tort law.” Id. at 701. The Court noted that imputation of crime
was classic defamation, actionable per se in all jurisdictions, and assumed that
both a defamation claim and a false-light privacy claim would be available under
state law. Id. at 697, 709–14. For a further discussion of this assumption, see infra
text accompanying note 761. In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that this is an
anomalous conclusion since this “basic concept” could override the specific
constraints of the First Amendment. Paul, 424 U.S. at 723 n.11 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, this interest in protecting individual reputation is “pervasive
and strong,” “strong and legitimate,” and “reflects no more than our basic concept
of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S.
1, 22 (1989); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
169 (1979) (The Court had repeatedly affirmed reputation as a “basic concern.”).
Occasionally, an even stronger statement has been issued by the Court, i.e., “an
overriding state interest” in protecting a state’s residents from libel if
constitutional malice is proved. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 271 (1974) (quoting Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966) (internal citation omitted)). Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Letter Carriers but agreed as to this characterization. See id. at 295 (Powell, J.,
with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring). For an analysis of reputation as
a form of property, see Epstein, supra note 50, at 800–01. For analyses of Gertz
as inconsistent with a treatment of reputation solely as property but as also
protecting dignity, see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 704, 729, 740–41
(1986); David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1049
(2006) [hereinafter Anderson, Rethinking Defamation] (reconsidering his earlier
views and following Post). Note that the Court’s consensus has likewise treated
personal privacy as an interest equivalent to First Amendment interests in
newsgathering cases. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). For
discussions of Bartnicki, see infra notes 113, 409, 723, 947, 966.
94. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (emphasis added). Note
that every member of the Court later agreed with this characterization of the
competing interests. Id. at 784 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C. J., White, J., and
Rehnquist, J., joining, dissenting); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 774 (1985). The Court would not “lightly require” a state to desert this
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Second, Justice Rehnquist imposed a heavy burden on defendants 95 to
demonstrate: (1) why either New York Times level status or subjectmatter-based protection should be given; and (2) where given, why
plaintiffs should be barred from proving their claims by assertions of First
Amendment-based evidentiary privileges. As to (1), Justice Rehnquist
joined the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. in imposing a high burden
on defendants attempting to demonstrate that plaintiff is an all-purpose
public figure. 96 This status would not be “lightly assume[d]” from a
citizen’s broad involvement in professional and community affairs but
instead require “clear evidence” of both “general fame or notoriety” in the
community and “pervasive involvement” in the affairs of society. 97 The
Court expressly supported a decided preference for vortex public
figuredom. 98
Later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 99 Justice Rehnquist issued a parallel
edict in rejecting a proposed partial revivification of Rosenbloom100 for
private persons defamed by inaccurate reports of judicial proceedings. 101
This proposal would entail a “substantial depreciation” 102 of plaintiff’s
“legitimate state interest . . . .” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. For discussions of the right
of reputation, see supra text accompanying notes 14, 30, 44–45; infra text
accompanying notes 102–03, 108, 154, 168–69, 257, 450, 507, 567, 570, 599–
600, 858, 868–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
95. Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 459 (The Court rejected the suggestion that
defendant had the right to select from among “several conceivable interpretations
[of a divorce decree] the most damaging” to plaintiff-respondent: “Having chosen
to follow this tack, petitioner must be able to establish not merely that the item
reported was a conceivable or plausible interpretation of the decree, but that the
item was factually correct.” (emphasis added)); Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n.,
443 U.S. 157, 167–68 (1979) (“A libel defendant must show more than mere
newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York
Times.” (emphasis added)); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979)
(imposing on the libel defendant the burden of identifying the “particular
controversy” into which plaintiff had thrust himself).
96. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 324.
97. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
98. Id. (“It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more
meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”
(emphasis added)).
99. Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 456.
100. Id. at 454.
101. Id. at 454–57.
102. Id. at 456 (rejecting “[p]resumptively erecting” the “New York Times
barrier” in such cases).
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interest in reputation without “any convincing assurance” this sacrifice
was mandated by the First Amendment. 103 In other words, any and all
attempts to superimpose New York Times’s “rather drastic limitations” 104
on plaintiffs in public-concern cases necessitate a heavy justification by
the media.
As to (2), Justice Rehnquist joined a strong Court majority 105 in
Herbert v. Lando 106 in repelling a broad First Amendment-based privilege
for editorial decisions. The Court refuted the media-press arguments for
modifying the common-law tradition of maximizing access to
information 107 and/or for the Court’s “firmly established” 108 defamationFirst Amendment jurisprudence in cases of plaintiffs seeking to prove
constitutional malice 109 as “by no means clear and convincing . . . .” 110
Third, in Justice Rehnquist’s unanimous decision in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 111 the Court dramatically restyled both the typical focus of the
common law and the Court’s traditional focus on plaintiff injury. The
Court emphasized that “[f]alse statements of fact harm both the subject of
the falsehood and the readers of the statement” and affirmed that a State
“may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its

103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 457; see supra text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73; infra text
accompanying notes 130, 133, 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–18, 924–25,
1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
105. See infra text accompanying note 712.
106. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see text accompanying notes
710–23.
107. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 161–69.
108. Id. at 169.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 620–90.
110. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169–70 (emphasis added). The parallels of these
heightened burdens to Justice Brennan’s adroit transmogrification of a
“convincing clarity” aside into a “clear and convincing” evidentiary requirement
are undeniable, palpable, and compelling. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 285–86 (1964); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52, 55 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (listing such as an element of the holding and later treating it
as equivalent to “convincing clarity”). This heightened Court-imposed
evidentiary standard was never specifically discussed, much less justified, but is
now well-ensconced in the Court’s defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence.
See infra text accompanying notes 622–23; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92,
§ 7:5. For further discussions of the clear-and-convincing evidence requisite, see
infra text accompanying notes 622–23, 1048.
111. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). For a further analysis, see
infra text accompanying notes 693–704.
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citizens” 112—i.e., to discourage and deter pollution of public discourse.
This powerful rationale recognizing the need for a viable remedy for
defamed plaintiffs remains equally, if not even more compelling, in the
Internet and social media era.
112. Id. at 776 (first emphasis added) (relying on New Hampshire’s criminaldefamation statute). See Paul A. LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment:
The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 788 (1984) (noting the Court
apparently was “actively engaged in an expansion of the recognized purposes” of
the defamation tort). On the impact of this expansion on First Amendment
standards in false-light, private-person, public-concern cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 351–57, 702–04, 762–65, 767. Note that United States v.
Alvarez, the Court’s “stolen valor” case, rejected use of knowing-or-reckless
falsity as a basis for broad rules criminalizing false speech. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 719–20 (2012). However, all members of the Court apparently
reaffirmed the viability of, or did not question, defamation actions, both civil and
criminal, for such calculated falsehoods that cause harm to a person as having no
protection under the First Amendment. See id. Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, applied an “exacting scrutiny”
standard and distinguished cases involving defamation, fraud “or some other
legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement”—the false-light
privacy tort or vexatious litigation—in concluding that the Court had never
approved a “categorical rule” that “falsity and nothing more” suffices for
criminalization. Id. at 715–19, 724–29. With “no clear limiting principle,” “[o]ur
constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of
Truth” a la George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Id. at 723. The Court
refused to provide government such “a broad censorial power unprecedented” in
the Court’s precedents or “in our constitutional tradition.” Id. Justice Breyer, with
Justice Kagan concurring, applying “intermediate scrutiny,” distinguished cases
like fraud or torts like defamation, false-light privacy, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress-“outrage” “that tend to cause harm to a specific victim of an
emotional-, dignitary-, or privacy-related kind.” Id. at 734. Such actions do not
allow either tort liability or criminal punishment “to roam at large, discouraging
or forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the need
for the prohibition is small.” Id. at 736. Citing Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court’s
1964 criminal-defamation case applying New York Times, Justice Alito, with
Justices Scalia and Thomas joining, dissented, finding that the lies at issue “inflict
real harm and serve no legitimate interest.” Id. at 739. They also cited the viability
of fraud and torts involving calculated falsity—defamation, false-light privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress-“outrage”—as wholly permissible
under the First Amendment. Id. at 740–50. For a discussion of Alvarez’s impact
in the context of false or fraudulent statements under state campaign laws, see
Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth? Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications,
Bullshit, and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
367 (2017). For further discussion of the impact of Alvarez in the false-light
privacy setting, see infra note 769.
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Justice Rehnquist’s defamation jurisprudence requires compelling
justification for any enhanced media protection beyond the skeletal
remains of the Court’s pre-Rosenbloom precedent. A plethora of examples
aptly evidence the Rehnquist Era Court’s exceedingly jaundiced view
toward any “unnecessary departure[s]” from First Amendment doctrines
of general applicability 113 and the substratal purposes of defamation law
and its generally applicable rules that have developed since the late
sixteenth century. 114 This detailed list includes: broad definitions of what
113. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 515–18 (1991); see infra text
accompanying notes 127–28. For discussion of such generally applicable laws in
the news gathering context, see the discussions of Bartnicki v. Vopper, supra note
93; infra notes 409, 723, 947, 966.
114. Masson, 501 U.S. at 515, 518–20 (rejecting any suggestion that readers
generally interpret quotations as an author’s “rational interpretation” thereof and
refusing to adopt any such presumption thereof in resolving the controversy). See
Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11–13 (recognizing the availability of a
libel, slander remedy since the latter part of the sixteenth century); Hustler Mag.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1988) (detailing a lengthy discourse on the
American tradition of political cartoons and parody); Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S.
1127, 1128–30 (1985) (dissenting from denial of certiorari); infra text
accompanying note 525; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S.
749 (1985); infra text accompanying notes 403–511 (reaffirming the availability
of both presumed and punitive damages under the common-law and state statutory
standards in private-plaintiff, purely private-concern cases); McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479, 482–84 (1985) (concluding that early libel decisions in state courts
evidenced no clear evidence as to the nature of the Petition Clause right at the
time the First Amendment was framed and following the Court’s 1845 decision
applying a common-law qualified privilege); infra text accompanying notes 395–
402; McDonald, 472 U.S. at 488–89 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., and
Blackmun, J., joining, concurring); Herbert, 441 U.S. at 161, 163–66 (rejecting a
broad evidentiary privilege for the editorial process, citing access to direct forms
of evidence, as evidenced in the “deeply rooted” traditions of the common law as
to punitive damages and defeasance of common-law privilege); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 707 (1976) (citing the federal absolute privilege for executive officers
as contraindicating a suggestion that the due-process clause included protection
of reputation alone as a liberty or property interest); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 460–63 (1976) (applying state law as to damages based on traditional
instructions); infra text accompanying notes 745–48; Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 461–
64 (The Court deferred to state mechanisms for determining fault and concluded
that neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendments required such to be made by a
jury—it could be made by an appellate, rather than a trial, court and need not be
analyzed in detail in a written opinion; the Court accorded deference to state-court
findings in this respect but ultimately found that no such “conscious
determination” of fault had been made at any level by any fact-finder.); Cantrell
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is actionable falsehood regardless of form; 115 retrenchment to a
constitutional minimum of negligence for private persons in publicconcern cases seeking compensation for actual injury; 116 revivification of
common-law standards in large part, if not most likely in toto, in purely
private defamation cases even against the media.117
The Court’s jurisprudence also rejects an “artificial dichotomy” 118
between opinion and fact under an open-ended, multi-factor, resultoriented, media-victory test 119 and undoubtedly retrenches the swath of
protection of those defined as public persons (public officials 120 and public
figures 121). The Court clarifies the nature of constitutional malice,
modestly liberalizes the standards the Court previously imposed, 122 and
powerfully reaffirms the right to discovery access to all admissible

v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 n.6 (1974) (adopting commonlaw respondeat superior); infra text accompanying notes 749–50.
115. Masson, 501 U.S. at 509–10, 517–18 (discussing the broad parameters of
libel under California law, stating that “[m]eaning is the life of language” and
concluding quotations could be a “devastating instrument” for publicizing false
meaning, with a self-depiction in plaintiff’s quoted words “especially damning”);
id. at 522 (concluding that statements attributable to “well-respected senior
colleagues” portraying plaintiff as an “intellectual gigolo” were equally or more
damaging than a self-depiction); id. at 523–25 (concluding that other altered
quotation statements—the “Sex, Women, Fun,” “I Don’t Know Why I Put It In,”
“Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived,” and “He Had The Wrong Man” quotations—
were capable of defamatory meanings); Ollman, 471 U.S. at 1128–29 (Rehnquist,
J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing the generally actionable per se rule for
statements defamatory of business, profession or office); Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at
462 n.7 (noting that imputing adultery to a woman was generally actionable per
se); Paul, 424 U.S. at 697 (opinion by Rehnquist noting that defamation per se
was available as a “classical claim” in “virtually every State” for imputations of
criminality and without proof of special damages); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 331–32 n.4 (1974) (indicating that false depictions of being a
“Leninist” or “Communist-fronter” were “generally considered” defamatory). See
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 (Court members contrasted the “Stolen Valor” statute
with multiple tort and criminal sanctions where the false statement produces
“legally cognizable harm” to an individual.).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 743–48.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 403–511; 938–68.
118. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 512–619.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 251–301.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 162–250, 302–88.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 620–90.

152

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

evidence thereof. 123 Lastly, the Court provides access to remedies
adequate to protect against reputational and other injuries and to prevent
and thereby deter—in part—pollution of public discourse. 124
The Court’s last significant 125 libel case, Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 126 patently, patiently, and potently illustrates the pro-plaintiff
changes the Rehnquist Era Court counter-revolution wrought. The Court
first rejected a special set of rules for altered quotation scenarios and
affirmed the appropriateness for First Amendment purposes of the
classical nature of the substantial-truth and material-falsity criteria 127—a
modest victory for defendants. 128 The Court’s opinion by Justice Stevens,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, then issued four hammer blows to
media attempts to circumvent 129 New York Times’s “demanding
burden” 130 and reinstate sub silentio layers of the “unconditional and
indefeasible immunity” 131 that the Court had repeatedly rejected132 in
123. See supra text accompanying notes 106–10; infra text accompanying
notes 637, 644–46, 692, 710–23, 917, 1042–43.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–12; infra text accompanying
notes 141, 453, 508, 702–04, 724–29, 767, 870–81, 973, 1017–81.
125. More recently, the Court issued a libel, prior restraint opinion dealing
with coercive defamation and decided it was not mooted by the death of the
celebrity-lawyer victim. See infra text accompanying notes 777–88.
126. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
127. Id. at 513–17 (rejecting the dissenters’ view that any deliberate alteration
of quotations other than of syntax or grammar sufficed for constitutional-malice
purposes and adopting the “historical understanding” of truth or falsity).
128. See id.
129. For a detailed analysis of both Masson and other media attempts to
circumvent New York Times and extend de facto versions of absolute privilege,
see David A. Elder, Truth, Accuracy and Neutral Reportage: Beheading the
Media Jabberwock’s Attempts to Circumvent New York Times v. Sullivan, 9
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 594–98, 627–830 (2007) [hereinafter Elder, Media
Jabberwock].
130. Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n., 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979). See supra
text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104; infra text accompanying notes
133, 806–07, 867–58, 867, 869, 882, 918, 924–25, 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48,
1073, 1077.
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
132. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686–88 (1989)
(noting that even in cases of candidates for elective office, “probably the strongest
possible case” for New York Times, the Court had not accorded the press absolute
immunity); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 480, 482, 483–89 (1985); Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (concluding that absolute immunity had been
“regularly found . . . to be an untenable construction” of First Amendment
guarantees); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (finding that the Court had long rejected the
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favor of a New York Times’s qualified privilege “widely perceived as
essentially protective of press freedoms . . . .” 133
First, the Masson Court tersely rejected any suggestion that the First
Amendment imposed any restraints on what states could define as
actionable libel under state law. 134 Second, the Court also perfunctorily
refuted any suggestion that the incremental harm 135 subdivision of the
libel-proof-plaintiff doctrine 136 was constitutionally compelled. 137 Third,
the Court unequivocally rejected any suggestion that the rationalinterpretation doctrine of Time, Inc. v. Pape 138 provided protection to
materially altered quotations. 139 Any other conclusion would sabotage the
accepted meaning of quotations 140 and engender distrust of the printed
“unconditional and indefeasible immunity” that would have entailed “total
sacrifice of the competing value” redressed by defamation law). See Chief Justice
Warren’s powerful statement in an opinion that became the majority in upholding
a substantial award of compensatory and punitive damage in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“Freedom of
the press under the First Amendment does not include absolute license to destroy
lives or careers.”). See also infra text accompanying notes 531–55, 789–881.
133. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169. This high level of protection is widely reflected
in the cases and the literature. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73,
78, 104, 130; infra text accompanying notes 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–
18, 924–25, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
134. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 509–10, 522 (1991)
(concluding this was purely a question of California law).
135. Id. at 509, 522 (“This doctrine measures the incremental reputational
harm inflicted by the challenged statements beyond the harm imposed by the
nonactionable remainder of the publication” and bars the claim where such added
harm was non-existent or only nominal in nature.).
136. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 9:8.
137. Masson, 501 U.S. at 522–23 (noting that this issue did not relate to either
falsity or constitutional malice and noting further that it had no indication
California had adopted this doctrine, with the latter alternative available as an
issue of state law as to injury, causation, and damages).
138. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 289–92 (1971) (finding no
constitutional malice where media interpreted an exceptionally ambiguous
governmental report). See infra text accompanying notes 143–44.
139. Masson, 501 U.S. at 508–09, 518–19.
140. Id. at 518–19. Such lacked support in either “general principles of
defamation law or in our First Amendment jurisprudence.” “Rational
interpretation” served First Amendment functions by authorizing an author
“interpretive license” in relying on ambiguous documents or sources as in Pape
or in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S. Inc. See supra text accompanying
note 138; infra text accompanying notes 160–61; Masson, 501 U.S. at 519.
However, quotation marks do not suggest the author is engaged in interpreting a
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word, 141 “ill-serv[ing] the values of the First Amendment . . . .” 142 Fourth,
the Masson Court accorded Pape a devastatingly narrow construction, i.e.,
as involving only a “falsification insufficient” 143 to sustain a
constitutional-malice finding in abuse-of-fair-report 144 cases.
Justice Rehnquist was on the losing side in only four post-Rosenbloom
cases. None have had significant impact in mitigating the Rehnquist Era
Court’s successful counter-revolution. In Letter Carriers v. Austin, 145 a
labor law, non-First Amendment case, 146 Justice Rehnquist primarily
dissented regarding the majority’s broad interpretation of what constituted
a labor dispute in applying the New York Times standard. 147 In
Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 148 Justice Rehnquist was on the
short straw side of a 5-4 decision requiring plaintiff proof of falsity in

source’s ambiguous declarations but merely what the source said. Such “orthodox
use” of quoted matter is the “quintessential ‘direct account of events that speak
for themselves.’” Id. (quoting Pape, 401 U.S. at 285).
141. Masson, 501 U.S. at 520 (If it provided journalists absolute licenses to
put statements in their subjects’ voices, the Court would eliminate any ability of
readers or viewers to distinguish statements and authorial interpretation; this
would cause harm to public persons and make them view the media with a
jaundiced eye.).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 519. Compare supra text accompanying note 138, with infra text
accompanying note 161.
144. Fair report looks at facial accuracy of the “four corners” of the official
report, document, or proceeding. See DAVID A. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT
PRIVILEGE 345–46 (1988).
145. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
146. Id. at 266–87. This was later affirmed as reflecting First Amendment
doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 576.
147. Id. at 291–92 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority opinion as an “sweeping extension” of Linn and
involving a classic union-management contretemps during an organizational
campaign in a case where defendant union had 96% membership and tried to
coerce plaintiff-non-members into joining via defamatory vilification;
disagreeing with the majority that “scab” was true, and asserting that each of the
Jack London definitions, including plaintiff’s imputed lack of character and
“rotten principles,” was an actionably false statement). Note that this opinion,
issued the same day as Gertz, compellingly refutes any suggestion Justice
Powell’s dictum reference to “no such thing as a false idea” was intended to
support a broad opinion rule. See id. at 284; infra text accompanying notes 512–
619.
148. Phila. Newpapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1985).
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media-defendant, public-concern cases 149 in addition to plaintiff’s proof
of the requisite level of culpability based on status.150
Yet, as the Philadelphia Newspapers majority conceded, this burdenof-proof-of-falsity rule will determine results only in the rare scenario
where falsity is improvable. 151 Indeed, the closeness of the decision offers
compelling witness to the power of the Rehnquist Era Court counterattack.
Four dissenting members of the Court, 152 including Justice Rehnquist,
excoriated this imposed plaintiff burden of proof and reversal of the

149. Id. at 768–69, 775–79. The Court limited its conclusion to media
defendants, did not decide the quantum-of-proof issue, and did not resolve what
standards would apply if a State were to accord plaintiff a right to get a judgment
of falsity but without damages liability. Id. at 779 n.4. For a further discussion of
the latter, see infra text accompanying notes 778, 996. Justices Brennan and
Blackmun concurred but noted that the reservation as to non-media defendants
was inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine, citing Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Dun & Bradstreet. Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 779–80
(Brennan, J., with Blackmun, J., joining, concurring). For a discussion, see infra
text accompanying notes 462–67. For a further discussion of the media, nonmedia distinction in the Internet age, see infra text accompanying notes 389–511.
150. Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 775–79.
151. Id. at 778 (noting that this burden “adds only marginally” to plaintiff’s
existing fault obligations and that “[a]s a practical matter” plaintiff’s required
proof of fault will normally include proof of falsity, with this burden
determinative only in cases involving unprovably false matter); id. at 784 n.5
(Stevens, J., with Burger, C. J., White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
their inclination to concur with the “adds only marginally” observation but
suggesting that the fact that the burden of proof happens to be “inconsequential in
many cases provides no answer” as to cases in which it becomes determinative).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B cmt. j (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (concluding
that “[a]s a practical matter,” defendant’s burden of showing fault will necessarily
involve plaintiff’s proof of falsity); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps
and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation,
75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1528 n.37 (1987) [hereinafter Smolla, New Analytic Primer].
The dissenters viewed this unprovability scenario as “not a merely speculative or
hypothetical concern.” Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 784. They listed a series
of factors making it impossible for an innocent person to refute maliciously
defamatory gossip, including the scenario before the Court, which involved
plaintiff’s burden of showing that the chain of stores of which plaintiff was
principal stockholder was not connected to organized crime or its minions. Id. at
785–86 n.7 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C. J., White, J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
152. Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 780.
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common-law affirmative defense of the truth 153 as “trad[ing] on the good
names” of plaintiffs “with little First Amendment coin to show for it.” 154
In a third decision, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 155 Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the majority in extending the clear-andconvincing evidentiary requirement to summary judgment and directed
verdict motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 156 As Justice
Rehnquist suggested 157—and fellow dissenter, Justice Brennan, appeared
to agree 158—this incorporated evidentiary standard will have little or no
impact while generating “great mischief” because of the lack of guidance
provided to trial courts. 159 Lastly, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
153. Id. at 780–90. Although not before the Court, the dissenters would not
have imposed the burden of proof of falsity on public persons either. Id. at 788
n.10.
154. Id. at 790.
155. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
156. Id. at 247–57. Clearly, states are not bound by such as a matter of federal
constitutional law. Note that the Court took considerable pains to affirm the role
of the jury as to credibility and evidence-assessment inferences to be drawn
therefrom and specifically rejected “trial on affidavits.” Id. at 255. Indeed, the
Court appeared to suggest that trial judges reject summary judgment where there
are grounds to believe that a trial would be the better avenue to follow. Id. One
scholar has characterized Liberty Lobby as “a resounding victory on an issue of
critical pragmatic importance” but as otherwise reflecting a principle of
“procedural neutrality” consistent with the Court’s general thrust in the post-Gertz
era. See Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1532–33. On the other
“procedural neutrality” cases, see infra text accompanying notes 691–723.
157. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 269–71 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority gives deference to jury determinations
of credibility and accords deference to all justifiable evidentiary inferences in the
non-movants’ favor).
158. Id. at 267–68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority’s
opinion “may well be . . . of little practical effect” but indicating concern about
the “difficult and troubling question” about erosion of the jury’s “enshrined role”
and the utility of summary-judgment procedure).
159. Id. at 271–73 (Rehnquist, with Burger, C.J., dissenting) (by changing the
traditional standard but without “even hinting as to how” it will be applied). But
compare the compelling argument by Professor David Anderson that the
independent-appellate-review and clear-and-convincing-evidence criterion
(which lacks the same deference as a preponderance standard) have incentivized
trial courts to resolve most constitutional-malice cases at the summary-judgment
level, creating a perception that libel litigation will be futile. David A. Anderson,
Second Thoughts: A Response to David A. Logan’s Rescuing Our Democracy by
Rethinking New York Times v. Sullivan, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 23, 25–26
(2021) [hereinafter Anderson, Second Thoughts]. See infra note 1048.
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United States, Inc., 160 Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority’s
decision to reject the clearly erroneous standard in confirming courts’ First
Amendment duty to engage in independent examination of the entire
record for proof of constitutional malice. 161
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE PUBLIC-PERSON, PRIVATE-PERSON
DICHOTOMY
As stated above, the Rehnquist Era Court rejected Rosenbloom’s
expansion of New York Times to all matters of public or general interest in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 162 and distinguished all public persons—public
figures 163 and public officials 164—from private persons. The Court relied
on two policies that one scholar views as having strong moral, political,

160. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498–514
(1984). The majority seemed to concede that the same result would probably have
occurred under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 514. Note that the Court
majority did not supplant trier-of-fact determinations of credibility, a view which
the apparent Court consensus reaffirmed later in Harte-Hanks, Inc. v.
Connaughton. Id. at 512; see infra text accompanying notes 682–90.
161. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 515–20 (Rehnquist, J., with O’Connor, J.,
joining, dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted the irony that First Amendment
principles designed to protect criticism of public officials’ conduct had been
extended to a magazine’s false depiction of a commercial loud-speaker system.
Id. at 515. One can correctly view the Court majority’s purported holding as
technically extensive dicta. The product-disparagement claim was based on a
dispute as to whether defendant’s expert correctly evaluated the sound system as
moving “along the wall” rather than “about the room.” Id. at 511. Justice
Stevens’s opinion specifically concluded that this “difference . . . fits easily within
the breathing space that gives life to the First Amendment.” Id. at 513 (emphasis
added). The true, limited holding seems to be that such was not a material falsity.
Justice Rehnquist agreed—this statement suggested the comment was “perhaps
not even false, or at any rate not false enough.” Id. at 516–17, 519 (Rehnquist, J.,
with O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Alternatively, the matter seems
to qualify as non-actionable opinion. See id. at 514 (noting that the statements in
controversy “tread the line between fact and opinion.”). Ultimately, the Bose
approach was measurably curtailed in Harte-Hanks Communications v.
Connaughton. See infra text accompanying notes 682–90.
162. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 170–250, 302–88. Presumably, the
Court would treat non-incumbent candidates for public office as either public
figures or apply the consensus “bright line” rule reflected in the cases. See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:3.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 251–301.
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and philosophical underpinnings 165 reflecting a common-sense but
profound political judgment 166 about a fundamentally fair rebalancing of
defamation defendants’ oft-asserted fear of self-censorship 167 and the
states’ “strong and legitimate” 168 interest in protecting private persons
from reputational and other harm. 169
The minor and secondary 170 rationale is the self-help or access to the
media 171 that public persons unusually command while private persons do
165. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:35.50 (2d ed. 2008)
(concluding that the public-figure concept is “heavily grounded in cultural and
moral equity—if you can’t stand the heat of the fire, stay out of the kitchen” and
also “heavily grounded in the public policy of facilitating free social discourse—
those who voluntarily seek to influence events and issues may appropriately be
forced to accept as part of the bargain a greater risk of defamation”) [hereinafter
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION]; Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the
First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 434
(1988) [hereinafter Smolla, Emotional Distress] (noting that “the prevailing
ethos” in America is to require of public persons “a certain toughening of the
hide” “as a cost of entering the public arena”); id. at 458 (suggesting that
assumption of risk is “an essential element to a pluralistic, robust, and open
culture”).
166. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 165, § 2:35.50; Smolla,
Emotional Distress, supra note 165, at 434; see supra text accompanying notes
62–63; infra text accompanying notes 936–68.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45, 93–94; infra text
accompanying notes 507, 599–600.
168. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). For discussions
of the right of reputation, see supra text accompanying notes 10–12, 14, 27, 44–
45, 68, 93–94, 102–03, 108, 135, 154; infra text accompanying notes 257, 570,
599–600, 858, 868–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 743–48.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 61; infra text accompanying notes
170–72, 201–03, 211–12, 225–26, 313–14, 329–30, 341–43, 1061–66.
171. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (admitting that opportunities for response are
rarely sufficient to repair the harm but concluding the inadequacy thereof did not
make such access irrelevant). See the views of Justice Harlan in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
dissented, following his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at
363–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the argument of media access might be true
as to “some very prominent people, even then it is the rare case where the denial
overtakes the original charge.” Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46 (plurality opinion). In
the overwhelming majority of public-person cases, the opportunity to respond will
be contingent on the media’s continued interest in the subject matter of the study.
Id. Accordingly, the “unproved, and highly improbable generalization” of better
access-response by public persons appeared to be “too insubstantial a reed” on
which to base a First Amendment distinction. Id. at 46–47.
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not. 172 The second and “[m]ore important” policy is the “compelling
normative consideration” 173 that public persons have “voluntarily exposed

172. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. The internet has surely diminished, if not
eviscerated, whatever justification that existed for distinguishing the two statuses
based on the access or self-help rationale. David A. Logan, Rescuing Our
Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759,
786 n.194 (2020) [hereinafter Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy] (This diminished
access rationale is “not true today, when a defamed person can often engage in
self-help by mounting a defense on the internet.”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding
the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 951, 976 (2014) (“Forty
years of revolutionary technological change has dramatically reduced the force of
this [lack of access] rationale for distinguishing public figures from private
persons.”); id. at 994 (“The empowerment of ordinary citizens has grown
exponentially in the last two decades, fundamentally undermining the Gertz
notion that private persons do not have meaningful access to channels of
communication for redressing attacks on their reputations.”); id. at 1004 (“While
the communication reach of private individuals has increased extraordinarily,
there are serious questions about the breadth of [an] audience an ordinary person
can reach.”); Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York Times v.
Sullivan by Promoting a Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 87–91, 106
(2007) (The access or self-help argument is “severely flawed.” The author
emphasizes the arbitrariness of the access rationale—under Justice Powell’s
standard “a public plaintiff’s reputation does not warrant special protection
because that plaintiff can resort to self-help that is almost always inadequate.”
However, the internet’s “expansion of outlets for mass communication has diluted
the effectiveness of public plaintiffs’ counterspeech.”); Gerald G. Ashdown,
Journalism Police, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 739, 756 (2006) (Justice Brennan
“effectively debunked” the access argument in his Rosenbloom plurality opinion
and Gertz dissent.).
173. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the view
of Justice Brennan and his Rosenbloom plurality opinion. Id. at 363–64 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). In Rosenbloom, Justice Brennan rejected any linkage between the
public interest in the subject matter and plaintiff's stature: “If a matter is a subject
of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a
private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the
event . . . .” Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43. Such assumed-risk analysis “bears little
relationship” to either First Amendment values or the nature of societal
membership. Indeed, involuntarily or voluntarily, all are “‘public’ men to some
degree” and some aspects of the most public persons fall outside the realm of
public interest. Id. at 47–48. The public-versus-private distinction based on
assumed risk becomes, “at best, a legal fiction.” Id. at 48. On the private aspect of
public persons and the fault standard that applies, see infra text accompanying
notes 409, 422, 425, 938–68.
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themselves to increased risk of injury” 174 from defamatory falsehoods. No
parallel assumption of risk can be attributed to a mere private person who
has neither sought nor gained public office nor “assumed an ‘influential
role in ordering society.’” 175 Thus, private persons are both more
vulnerable and deserving and have a “more compelling call” 176 on the
courts to redress injuries from defamatory falsehood.
Applying the Court’s minor and major considerations, the Gertz
opinion initially raised the specter of three types of public figures. It noted
the hypothetical possibility of public figuredom without “purposeful
action” of the claimant but noted that “instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare.” 177 The Court then focused on public
figures who have “assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society” and thereby “invite attention and comment.” 178 Some such
174. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added). Many scholars have strongly
criticized the assumed-risk rationale. See, e.g., Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy,
supra note 172, at 786 n.191, 812 (Professor Logan finds such “flawed because it
ignores the requirement of ‘actual voluntariness’ central” to that tort doctrine and
asks: “[S]hould the fact that millions of people recognize the name of NBA star
LeBron James strip him of the right to effectively protect his reputation from
falsehoods?”). Professor Logan proposes as one of his “retool[ing]” proposals that
the Court “could start with the low-hanging fruit” and limit those deemed to be
public figures to those where there is proof of “a truly ‘voluntary’ and meaningful
effort to engage public attention.” Id. at 762, 812; Barron, supra note 172, at 87–
89 (The internet makes the assumed-risk rationale “severely flawed,” as “[t]he
potential damage inflicted by defamatory Internet speech is substantially
magnified, as Internet publications are open to a global audience and available for
a longer, sometimes permanent duration.”); Ashdown, supra note 172, at 756–59
(Assumed risk is not a “sound rationale” for distinguishing “most public persons.
At best, the waiver theory might apply to those who seek elective office” but has
little application to a person claimed to be a “‘public official’ simply because he
holds some minor government position.” Following Professor David Anderson,
he concludes that “the waiver theory is circular. If public officials and figures
sacrifice their reputations, it is only because the Supreme Court has so
declared”—the Court has “not provided a satisfactory explanation” for this
distinction.). For other critical discussions of the assumption-of-risk rationale and
its applications, see supra text accompanying notes 61, 66–67, 92; infra text
accompanying notes 227–40, 262, 313, 339–40, 344, 348–49, 363, 365–88, 930,
963–68, 993, 1061–68.
175. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added) (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added); id. at 342 (describing those who become public
figures “by reason of the notoriety of their achievements”). The Court again
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persons “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence” that
they are treated as all-purpose public figures. 179 However, the more
common prototypes are those who “thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.” 180
After sketching its broad constructs, including the hypothetical
involuntary version, Justice Powell identified and discussed only the latter
two alternatives. 181 Although Gertz had been an officer in professional and
civic groups and was published widely in the legal areas, this substantial
recognition in limited circles 182 did not provide the “clear evidence” 183 of
“general fame or notoriety” and “pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society” 184 mandated for all-purpose public figuredom. The Court then
rejected Justice Brennan’s views in Rosenbloom. See id. at 342–44. In Justice
Brennan’s view, a negligence-by-preponderance standard for private persons
would provide inadequate breathing space. Id. at 366–68 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion).
179. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. A modern exemplar would be the Reverend Jerry
Falwell. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 n.5 (1988) (concluding
that it is clear and undisputed by the parties that Falwell is a public figure, noting
his national television program and presidency of Moral Majority).
180. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added); id. at 342 (identifying as public
persons those who become so “by reason of . . . the vigor and success with which
they seek the public’s attention . . .”). The emphasized language becomes the
pivotal focus of the Court’s later decisions. See infra text accompanying notes
181–250.
181. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52. There is no further analysis of the involuntarypublic-figure concept in any of the Court’s later analyses of public figuredom. See
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453–55 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 133–36 (1979); Wolston v. Readers Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 163–
69 (1979); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 n.3 (1986); Hustler
Mag., Inc., 485 U.S. at 51–52, 57 n.5. In a subtle way, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reinforced these two alternative approaches while ratcheting up the requirements
for such status by quoting from Chief Justice Warren’s earlier opinion in Curtis
Publishing Co. In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view, the First Amendment’s “robust
political debate . . . produce[s] speech that is critical of those who hold public
office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large.’” Hustler Mag. Inc., 485 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added)
(quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring)). See also Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1990).
182. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
183. Id. at 351–52. On the heighted burden of justification suggested by this
and other Court analyses, see supra text accompanying notes 96–112.
184. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
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stated a decided preference 185 for resolving the question by analyzing the
“nature and extent” of the defamation claimant’s “participation in the
particular controversy” 186 precipitating the defamation. Yet, in discussing
this more common “limited range of issues” (or vortex) public figure, the
Court adverted to two possibilities—i.e., a person “voluntarily injects
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy . . . .” 187 In either
version, such individuals “assume special prominence in the resolution of
public questions.” 188
Note the inherent ambiguity in the Court’s two brief analyses.
Although the hypothetical involuntary version is discarded, the Court’s “is
drawn into” dictum appears to contemplate non-injection vortex public
figures. However, the Court then calculatedly ignored this three-word
aside in its treatment of Gertz 189 and ignored it in all its successor, publicfigure opinions. 190 The Court emphasized that Gertz engaged in a very
minimal involvement at the coroner’s inquest into his client’s son’s death
at the alleged hands of a police officer, was not involved in the parallel
criminal proceedings, and limited his other representational efforts to the
filing of civil, wrongful-death litigation. 191 While such high-profile
litigation was undoubtedly certain to attract media attention, 192 Gertz had
not himself discussed it or the criminal prosecution with the media or been
quoted as having done so. 193 In sum, he did not “thrust himself” into the
public issue’s vortex or “engage the public’s attention” in trying to
influence the resolution thereof. 194

185. Id. On the significance of this analysis, see supra text accompanying note
96.
186. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
187. Id. at 351–52 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 351–52.
190. See supra text accompanying note 181.
191. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 230–32, 237–40. Gertz would have
been a public figure under pre-Gertz precedent. Accordingly, Gertz
“unmistakably signals a narrowing” of this category. See Robertson, supra note
27, at 222. As to its vortex aspect, the Court employed “intentional pursuit of
media exposure” rather than the probability of press-media interest in the specific
event.” Id. at 224.
193. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326, 352.
194. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). Note that even media-friendly Justice
Brennan agreed that Gertz could not have been viewed as a public figure at the
time of publication. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In the Rehnquist Era Court’s first post-Gertz libel case Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 195 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected both
grounds the publisher asserted for applying New York Times to the
magazine’s depiction of petitioner’s divorce as based in adultery. 196 The
Court rejected the alternative arguments that either inaccurate reportage of
judicial proceedings or of what actually occurred in court necessitated
application of that case’s “rather drastic limitations.” 197 The Court then
refuted the proposed alternative ground: petitioner’s purported vortexpublic-figure status. First, the Court concluded that the “particular public
controversy” Gertz required 198 did not equate to “all controversies of
interest to the public” such as the sensational divorce trial therein. 199
Second, respondent did not “freely choose to publicize issues” related to
her marriage. Mere use of the state’s monopoly over divorce was not truly
“voluntary in a realistic sense . . . .” 200 The few press conferences petitioner
195. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
196. Id. at 453–57.
197. Id. at 456–57. As in Rosenbloom, “[w]hatever their general validity, use
of such subject-matter classifications . . . may too often result in an improper
balance” in accommodating free expression and reputation. Id. at 456.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 204, 220–23.
199. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 (noting that divorces of wealthy individuals
might interest some element of the public but were “not the sort of ‘public
controversy’” contemplated by Gertz). Such treatment of a “cause celebre”
divorce as sufficient would reinstate Rosenbloom’s general-or-public-interest test.
Id. at 454–57.
200. Id. at 454 (emphasis added) (quoting Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 376–
77 (1971)). The Court specifically distinguished as “quite different” the
respondent’s actions from those of General Walker in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Retired General
Walker had a “long and honorable career” in the Army and had led federal troops
during the 1957 Little Rock, Arkansas desegregation controversy. Id. at 140. He
had also made a number of highly publicized incendiary statements in opposition
to federal intervention in attempting to desegregate public schools and
universities, including several to the media just prior to the complained of
defamatory statements charging him with precipitating a riotous charge on federal
marshals attempting to facilitate James Meredith’s entry into Ole Miss. Id. at 140–
41. Thus, he became a public figure “by his purposeful activity . . . thrusting . . .
his personality into the ‘vortex’ of an important public controversy . . . .” Id. at
155, 159 n.22; id. at 162–65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (noting that seven Court
members passing on the issue found Walker to be a public figure). But cf. RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 328 (2008) (concluding that Walker was an allpurpose public figure). Note that Firestone’s not “voluntary in a realistic sense”
analysis parallels the Court’s digital-technology Fourth Amendment
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held to mollify reporters did not transform her into vortex public-figure
status. 201 These press contacts should have had no impact on the
underlying legal issues and no intent to do so should be assumed. 202
Moreover, no evidence suggested plaintiff tried to use these reactive press
contacts as “a vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some
unrelated controversy . . . to influence its resolution.” 203
The fact that the Court and Justice Rehnquist clearly limited vortex
public figures to the exceedingly narrow realm of those who “thrust
themselves to the forefront” to influence the particular controversy’s
resolution is convincingly evidenced by the opinion by the dissenter on the
public-figure issue. 204 Justice Marshall initially criticized the Court’s
decision to delve into a subject-matter analysis of what was legitimately
newsworthy, i.e., “deemed relevant to the ‘affairs of society’” 205—a view

jurisprudence and its approach to the assumption-of-risk/waiver arguments
underlying the “third-party doctrine.” See Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018). In Carpenter, the Court rejected the argument under the “third-party
doctrine” that cell-phone information was voluntarily exposed and that all cellphone users assumed the risk of its warrantless disclosure to law enforcement. Id.
at 2216. The Court followed its decision in Riley v. California that cell phones
were “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” in light of their
pervasive and necessary use as part of daily existence. Accordingly, “in no
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over
[such] a comprehensive dossier” of physical movements by having and using a
cell phone. Id. at 2220 (first alteration in original); see Riley v. Cal., 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2013).
201. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454–55 n.3.
202. Id.
203. Id. That the Court placed almost exclusive emphasis on the lack of
assumed risk as Gertz’s pivotal focus is clear: “By confining inquiry to whether a
plaintiff is a public officer or public figure who might be assumed to ‘have
voluntarily exposed (himself) to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehoods,’ [the Court] sought a more appropriate accommodation between . . .
an uninhibited press and its equally compelling need for judicial redress” of
defamatory statements. Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 484–90, 489 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 487. He concluded that the Court majority had affirmed the
Rosenbloom pre-Gertz view of the Florida Supreme Court that curiosity or
sensationalism was not a matter of “real public or general concern” that should
be protected in the interest of hardy debate. Id. at 489 n.1 (emphasis added)
(quoting Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1972), the analysis of
which was later reaffirmed post-Gertz, Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172,
174–75 (Fla. 1974)). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes
429–38.
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he thought Gertz rejected in repulsing Rosenbloom. 206 He then severely
criticized the intent-to-influence focus as wrong-headed, transforming an
example of public figure status into a threshold requirement thereof. 207 To
him, Mrs. Firestone’s more-generalized voluntary conduct met the “more
important” 208 and broader Gertz assumption-of-risk rationale. She had
positioned herself in the socially prominent and sporty set, whose lives

206. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 487–89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 489 n.2. If Gertz had so intended, Butts, the University of Georgia
Athletic Director, would not have been a public figure. However, Gertz had
affirmed that determination. Id. Justice Marshall was confused. Unlike General
Walker, who was a vortex public figure, see supra text accompanying note 200,
Coach Butts was a “well-known and respected” head coach who had “overall
responsibility” for administering all the athletic programs at the University of
Georgia and who was negotiating for a professional position at the time of
publication. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1967) (plurality
opinion). He had “obtained that [public figure] status by position alone . . . .” Id.
at 155, 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (viewing Butts as in that public figure class
which “by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large”). He was, in other words, what the Court in Gertz called a general or allpurpose public figure. See supra text accompanying notes 183–84. Coach Butts
was privately paid even though he ran and had responsibility for a major
component of a state university with control over significant public moneys. By
contrast, the other head coach implicated in the alleged game “fix,” Paul “Bear”
Bryant of Alabama, was a comparably situated state employee. Id. at 137–38. One
could modernly argue that Butts was a major state actor for § 1983 purposes and
that he should be viewed as a public official under the Rosenblatt v. Baer criteria,
an argument cited and apparently rejected at that time, id. at 146–47, in favor of
an extension of New York Times to public figures. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Public
Figures, WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 914–16 (1984) [hereinafter Schauer, Public
Figures] (viewing both Walker and Butts as close analogues to the public officials
specifically covered by New York Times); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 51,
at 439 n.30 (The authors conclude that the Court’s extension of the New York
Times standard to both Butts and Walker was justified—Butts was “a quasiemployee” of a state university and Walker was a retired general.). Indeed, the
specter of different statuses for Coaches Butts and Paul “Bear” Bryant based on
the technical source of compensation would be difficult to defend. Compare the
state-actor cases involving private persons. Compare Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399 (1997) (denying qualified executive-officer immunity to privateprison guards), with Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (denying the same
immunity to private defendants utilizing replevin, attachment, and garnishment
statutes).
208. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 486 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 344–45 (1974)).

166

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

attract unbroken media attention. 209 She then chose to sue for separate
maintenance. 210 Lastly, and most importantly, she held several press
conferences. 211 Justice Marshall viewed this triad of factors as justifying a
finding of assumed risk of media scrutiny or at least entitled the media to
so assume. 212
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 213 the third media libel opinion of the
Rehnquist Court Era, the entire Court 214 agreed that petitioner, behavioral
scientist and federal-grant recipient, was not a public figure with regard to
defendant-Senator’s Golden Fleece of the Month Award 215 despite the
foreseeable local publicity his applications had generated.216 Like
innumerable other co-professionals, his applications and scholarly
writings 217 could not be said to have “invited that degree of public
attention and comment” 218 to justify vortex-public-figure status. Nor had
Hutchinson assumed any risk of enhanced scrutiny by “thrust[ing] himself
or his views into public controversy . . . .” 219 Indeed, respondents could
not even identify 220 the particular controversy Gertz mandated. 221
A mere concern about general public expenditures did not suffice, as
such a focus would subsume all recipients of research grants within public
figuredom 222—adopting a subject-matter classification at odds with the
Court’s jurisprudence. 223 In any event, any such newsworthy controversy
had been generated by respondents—who would not be allowed to
209. Id. Justice Marshall noted that Mrs. Firestone’s press references were
sufficiently frequent that she had a press-clipping subscription. Id. at 485.
210. Id. at 487. The 17-month trial and related activities generated a total of
88 articles in the leading Miami and Palm Beach newspapers. Id. at 485.
211. Id. at 485–87.
212. Id. at 486–87.
213. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
214. The sole dissenter disagreed only with the Court’s refusal to accord
Speech or Debate Clause immunity to respondents’ press releases and newsletters.
Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 114–22, 133–36.
216. Id. at 134.
217. Id. at 135.
218. Id. The Court noted that Gertz had actively engaged in community affairs and
published widely on legal matters but had not been held to be a public figure. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Clearly, the Court imposed the burden of identifying this element on
respondents. For a discussion on burdens of proof and justification, see supra text
accompanying notes 96–112.
221. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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bootstrap themselves from liability by perfecting their own defense. 224 As
to the minor or secondary right-of-response factor, the Court found any
such media access was purely responsive to the Golden Fleece Award
itself 225 and did not qualify as the “regular and continuing access” 226
characteristic of public figuredom.
In the Rehnquist Era Court’s fourth libel decision, Wolston v. Reader’s
Digest Association, 227 Justice Rehnquist wrote a powerful opinion for six
members of the Court, which restrictively construed vortex public
figuredom in a case involving a criminal contemnor whose voluntary
failure to appear under subpoena before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage 228 resulted in a brief and localized “flurry of publicity.” 229 The
Court rejected the lower courts’ generalized, assumption-of-risk, invitedcomment-and-attention analysis, 230 concluding such was insufficient, as a
matter of law, for public-figure status. 231 Wolston’s voluntary course of
conduct, knowing it was certain to generate press attention, was, like that
of Gertz, wholly insufficient.232 Wolston’s contempt citation, although
newsworthy, did not “automatically transform[]” him into a public
figure. 233 To do so would effectively revive the repudiated Rosenbloom
test. 234 The Court also rejected a parallel per se rule as to anyone who
224. Id. The Court concluded: “Clearly, those charged with defamation
cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a
public figure.” Id. (citing Wolston v. Readers Dig. Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167–
68 (1979)).
225. Id. at 135–36.
226. Id. at 136.
227. Wolston, 443 U.S. 157.
228. Id. at 161–63.
229. Id. at 162–63 (noting that the six-week period resulted in 15 stories
discussing these events in the Washington and New York press but that Wolston
largely succeeded thereafter in returning to his previous private life).
230. Id. at 165. The district court concluded Wolston “became involved in a
controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that invited attention and
comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in knowing about his
connection with espionage . . . .” Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 167, 178 n.33 (D.D.C. 1977). The court of appeals drew a parallel
conclusion that Wolston “stepped center front into the spotlight focused on the
investigation of Soviet espionage. In short, by his voluntary action he invited
attention and comment in connection with the public questions involved . . . .”
Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, Inc., 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
231. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166–68.
232. Id. at 167.
233. Id. at 167–68.
234. Id.
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engaged in criminal conduct for purposes of media comment thereon, as
such would “create an ‘open season’” for those who wish to defame
individuals convicted of crime. 235 In resounding language, the Court
mandated that a defamation defendant show “more than mere
newsworthiness” to justify imposing New York Times’s demanding
requirements. 236
Justice Rehnquist took exceptional care to emphasize that petitioner
had not “engaged the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the
resolution of the issues involved” or any other issue therein, 237 for
example, by inviting a contempt citation to use the occasion as a “fulcrum
to create public discussion” 238 regarding an investigation or prosecution.
In sum, the Court found no ground whatsoever for concluding Wolston
“relinquished, to any degree,” his interest in protecting his name and
reputation. 239 The extraordinary narrowness of the Court’s vortex-publicfigure standard is compellingly evidenced by the strident alarm in the
concurring opinion of Justices Blackmun and Marshall, that the Court
specifically seemed to hold that one becomes a vortex public figure “only
if he literally or figuratively ‘mounts a rostrum’ to advocate a particular
view.” 240
The last Court opinion revolving around a dispute about public-figure
status was a two-party dissent from denial of certiorari in Lorain Journal
Co. v. Milkovich, 241 in which Justices Brennan and Marshall sharply
criticized the Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion that a locally and
nationally prominent high-school wrestling coach met neither the allpurpose nor vortex-public-figure standards regarding a public controversy
centered around allegations that the coach had purportedly precipitated a
melee at a wrestling match. 242 Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded
235. Id. at 168–69 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 467 (1976)).
236. Id. at 167–68 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 168.
238. Id. (There was no evidence his appearance was intended to or in fact had
“any effect on any issue of public concern.”).
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 169–72 (emphasis added) (Blackmun, J., with Marshall, J.,
concurring) (rejecting any necessity “to adopt so restrictive” a viewpoint on the
facts before it, and concurring in the result, applying a passage-of-time rationale).
See infra text accompanying notes 311–16, 329, 336–45.
241. Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 960–64 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
with Marshall, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 962; see Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1194–95
(Ohio 1984). On Milkovich’s local and national prominence (at least in wrestling
circles), see id. at 1194–95 n.1; Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 963 n.7 (Brennan, J.,
with Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the close analogy to Coach Butts in Curtis
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this limited, two-part focus on “narrowly defined” 243 categories had
transformed “merely descriptive” 244 standards in the Court’s libel
jurisprudence into “rigid, technical standards.” 245 Emphasizing the
public’s interest in discussing matters of “legitimate public concern,” 246
the dissenters asserted that, while a mere nexus to a public controversy did
not suffice, 247 public-figure status extended to “major figures around
which a controversy rages.” 248 In other words, it would suffice that a
person “voluntarily injects [oneself]” into a controversy “or is drawn into
a particular public controversy.” 249 In their view, Milkovich was “clearly
the major player” 250 in the controversy at issue. The clear majority
appeared to disagree.
IV. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND PUBLIC OFFICIAL STATUS
As the author has demonstrated elsewhere, 251 the Court delved, postNew York Times, 252 into the issue of who constitutes a public official in
Publishing Co. and that except for “a few rather flamboyant figures who gain
national exposure,” most coaches are like Butts and Milkovich—prominent
locally and within their athletic circles). The analogy to Coach Butts is specious.
See supra text accompanying note 207.
243. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 960 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
See THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 4–5
(Vincent Blasi, ed., 1983) (concluding that the Court’s precedent had developed
a “very narrow definition” of public figure).
244. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 962.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 963.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 963 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351). Of
course, this “drawn into” language has been subsequently ignored and appears to
be at odds with Gertz and its collective Rehnquist Era Court progeny. See infra
text accompanying notes 359–88.
250. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 963 n.8.
251. See David A. Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt
v. Baer Criteria—A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades after New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 589–95 (1985) [hereinafter Elder,
Public Officialdom].
252. New York Times declined to delineate in detail “how far down into the
lower ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation would
extend . . . or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not
be included.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 n.23 (1964). During
oral argument, Justice Harlan raised this issue—who would be encompassed
within the public-official category—and stated that “I would not want to foreclose
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the important decision of Rosenblatt v. Baer. 253 In that case, the Court
outlined two general tests for public-official status—the “substantial
responsibility” 254 and “independent interest.” 255 However, the Court took
obvious pains to ensure that public officialdom is not based merely on
governmental affiliation or employment plus media-generated
newsworthiness. 256 The Court appended an extremely important and
narrowing qualification to the independent-interest test: it is not sufficient
for application of New York Times that a story merely “catches the public
interest,” as such would “virtually disregard” society’s strong interest in
protecting reputation. 257 The particular position must be such that it would
“invite public scrutiny and discussion” of the holder thereof separate and
apart from the “scrutin[y] and discussion occasioned by” the specific
charges at issue. 258 In rejecting media-generated bootstrapping, the Court
came to two significant but ignored conclusions. A night watchman or
security guard would not so qualify, 259 and the petitioner before it—a

a cop, a clerk, or some other minor public official from ordinary libel suits without
a great deal more thought.” David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 229, 243 n.96 (2014) (citing KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL:
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
187–88 (1993)). As Professor Anderson notes, all such have become public
officials. Id. at 243 n.96. See also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:1.
253. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
254. Id. at 85 (The status “applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy
of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”).
255. Id. at 86 (The Court’s jurisprudential policies are also met “[w]here a
position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who
holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance
of all government employees . . . .”).
256. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 589–95, 622–25, 659–79.
257. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13. For further discussions of reputation, see
supra text accompanying notes 14, 30, 44–45, 93–94, 102–03, 108, 135, 154,
168–69; infra text accompanying notes 507, 599–600, 858, 868–903, 972–73,
1023, 1041.
258. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13.
259. Id. The Court was responding to Justice Douglas’s argument that “if free
discussion of public issues is the guide, I see no way to . . . exclude that night
watchman, the file clerk, the typist, or, for that matter, anyone on the public payroll.”
Id. at 89 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). This analogy has been ignored
in generally cryptic and conclusory discussions in the lower-court cases. See Elder,
Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 594, 594 n.56, 663, 675–78.
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supervisor for a county recreation district—might so qualify. 260
Importantly, on remand the state court held that plaintiff’s general
responsibility over financial matters and overall supervisory powers over
the recreation area were insufficient under Rosenblatt. 261
The Rehnquist Era Court provided several, clear indications during the
post-Rosenbloom era that the Rosenblatt criteria remains alive, well, and
controlling even if lower courts often disregard it. First, the Court
coequally applied its primary “compelling normative consideration” of
assumption-of-risk and the minor or secondary access or self-help criteria
to determinations of public-official status. 262 Second, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. the Court cryptically and perfunctorily, but importantly,
rejected as not worthy of serious discussion the argument that attorneys as
officers of the court are “de facto public official[s]” as “distort[ing] its
plain meaning . . . beyond all recognition.” 263 Third, on the same day as
260. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 (citing the tactical arguments respondent—
constrained by his lack of specific identification—had made to the effect that his
management role was “so prominent and important” that the public viewed him
as accountable for the recreation area’s operations). On the First Amendment
issues revolving around libels-of-government, “of and concerning,” and group
defamation raised by Rosenblatt, see David A. Elder, Small Town Police Forces,
Other Governmental Entities and the Misapplication of the First Amendment to
the Small Group Defamation Theory—A Plea for Fundamental Fairness for
Mayberry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881 (2004) [hereinafter Elder, Small Town].
261. See Baer v. Rosenblatt, 237 A.2d 130, 132–33 (N.H. 1967). Defendant
had the burden of demonstrating the privileged occasion. Id. at 133. On the
burden-of-proof issue, see supra text accompanying notes 95–112. On the impact
of Rosenblatt on remand, see infra text accompanying note 301.
262. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–52 (1974). See also supra
text accompanying notes 59–60. Professor Usman agrees with the author’s
conclusion that extension of public-official status to “low-level public
employees” is “antithetical to the general reasoning behind the Gertz framework.”
Usman, supra note 172, at 976–77, 984. He proposes and defends an expanded
involuntary-public-figure status as an alternative. See generally id.; see also infra
note 363.
263. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. Even media-protective Justice Brennan agreed
with this part of the Court’s opinion. See id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). On
the public-official issue, the Court briefly referenced petitioner’s limited service
years earlier on housing committees by appointment of the mayor of Chicago but
noted that at the time of the defamatory publication he had never had “any
remunerative governmental position.” Id. at 351. While remuneration is obviously
not controlling on the public-official status issue, the Court seems to be suggesting
that it is a relevant, if not important, factor in determining whether the Court’s
assumption-of-risk criterion is met. On the latter, see supra text accompanying
notes 173–76, 262.
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Gertz, the Court issued Letter Carriers v. Austin, 264 which reaffirmed the
extension of New York Times to any and all defamation in the labor-dispute
context. Importantly, no member of the Court 265 even hinted that
plaintiffs’ specific governmental status as postal workers defamed in a
union newsletter paper separately and independently warranted First
Amendment protection under New York Times and Rosenblatt. Fourth, in
a massively important footnote in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 266 the Court
expressly and unequivocally rejected the suggestion that public official
status encompassed all public employees. 267 Fifth, the Court has
eloquently reiterated the view that media-generated newsworthiness never
suffices for public-figure status 268—a position that would preclude a

264. Nat’l Assoc. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280–87 (1974).
Although certiorari was originally granted on the alternative ground of First
Amendment protection, id. at 270, the Court did not reach the issue since federal
labor law protected the statements. Id. at 283 n.15. Only Justice Douglas discussed
the issue and alternatively found such absolutely protected in accordance with his
previously stated opposition to all defamation law. Id. at 287–91 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
265. See generally id.
266. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979).
267. Id. The Court noted that the district court had found that plaintiff was a
public official, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327–28 (W.D. Wis.
1977), but that the court of appeals did not determine whether this was a correct
resolution. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.14 (7th Cir. 1978).
The Court “express[ed] no opinion” thereon but then proceeded to provide that
the lack of “precise boundaries” in prior precedent, presumably Rosenblatt,
“cannot be thought to include all public employees, however.” Hutchinson, 443
U.S. at 119 n.8. The district court cited the fact that Hutchinson had held the
“important public position” of research director at Kalamazoo State Hospital at
the time of the defamation and had been treated as a “responsible public official”
by federal administrative entities that subsidized his research. Hutchinson, 431 F.
Supp. at 1327–28. Hutchinson had likewise previously held a parallel position at
Fort Custer State Home. Id. at 1316. Both were under the control and direction of
the Michigan State Department of Mental Health. Id. at 1317. Accordingly, he
was a state employee while in these positions. In addition, he was an adjunct
professor at Western Michigan University, a state entity, during most of the period
covered by the Golden Fleece Award. Id. at 1316. Shortly after receiving the
award, the hospital’s research division was closed, and Hutchinson transferred his
funding to the non-profit Foundation for Behavioral Research, where he was
research director. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114–15.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 224, 233–36.
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partially revitalized Rosenbloom in which government-paycheck reception
plus newsworthiness suffices for public official status. 269
A long-running libel case, Milkovich v. News-Herald 270—one in which
Justice Brennan, the media’s most constituently media-protective nonabsolutist 271 dissented thrice 272—unequivocally and dramatically reflects
the appropriately restrictive view of public-official status under
Rosenblatt. The Ohio Supreme Court determined that a well-known high
school wrestling coach was not a public official, 273 rejecting an Oklahoma
Supreme Court grade school wrestling coach case Johnson v. Corinthian
Television Corp.’s 274 holding to the contrary. Any other conclusion would
“unduly exaggerate” the public-official designation beyond its original
intention in Rosenblatt. 275 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from
denial of certiorari by the Rehnquist Era Court, arguing that this seriously
269. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 663–64 (noting that the
“Siamese twin” to the Rosenbloom test was the “governmental affiliation”
concept (governmental employment and “newsworthiness” or “public interest”)
and that the “latter correlative illegitimate was indefensible under Rosenblatt and
has been implicitly disavowed by Gertz and its offspring”).
270. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1984); see infra text
accompanying notes 241–50.
271. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 614.
272. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (Brennan, J., with
Marshall, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 567–619; Lorain J.
Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting);
see supra text accompanying notes 241–50; Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S.
966 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273. Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1195–96.
274. Johnson v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
275. Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1196. Later, in a companion case, Scott v. News
Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 702–04 (Ohio 1986), the court specifically held that a
municipal superintendent met both Rosenblatt tests. Id. at 703. It also found that
the perjury charges related to Scott’s conduct and actions while superintendent.
Id. Scott’s retired status at the time of the hearing was not relevant since the
alleged defamation arose from his official actions and related to the community’s
interest in a public official’s duties. Id. at 703 n.2. Lastly, the court also opined
that both Milkovich and Scott were “authority figures,” public officials, and
public figures. Id. at 703. Anomalously, the court cited the earlier BrennanMarshall opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari. See infra text accompanying
notes 276–81. The court broadly overruled Milkovich’s “restrictive view” of who
was a public official. Id. at 704. Before the Supreme Court in Milkovich III, see
infra text accompanying notes 567–619, the respondents contended that the earlier
Milkovich determination that Milkovich was a private person had been repudiated.
The Court, however, viewed that language as dicta and not binding on a non-party
under Ohio law. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 10 n.5.
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misinterpreted 276 Rosenblatt. In their view, public school educators were
undoubtedly central to public schools’ important functions in inculcating
citizenship values and responsibilities. 277
The Ohio Supreme Court decision is clearly correct under Gertz and
its progeny’s strongly pro-reputation jurisprudence, 278 which, to quote
Justices Brennan and Marshall’s criticism, reflects “an exceptionally
narrow” 279 interpretation of public personage, including public-official
276. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 958 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 958–60 (relying primarily on the Court’s equal-protection cases
holding that government was not barred from excluding aliens from teaching in
public schools and finding that the schoolteacher was “unquestionably the central
figure” in the public educational system).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 25–144, 162–250, 262–69.
279. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 954 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
For an excellent opinion consistent with the strong intimations in the Rehnquist
Era Court opinions and correctly reflecting Justices Brennan’s and Marshall’s
view that the majority had greatly narrowed public-official status, see O’Connor
v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1218–20 (Utah 2007). This case involved a
teacher-coach of a high school women’s basketball team. Id. at 1220. The court
acknowledged that athletics had an “ever-more prominent position” in popular
culture but nonetheless limited public officialdom to those in public education in
“supervisory and policy-making positions more comprehensive” than persons like
plaintiff who “struck no such bargain” to forego protection of reputation. Id. The
court discussed in detail the “apparent importance” and “independent interest”
test in light of the footnote 13 qualification and concluded that the New York Times
standard is limited to those persons whose scope of responsibilities are likely to
influence matters of public policy in the civil—as distinguished from the cultural,
educational, or sports—realms. Id. at 1218; see supra text accompanying notes
257–59.
The “apparent importance” of a position in government sufficient to
propel a government employee into a public official status has nothing
to do with the breadth or depth of the passion or degree of interest that
the government official might ignite in a segment of the public. Nor is
celebrity, for good or ill, of the government employee particularly
relevant. Rather, it is the nature of the government responsibility that
guides our public official inquiry. The public official roster is comprised
exclusively of individuals in whom the authority to make policy
affecting life, liberty, or property has been invested. Likewise, only those
issues that have such bearing on civil life as to fairly touch on matters
that in the eyes of the law concern life, liberty or property may be traced
to the actions of a public official. So viewed, high school athletics can
claim no “apparent importance.” The policies and actions of any high
school athletic team do not affect in any material way the civic affairs of
a community—the affairs most citizens would understand to be the real
work of government.
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status. 280 Incongruously, the teacher-coach was thought by the dissenters
to fulfill both the Rosenblatt tests aforementioned. 281 There is, of course,
little in logic, public policy, or simple fairness to justify this, 282 and the
rest of the Court apparently agreed.
The Brennan-Marshall dissent reflected two other flagrant
misinterpretations or misapplications of Rosenblatt. First, Rosenblatt did
not, of course, hold 283 that the petitioner therein was a public official.
Second, what the Johnson case predominantly relied on was itself fatally
defective. It did not discuss 284 and was apparently unaware of Rosenblatt’s
important footnote-13 qualification. 285 This is evidenced by Johnson’s
primary reliance in finding an “independent interest” on the bootstrapping
conclusion that large numbers of parents had withdrawn students from
plaintiff’s classes as a result of press attention to libelous charges of
student abuse. 286 The more defensible, indeed only defensible, view is that
such low-ranking teachers lack access to the media and 287 have not forgone
the right to protect reputation like those in elected and policy positions. 288
Any governance or control over government is “at most remote and
philosophical.” 289

O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1219. See also McQuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 827
(Minn. 2019) (following O’Connor and noting that four out of the five recent
cases had refused to extend public-official status to high school coaches).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 162–250, 262–69.
281. Lorain J. Co., 474 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that teachers per se “possess a high degree of responsibility and
discretion” in implementing “a basic governmental obligation” and that they selfevidently and obviously met the “independent interest” test). See ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 200, at 320–21 n.50 (agreeing with Brennan and Marshall).
282. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:1; Elder, Public
Officialdom, supra note 251, at 659–73. See also supra text accompanying notes
251–81; infra text accompanying notes 283–301.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 260–61.
284. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103–04 (Okla.
1978) (noting that there was “no higher community involvement touching more
families and carrying more public interest than the public school system,”
including athletics).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 257–59.
286. Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103.
287. See True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986).
288. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984).
289. Franklin v. Benevolent etc. Ord. of Elks, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (New York Times and Rosenblatt are based in “the concept of a
freedom of the [g]overned to question the [g]overnor, of those who are influenced
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Although a state may adopt more media-protective, public-official
criteria as a matter of state law, 290 Gertz and family 291 have undoubtedly
revitalized the Rosenblatt criteria with its “motivating force,” i.e., “a
strong interest in debate about those persons . . . in a position significantly
to influence the resolution of [public] issues.” 292 A substantial post-Gertz
minority has trenchantly applied these revitalized criteria.293 It is projected
that the Court will eventually specifically adopt and affirm the rejection of
the unconscionable governmental-affiliation-public-interest, lower-court
interpretation based on a pervasive misreading of Rosenblatt. 294 In light of
Rosenblatt’s rejection of a governmental “night watchman” as a “public

by the operation of government to criticize those who [c]ontrol the conduct of
government.” (emphasis added)).
290. See supra text accompanying note 275; infra text accompanying notes
296, 615–16.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 261–69.
292. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (emphasis added). The
Rosenblatt Court initially identified two motivating factors. Id. The other was “a
strong interest in debate on public issues.” Id. (emphasis added). Note that this factor
has been persuasively and irreparably repudiated by Gertz and progeny and would
not alone justify extension of New York Times in the post-Gertz era. See supra text
accompanying notes 162–269. What remains is the two-part test, footnote 13, and
the overweening “position significantly to influence” rationale. See Rosenblatt, 383
U.S. at 85; Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 592 n.51.
293. As Justice Brennan suggested in 1985, the cases were in “general
disarray” on the application of New York Times to varying types of public
employees. Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 959 n.3 (1985) (Brennan,
J., with Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Cf. Elder, Public
Officialdom, supra note 251, at 667–68 (noting that Rosenblatt’s careful analysis
had been “generally grossly misinterpreted, flagrantly misapplied, or blatantly
ignored” in lower court opinions). However, even at that time, a “growing
minority” view had rejected an overly expansive interpretation of Rosenblatt. Id.
at 640. This narrowing trend has continued apace, with a significant number of
decisions now compellingly rejecting a knee-jerk equation of public official with
“government affiliation” and any matter of public interest, with many such issued
after Hutchinson’s footnote eight caveat. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note
92, § 5:1.
294. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 659–80. Compare Professor
David Logan’s suggestion, as part of the Court’s possible “retool[ing]” efforts,
that the Court might limit New York Times by “return[ing] to the seditious libel
justification” for New York Times and “imposing stiff scienter requirements only
when the plaintiffs are high enough up in government that they make, rather than
implement, public policy.” Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at
762, 812.
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official,” it is not even clear that the near consensus per se rule 295 that all
police officers—regardless of rank—are public officials remains
defensible. 296 Despite undoubted confusion on this issue, 297 the Court
itself has never adopted such a position. 298 Lower courts applying the per
se rule have almost never discussed the night watchmen analysis. 299
Accordingly, had the issue been before it, the Rehnquist Era Court would
likely have viewed the low-level beat cop and probationary police officer
as mere private persons employed by the government under Gertz—not
public officials—because they are not persons “in a position significantly
to influence the resolution of [public] issues.” 300 Justice Rehnquist would
295. Compare ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:1 n.120 (noting the
“overwhelming majority” rule), with id. § 5:1 nn.170–75; infra text accompanying
notes 259, 296–99.
296. As the author has said elsewhere, “Can the latter federal security officer
be distinguished in any principled fashion from the beat policeman, the
undercover agent, the radio dispatcher, the part-time deputy, the uniformed
taxicab inspector, or the officer in the communications department,” all of whom
have at times been held public officials? See Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note
251, at 678 (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying note 259. Of
course, state courts could adopt such a bright-line rule as a matter of state law. See
Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 665, 671; supra text accompanying
notes 275, 290; infra text accompanying notes 615–16.
297. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 675–78.
298. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court accepted for
“purposes of this case” only the Louisiana court’s determination that a parish
deputy sheriff was a public official. Id. at 730. Similarly, in Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279 (1971), the Court accepted the lower court’s determination that a
deputy chief of detectives of Chicago was a public official. Id. at 284. The sole
issue before the Court was the sufficiency of evidence of constitutional malice.
Id. In another case, the Court correctly treated the chief of police of Clarksville,
Mississippi, as a public official. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). Other
cases cited to or decided by the Court involved parallel high-ranking law
enforcement officers. New York Times cited positively two fair-comment cases.
See Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 720 (Mich. 1959) (deputy superintendent
of police of Detroit); Snively v. Rec. Pub. Co., 198 P. 1, 2 (Cal. 1921) (Los
Angeles chief of police); see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.3
(1964). Two criminal-libel cases involved parallel ranking police victims. See
Moity v. La., 379 U.S. 201 (1964) (sheriff); Ashton v. Ky., 384 U.S. 195, 200–01
(1966) (sheriff, chief of police). Of course, there is a “quantum difference in
functions, authority, and responsibilities” of a chief of police or Chicago deputy
chief of detectives and a low-ranking police officer at the bottom of police
officialdom. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 677–78.
299. Id. at 675–78. See also supra note 259.
300. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (emphasis added).
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no doubt have concurred with the view of Justice Souter while on the New
Hampshire Supreme Court that a part-time deputy sheriff was not, as a
matter of law, a public official.301
V. THE PUBLIC-VERSUS-PRIVATE PERSON DICHOTOMY AND
UNRESOLVED CONTROVERSIES: THE EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF TIME AND
INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGUREDOM
In light of the Court’s Four Horsemen of Public Figuredom, 302 two
applications of this quartet are worthy of further consideration. How would
the Rehnquist Era Court have resolved the impact of passage of time on
public-figure status? 303 How would it have dealt with the oxymoronic
concept of involuntary public figuredom? 304 As to the former, Rosenblatt
v. Baer 305 briefly discussed passage of time in the public-official
context. 306 By contrast, the opinions in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest
301. In Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 498 A.2d 348 (N.H. 1985), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Souter held that a jury could
find that a city patrolman was outside the Rosenblatt criteria, i.e., within “the
lower ranks, without substantial responsibility for the control over the conduct of
governmental affairs.” Id. at 353. Justice Souter followed the court’s earlier
decision before he joined the court in McCusker v. Valley News, 428 A.2d 493,
495 (N.H. 1981), declining to find that a 78-year-old, part-time deputy sheriff
working for his brother, the elected county sheriff, was a public official as a matter
of law. Noteworthily, the Rehnquist Era Court denied certiorari without a single
dissenting vote. See Valley News v. McCusker, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981). The statecourt opinions followed the approach of Rosenblatt on remand. See supra text
accompanying note 261. Compare Nash, 498 A.2d 348, and McCusker, 428 A.2d
493, with the grossly unfair result in Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broading &
Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187 (1986).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 162–240.
303. See infra text accompanying notes 305–58.
304. See infra text accompanying notes 358–88.
305. For a discussion of Rosenblatt and its public official criteria, see supra
text accompanying notes 253–61, 292–94.
306. The Court concluded it could not be “seriously contended” that plaintiff’s
absence from a supervisory relationship at the time of publication had “decisional
significance.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 n.14 (1966). “To be sure, there
may be cases where a person is so far removed from a former position of authority
that comment on the manner in which he performed his responsibilities no longer
has the interest necessary to justify the New York Times rule.” Id. However, in this
case the area’s management remained “a matter of lively public interest . . . .” Id.
Proposals for additional change were circulating, and the interest in the previous
administration’s performance “continued strong.” Id. (emphasis added). Note that
Rosenblatt involved a situation where there was only an abbreviated period since
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Association did not mention Rosenblatt’s discussion of passage of time. 307
As indicated above, 308 the Wolston majority confronted the broader issue
of Wolston’s public figure status in 1958 and did not reach the much
narrower issue of his status at the time of publication in 1974. 309
Justice Brennan dissented in Wolston, agreeing with the court of
appeals that Wolston was a public figure at both times. 310 Justices
Blackmun and Marshall concurred in the result on the sole, more-limited
ground that Wolston had receded to private-person status under Gertz in
the 16 years culminating in the 1974 publication. 311 The latter Justices,
often thought to be very sensitive to the media on liability issues, 312 found
that passage of time was highly relevant to both Gertz criteria for public
figuredom. 313 Whatever Wolston’s access to the means of response in
1958, it “strain[ed] credulity” to believe he could generate such in 1974. 314
Furthermore, his calculated efforts to reassume anonymity during the 16-

plaintiff had been a public servant and did not involve a case where the media
resuscitated interest in a former public official. See id.; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra
note 92, § 5:4; supra text accompanying note 275.
307. See Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 159–69 (1979); id. at
169–72 (Blackmun, J., with Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 172 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 227–40.
309. See supra text accompanying note 240. The Court noted that petitioner
had abandoned the lapse-of-time issue in proceedings before the Court. Wolston,
443 U.S. at 166 n.7.
310. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited to and relied
upon a perfunctory discussion by the court of appeals, which relied solely on a
dictum in Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion
of Meeropol, see infra text accompanying note 345.
311. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 169–72 (Blackmun, J., with Marshall, J.,
concurring).
312. For example, Justice Blackmun joined in the short-lived Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. decision. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30
(1971). He later backed off to ensure a clear majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). His Rosenbloom media protectiveness self-revived in his support for
neutral reportage in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton. See
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); see generally
supra text accompanying note 240; supra text accompanying notes 454–77. As to
Justice Marshall, see supra text accompanying notes 204–12, 240, 241–50, 270–
77, 279–86; infra text accompanying notes 454–77, 730–34.
313. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 170–72 (Blackmun, J., with Marshall, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 171.
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year period negated any suggestion of assumed risk. 315 Undeniably, this
posture opened historians to greater potential liability. However, this
enhanced possible liability did not countervail First Amendment values
but merely reflected the additional time historians have for contemplation,
investigation, and verification. 316
In light of the Wolston opinions, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Street
v. National Broadcasting Co. 317 is worth analyzing in detail to project how
the Rehnquist Era Court, which had granted certiorari, 318 would have
resolved the case had it not settled—apparently because of significant and
justified concerns in the media community that the media would suffer yet
another devastating loss. 319 The Street case involved a docudrama about
the infamous “Scottsboro Boys” trials and Southern justice in the
1930’s. 320 Plaintiff was the supposed victim-sole prosecutrix. 321 The
award-winning docudrama adopted the view of a “courageous and
tragic” 322 judge but ignored that of the state and prosecutrix. 323 The Sixth
Circuit majority opinion by Judge Merritt held that Street’s prominence,

315. Id. (while suggesting that by ignoring the grand-jury subpoena in 1978,
he may have foreseen such a refusal would “invite critical commentary from the
press”).
316. Id.
317. Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
318. Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., cert granted, 454 U.S. 815 (1981), cert.
dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (by stipulation of the parties).
319. For a discussion of the string of plaintiff victories in the period 1974–
1979, see supra text accompanying notes 25–68, 92–112, 162–240; infra text
accompanying notes 710–23. See also Fred Barbash, A Bizarre Epilogue to the
Scottsboro Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1982, A1 (noting the confidential nature of
the settlement, the fact that plaintiff had thereafter bought a house with cash, and
concluding that the passage-of-time issue was one the television network “was
not eager to have [the Court] decide”).
320. Street, 645 F.2d at 1229–30 (tracing the lengthy history of the cases
through the state system and the United States Supreme Court, with the latter
reversing convictions twice and denying certiorari in one of the companion cases
following a fourth retrial; noting that the final Scottsboro defendant was not
paroled until 1950).
321. Id. at 1234.
322. Id. at 1229. The court found that the “element of balance and neutrality”
required for application of the fair-report privilege to judicial proceedings was
absent. Id. at 1233.
323. Id. at 1233.

2022]

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

181

then contemporaneous access to the media, and aggressive promotion of
her version of the rape charges made her a vortex public figure. 324
The Merritt majority rejected any suggestion that the ensuing four
decades—relying on a historian’s account, defendants thought she was
dead 325—and Street’s obscurity had caused her to recede from public
figure status. She remained a public figure as to any later evaluation or
critique of the Scottsboro Boys cases and the issues of racial justice related
thereto—a “living controversy.” 326 The majority preeminently relied on
the need for “sufficient breathing room” 327 by not inducing chilling-effectself-censorship by those writing historically. 328 The majority took a
position directly and unequivocally at odds with Justice Blackmun and
Marshall’s concurrence in Wolston 329 as to the impact of the passage of
time on media access of now-obscure persons 330 and the defendant’s
absence of time deadlines. 331 The Merritt majority said nothing about the
324. Id. at 1233–35. The court majority found the “most troublesome issue” to
be Street’s voluntarily thrusting of herself into the controversy. Id. at 1234. It
declined to resolve this issue based on whether her accusations were false, and
thus voluntary, or whether she was in fact raped and a true victim, and, thus, an
involuntary participant. Id. Here, however, issues of her voluntariness were not
inextricably intertwined with the underlying truth of the charges. She had
“aggressively promoted” her side of the case to the media. Id. at 1235. Judge Peck
agreed that Street was “unquestionably” a public figure during the Scottsboro Boy
trials. Id. at 1248 (Peck, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 1230; id. at 1248 n.3 (Peck, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 1235–36.
327. Id. at 1236.
328. Id. (Public-figure status “promotes a forceful exchange of views.”); id.
(“A contrary rule would tend to restrain efforts to shed new light on historical
events and reconsideration of past errors.”).
329. See supra text accompanying note 240; infra text accompanying notes
339–46.
330. Street, 645 F.2d at 1235. Incredibly, without any citation to authority and
in the face of common sense, Judge Merritt concluded: “Past public figures who
now live in obscurity do not lose their access to channels of communication if
they choose to comment on their role in the past public controversy.” Id. at 1236.
Judge Merritt offered no data supporting such a conclusion and offered no
suggestions about how such an obscure person would go about responding.
Compare Judge Peck’s response in infra text accompanying notes 341–45, with
supra text accompanying note 172. For discussions of the internet and social
media access, see infra the text accompanying notes 329–30, 465, 511, 1032,
1049–52, 1059, 1061–66, 1069, 1072, 1081.
331. Judge Merritt rejected the absence of journalistic time pressures and
deadlines as having little impact as to the reportage accurately of long-distant
events: “Although information may come to light over the course of time, the
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Rehnquist Era Court’s controlling “compelling normative” 332 assumptionof-risk jurisprudential policy. 333 Judge Merritt’s emphasis focused almost
exclusively on the fact that some very controversial and historically
newsworthy controversies’ symbolism had an “overlay of political
meaning.” 334 To the Street court, the issue would have been the same had
the courageous but later obscure judge brought a claim. 335
In dissent, Judge Peck excoriated the majority for ignoring Gertz and
resuscitating Rosenbloom 336 and found “no convincing reason in law or
policy” 337 for its conclusion. If protection of such vigorous debate were
the sole concern, no public-figure, private-figure dichotomy would be
necessary. 338 Adopting the Blackmun and Marshall position in Wolston,
Judge Peck concluded that the passage of time measurably lessened the
“inevitability of demonstrable error” 339 and justified a negligence
distance of years does not necessarily make more data available to a reporter:
memories fade; witnesses forget; sources disappear.” Street, 645 F.2d at 1236.
332. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). See supra text
accompanying notes 60, 173–76, 178–224, 227–40.
333. Street, 645 F.2d at 1235–36.
334. Id. at 1236–37 (“The mere passage of time does not automatically
diminish the significance of events or the public’s need for information.”).
335. Id. at 1237 (discussing application of the constitutional-malice standard
and noting that in such controversial historical acts and events, “[s]peech . . .
becomes in part political speech” and that the historian or dramatist should be
allowed to defame or portray even the trial judge—a long-term obscure private
person—falsely unless the New York Times standard were met).
336. Id. at 1247–48 (Peck, J., dissenting) (concluding this approach
reestablished a public-interest test that was “standardless, easily manipulated, and
no more speech-protective than the judges who happen to be applying it”).
337. Id. at 1246.
338. Id. at 1247.
339. Id. To Judge Merritt’s conclusion on the enhanced difficulties of
verification with passage of time, see supra notes 327–31, Judge Peck replied that
“a negligence standard does not expect a writer to discover what is forever lost.”
Id. at 1250. “When truth is unknowable, falsity, and hence defamation, cannot be
proven.” Id. Judge Peck also derided the majority’s implicit assumption that the
New York Times standard necessarily accorded defendants “breathing space,” that
“ultimate liability” was only marginally affected by such, and that more important
considerations were probability of suit and cost of defense. Id. (quoting TRIBE,
supra note 30, at 643) (Peck, J., dissenting). Post-Herbert v. Lando, litigation
costs were unlikely to vary depending on whether the New York Times or Gertz
standard applied. Id. Judge Peck seriously questioned whether their different
standards measurably affect editorial decisions: “Invocation of New York Times
. . . does not exorcise what to the majority is the demon of self-censorship. Only
abolition of the torts of defamation and invasion of privacy can do that, and that
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standard. 340 Furthermore, Street, a nonentity 341 at the time of publication
of the actionable matter, 342 had neither access to the media 343 nor had she
assumed the risk 344 of defamation or false light at that time. Judge Peck
found no supporting authority 345 for treating such a historically obscure
person as subject to the New York Times standard.
abolition is a price measured in individual dignity that our Constitution does not
exact.” Id. at 1250 (Peck, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the negative impact
of the constitutional-malice standard on both plaintiff and defendant interests, see
infra text accompanying notes 914–25, 972–81, 1017–81.
340. Street, 645 F.2d at 1247 n.1, 1249–50 (Peck, J., dissenting). Tennessee
had adopted a negligence standard for private persons post-Gertz. Id. at 1249–50.
Note that all members of the panel agreed that no constitutional malice could be
shown, as defendant relied on two apparently responsible sources. Id. at 1237,
1239. They also agreed that if the negligence standard applied, Street had made a
submissible case as to the second showing. Id. at 1236 n.6, 1247 n.1, 1249–50
(Peck, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 1248 (Peck, J., dissenting).
342. Id.
343. Id. Gertz “encourages and expects” public figures to be “uninhibited,
robust debaters.” Id. However, Street could not modernly counter such
docudramas, which “literally reach the entire nation in ‘gripping’ displays.” Id.
344. Id. (disparaging the majority’s implicit conclusion of assumption of risk
based on a non-enumerated series of interviews four decades earlier and
concluding that “[f]ew people assume the risk that the most personal aspects of
their lives will be presented to the nation as dramatic entertainments”).
345. Id. at 1248–49. The only extant citation was Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Judge Peck in
dissent interpreted the Street majority as “sub silentio” concluding that public
figuredom endures as long as the precipitating controversy. Street, 645 F.2d at
1249 (Peck, J., dissenting). In Meeropol, the lower court noted that plaintiffs did
not and could not claim lack of access to “the channels of effective
communication.” Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The
court viewed the just-issued Gertz decision as “severely limited” to the facts
before it and found that the adopted, renamed Rosenberg sons’ renunciation of
any “public spotlight” did not preclude their public figure status under Gertz. Id.
As children, they were “subjects of considerable public attention,” and the case
remained controversial two decades later. Id. The court referenced a docudrama
and that the case was discussed “with some regularity” in the media. Id. n.2.
However, as Judge Peck noted, the Second Circuit’s Meeropol analysis was
dictum. The latter court actually relied on the fact that the book author had not
identified the plaintiff-Meeropols, the sons of the executed Rosenbergs, by their
adopted name or connected their adopted identity to the Rosenbergs. Street, 645
F.2d at 1249 (Peck, J., dissenting). Nor had the court given any reasons for
bestowing public figure status on the Meeropols. Id. Note that Meeropol is
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Judge Peck was undoubtedly correct. NBC was wise to settle. It and
the media would have likely suffered another debilitating defeat on four
levels. First, the Rehnquist Era Court, including Justices Blackmun and
Marshall on this issue, would have agreed with Judge Peck that the passage
of time had abrogated the plaintiff’s public figure status in favor of private
status a la Gertz. 346 Second, repudiation of Judge Merritt’s equality-oftreatment argument had the claimant been the trial judge would have
inaugurated a parallel post-Gertz retrenchment from the interpretation of
the passage of time footnote in Rosenblatt. 347 Both parallel developments
would have concomitantly destabilized the consensus of broadly mediaprotective, anti-plaintiff lower court case law in both the public figure348

generally viewed as an example of the discredited involuntary public figure
concept. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:8 n.15.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 305–06.
347. See supra text accompanying note 306.
348. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:14 (Referencing the “lively
public interest” abbreviated-time-since-departure-from-public-service aspects of
Rosenblatt, the author notes the “near consensus” of precedent, which has been
expanded “in an open-ended way to allow a media defendant to resurrect
controversies in a state of advanced rigor mortis or decay and make these
moribund matters again newsworthy by doing a retrospective piece.”). For a
prototypical example, see Milsap v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 100 F.3d 1265, 1269–
70 (7th Cir. 1996), where a retrospective piece on another journalist revived an
issue about the activist-head of an anti-poverty program despite the absence of
any evidence that such was a matter of continuing lively public interest and in the
face of plaintiff’s contention that his connection to the controversy had ended a
quarter-century before and that he had long ago moved from the state. Id. The
court concluded that a public figure “assumes the risk of negative public comment
on his role in the controversy, both contemporaneously and into the future.” Id. at
1270. As the author has said, such an interpretation of the Court’s assumed-risk
analysis “measurably expands the rationale for the public-figure, private-figure
dichotomy, undermines its anti-bootstrapping, media-generated newsworthiness
analysis and frustrates the Court’s calculated emphasis on fairness to the
plaintiff.” ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:14. Compare the rare breadth
of fresh air in an opinion wholly consistent with and reflective of the BlackmunMarshall concurrence in Wolston, in Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57,
68 (1st Cir. 1998), where an exceptional opinion by Judge Selya rejected a media
claim that a local athletic hero’s “pervasive fame” as a high school star continued
to make him as a public figure more than two decades later. The court refused to
“elevate[] hope over reason” and concluded that “passage of time obviously
diluted whatever fame” plaintiff had gained during his “adolescent heyday.” Id.
Imposing a “temporal dimension” to public figuredom, Judge Selya suggested:
“Intuitively, one should not become fair game for eternity merely by injecting
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and public official 349 passage of time arenas. Three, the Court would likely
have used Street to extend the Gertz negligence-as-a-minimum rule 350 also
to false-light 351 claims. The Court would have repudiated the Time, Inc. v.
Hill 352 extension of New York Times to all plaintiffs as to matters of public
interest or concern regardless of status 353—the anachronistic residue of
Rosenbloom354 that the Restatement (Second) of Torts 355 and the great
majority of courts 356 still continue to follow despite the Court’s caveats 357
on this issue. Fourth and finally, Street’s repudiation would have
unequivocally affirmed what was indubitably suggested by the Court’s
oneself into the debate of the moment.” Id. at 70. He conceded the consensus view
contra. Id.
349. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:4 (noting that the cases have
“universally followed, indeed expanded” the brief Rosenblatt discussion to “quite
dated conduct”). This broad interpretation has truncated discussion of the passageof-time issue, as the author has suggested elsewhere. Id. However, it seems clear
that the Court would—and lower courts should—identify and apply the
assumption-of-risk and access or self-help underpinnings of Gertz and progeny to
matters involving public officials who are without continued “lively public
interest” and where the media has resuscitated interest in the former public
servant. Id. § 5:4 n.6. Otherwise, the courts sub silentio adopt an only thinly veiled
partial revivification of Rosenbloom, a view repeatedly repulsed by the Rehnquist
Era Court. See supra text accompanying notes 25–83, 93–104, 113–24, 162–250,
262–79, 307–16.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 26–68.
351. Plaintiff Street was portrayed in “an extremely derogatory light”—
perjurer, suborner of perjury, a promiscuous and amoral woman, if not a
prostitute, a false-rape accuser willing to send the criminal defendants to the
electric chair. Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1230–33 (6th Cir. 1981).
Note that these characterizations would be actionable as libel, see ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §§ 1:10, 1:13, and false light, see DAVID A. ELDER,
PRIVACY TORTS § 4:5 (2002) (Supp. 2022) [hereinafter, ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS].
See also infra text accompanying note 770.
352. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
353. Id. at 380–91. For a more detailed analysis, see infra text accompanying
notes 751–75.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 25–83, 93–104, 113–24, 162–250,
262–79, 307–16.
355. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1977). The
drafters appended a generally ignored caveat as to whether a lower negligence
standard might be available after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. See supra text
accompanying notes 26–68 and noted that Time Inc. v. Hill is “presently in some
doubt.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E(b) cmt. d (1977).
356. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, § 4:13B.
357. See infra text accompanying note 754.
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Four Horsemen of Public Figuredom 358—that the involuntary-publicfigure dicta were and are oxymoronic and have been rendered as extinct
as the stegosaurus by a proper interpretation of Gertz and the Court’s postGertz jurisprudence.
The latter conclusion requires additional analysis. As indicated above,
Gertz made two references that have been construed as providing support
for an involuntary public figure—the dictum about such a hypothetical but
“exceedingly rare” third classification 359 and a brief four-word dictum
aside—“or is drawn into” 360—in discussing Gertz as a possible vortex
public figure. Some, including Justice Brennan, 361 have suggested that
Gertz’s repudiation of Rosenbloom did not purport to or intend to repudiate
Rosenbloom on its facts 362—that Gertz contemplated as an involuntary
public figure someone like Rosenbloom caught up in “erroneous reporting
of the public actions of public officials . . . .” 363 Of course, Gertz itself
358. See supra text accompanying notes 162–240.
359. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
360. Id. at 351.
361. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 476 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
362. Id.
363. Id. He cited Justice White’s concurrence in Rosenbloom and viewed the
precise holding thereof as still valid on its facts, citing a leading scholar in support
thereof. See id. at 475 (citing David Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship,
53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 450–51 (1975)). Laurence Tribe, a leading commentator,
agrees, see TRIBE, supra note 30, at 881, but makes no attempt to demonstrate
how this conclusion is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly
Firestone and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. See supra text
accompanying notes 227–40; infra text accompanying notes 370–74. A recent
article emphasizes the tensions in the Gertz criteria and the “almost
unrecognizable” notion of presumed voluntariness of a broad swath of public
figures and recommends reviving a Rosenbloom framework as part of a revitalized
involuntary-public-figure status, which would extend to scenarios where an
individual becomes “integrally intertwined” with: (1) “the official conduct or
qualifications for office of a public official” (the Rosenbloom scenario); (2) “the
actions of a public figure with regard to a matter of public concern”; or (3) “a
matter of public concern itself.” Usman, supra note 172, at 1007–11. The last
alternative would not apply where the private person is “merely tangential, trivial
or simply being used in a representative capacity” with respect to the matter of
public concern. Id. at 1011. It is difficult to believe that the present Court, and
courts, with their askance view of claims of exceptionalism of the Fourth Estate,
see infra text accompanying notes 1019–35, 1054, 1057, 1061, 1067–81, would
adopt a proposal that effectively resuscitates the largely open-ended Rosenbloom
view that survived only three years and that would also revive an involuntarypublic-figure concept viewed by many as totally inconstant with the tenor of the
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rejected Rosenbloom in large part because it subjected any person
“involuntarily associated with a matter of general interest” to the
“demanding requirements” of New York Times. 364 It is very difficult to
view the Court’s two aforementioned dictum discussions as other than
indefensibly anomalous. However, the Court then went on to specifically
hold that Gertz’s voluntary association with a case guaranteed to become
newsworthy did not make him a public figure. 365 How being involuntarily
“drawn into” the same such controversy is somehow magically revivified
into a separate, distinct, and viable involuntary category is almost
impossible to imagine and difficult to justify. It is noteworthy that the
Court ultimately specified only two ways of Gertz arguably being a public
figure—all-purpose and vortex—and found neither applicable, 366 a limited
focus, two-part analysis reiterated in its three successor opinions. 367
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions for the Court in Firestone 368 and
Wolston 369 individually and collectively eviscerated whatever remained of
the involuntary public figure concept. Justice Rehnquist took careful pains
to expressly repudiate the identical “is drawn into” language on two
specific occasions in each opinion. Litigants will “likely resemble
respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to
attempt to obtain the only redress available to them” or defend against civil
actions brought by third parties or criminal actions prosecuted by the
state. 370 In such cases, there was and is “little reason” why theretofore
Rehnquist Era Court’s decisions on public figuredom. And, alternative (3), if
adopted, would leave very little of private-figure status, as libel defendants would
perform ye o person feats of well-financed creativity to demonstrate how private
persons come within the amorphous concept of being “integrally intertwined”
with a matter of public concern. Lastly, the possibility, if not the likelihood of
pervasive, maybe permanent, residence of the defamatory matter on the Internet
would likely give a modern Court huge pause for reviving this broadened version
of Rosenbloom. For other critical discussions of the logic underlying and the
difficulties posed by the assumption-of-risk rationale for public-person status, see
supra text accompanying notes 61, 66–67, 92, 173–74, 227–40, 262, 313, 339–
40, 344, 348–49; infra text accompanying notes 365–88, 930, 963–68, 993, 1061–
68.
364. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 192–94, 230–36.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 181–94.
367. See supra text accompanying note 181.
368. See supra text supporting notes 195–212.
369. See supra text supporting notes 227–40.
370. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (emphasis added);
Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168–69 (1979) (emphasis
added).

188

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

private persons should “substantially forfeit” defamation law’s protection
“simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom.” 371
In Wolston, media defendants sought to carve out a modest subset
exception for litigants to be accorded less deferential treatment, i.e., those
convicted of crime. 372 Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed his Firestone 373
analysis and concluded that any other result would “create an ‘open
season’” to defame criminals. 374 This strongly suggests that, a fortiori,
those merely accused and presumptively innocent—and all others not even
so accused—would be treated at least as, if not more, favorably. Take, for
example, the abysmal maltreatment by prosecutor Michael Nifong of the
Duke lacrosse team as a whole and the three players ultimately charged. 375
Are any or all of them public figures? Ultimately, the North Carolina
Attorney General found there had never been any factual basis for the
charges and characterized Nifong as a “rogue prosecutor.” 376 The author
has strongly criticized the media’s herd mentality “rush to judgment,” 377
as have others. 378 But the question is worth posing: How would the
Rehnquist Era Court or a successor Court, or lower courts, following
Rehnquist’s considerable legacy as a defamation jurisprudent, have
resolved or would resolve in futuro such an unconscionable scenario?
As Wolston concluded, a voluntary decision not to appear, knowing it
would generate press-media attention, nonetheless left him in his protected
371. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added). A substantial number of
commentators have concluded that the Court’s Firestone-Hutchinson-Wolston trio
reflects the Court’s “distancing itself from even the possibility” of an involuntary
public figure. See Joseph H. King Jr., Deux Ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise
of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J.
649, 665–67 (2007); id. at 671–94 (examining different tests).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 227–40.
373. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168–69 (such “remain[s] sound”).
374. Id. at 169.
375. See generally STUART TAYLOR JR. & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN
INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE
DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007). For a thoughtful colloquy concerning the
broad legal ramifications of the case, see James Coleman et al., The Places and
Faces of the Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A Conversation, 19 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 181 (2009). For a libel scholar’s analysis of the libel and/or
First Amendment issues raised thereby, see David A. Elder, A Libel Law Analysis
of Media Abuses in Reporting on the Duke Lacrosse Fabricated Rape Charges, 9
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 99 (2008) [hereinafter, Elder, Duke Lacrosse].
376. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 375, at 351–52.
377. See Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375, at 99–104, 152–80.
378. Id.; Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 197 (comments by Professor
Michael Gerhardt about “the media circus” enveloping the Duke lacrosse case).
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private status 379—“dragged unwillingly” into the controversy by
government pursuers. 380 Consider the scenario of fabricated charges, an
unethical, complicit, politically partisan, disbarred attorney and equally
complicit press-media. 381 Should the press-media be allowed to bootstrap
themselves to New York Times’ extraordinary level of protection 382 in a
scenario where they assisted in making the accused names and faces
notorious? 383 It is extremely doubtful that the Rehnquist Era Court or any
Court, or lower courts, attempting to divine and follow the Rehnquist
legacy would countenance such gross unfairness. But what about the
accused Duke lacrosse players’ lawyers’ adroit and effective attacks in the
media in an attempt to undo the prejudice and remove the taint of Nifong’s
statements, together with the limited number of public responses by the
three accused themselves? 384 The author has no doubt that the Rehnquist
Era Court would have—as other courts should in futuro—treated such as
wholly proportionate replies 385 insufficient to impose either vortex 386 or

379. See supra text accompanying notes 230–36.
380. Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).
381. Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375, at 99–104, 152–80.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30, 46, 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104,
130, 133, 197, 236; infra text accompanying notes 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869,
882, 917–18, 924–25, 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
383. See Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375, at 99–104, 152–80.
384. Id. at 104–18.
385. Id. (providing a detailed analysis of involuntary public figuredom and its
application in the Duke Lacrosse context). The author analyzes in detail and
applies Judge Murnaghan’s scholarly opinion in Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., in which grandparents accused of sexual abuse of their granddaughter were
treated as private plaintiffs for libel purposes. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994). See also Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375,
at 115–16. The court relied on the common-law right of reply or self-defense
privilege as justifying the grandparents’ right to an “uninhibited, robust, and wide
open” right of reply. Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1560 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). This included plaintiffs’ likely intent to
“influence the outcome” of the custodial dispute between their son and former
daughter-in-law and the congressional debate over the latter’s civil-contempt
citation in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1563. Judge Murnaghan concluded that
it was “almost impossible” to disentangle acts self-defensive in nature from those
calculated to influence the resolution of the controversies in question. Id. He
applied a “predominant” or “primary” motive standard, id. at 1543, 1559–60,
1563, and concluded that the entire record evidenced “measured defensive
replies.” Id. at 1563.
386. Id. at 1543, 1546–64.
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involuntary 387 public figure status. Only such a conclusion would “hold[]
the balance true.” 388
VI. THE MEDIA, NON-MEDIA AND PUBLIC-CONCERN, PURELY PRIVATECONCERN DICHOTOMIES
The Rehnquist Era Court’s views on the media, non-media dichotomy
and the application of the First Amendment are extravagantly ambiguous
and ambivalent. In what must be one of the strangest, ill-considered
comments in the Court’s defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 389
an opinion that Justice Rehnquist joined, declared ex cathedra in a terse
dictum that the Court had “never decided” 390 the issue of extending the
New York Times standard to non-media or individual defendants. Of
course, this ignored the individual defendants in the Court’s first two
applications of the New York Times rule—the non-media clergyman
codefendants in the New York Times 391 case itself and the parish attorneycriminal defendant in Garrison v. Louisiana, 392—numerous other

387. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (8th Cir. 1999).
388. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
389. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
390. Id. at 133 n.16.
391. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 286 (1964). The ad was
in codefendant Times’s newspaper but that was essentially irrelevant to the
Court’s analysis, as the non-media codefendants were not aware of and had not
authorized usage of their names in the ad. Id. at 286. Interestingly, counsel for the
petitioner in oral argument in Hutchinson called this point to the Court’s attention.
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1978 TERM SUPPLEMENT 254 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1980) (comment of counsel for petitioner, Michael E.
Cavanaugh). See also William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the
Perils of Defining the Press, 48 GA. L. REV. 757, 758–61 (2014) (discussing the
companion case of Abernathy v. Sullivan, also resolved on First Amendment
grounds, as “critical as contemporary courts address the emergence of citizen
journalists”).
392. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (holding a criminal defamation
prosecution case against a public official for statements at a press conference that
did not meet the New York Times criteria violated “guarantees of freedom of
expression”).
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decisions of the Court, 393 and the nearly universal view of the state and
federal decisions before and after the Court’s aside. 394
The Court appears to have definitively resolved this issue in publicperson plaintiff cases at least by its opinion in McDonald v. Smith 395
unanimously rejecting an absolute privilege 396 in Petition Clause cases.
The Court adopted the New York Times standard 397 in a candidate for
federal attorney-public person case involving letters sent to President
Reagan and a limited number of other federal officials. 398 The Court
viewed the Petition Clause as “cut from the same cloth” 399 and “inspired

393. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 78, 86 (1966) (Defendant was an unpaid
regular contributor-columnist to the settling codefendant’s paper.); Henry v.
Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (Both cases involved non-media defendants where
the defamatory matter was communicated to and published by the media.); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728–29 (1968) (Defendant-political candidate
published the defamatory statements during televised remarks.); Greenbelt Co-op
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (The epithet “blackmail” was not
slander when said by the source at a city council meeting and was not libel when
reported accurately by the media.). Note that all these cases involved media
reportage of the non-media defendants’ statements. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492–93 (1984) (The publisher of Consumer
Reports was a media defendant “under any conceivable definition” of that
concept.). Note also that no member of the Court took issue with the opinion of
the Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519, 525 n.8
(2001) (Citing New York Times, the Court found no First Amendment distinction
between passive-recipient media and non-media users of legally obtained true
information.).
394. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:4; Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d
48, 56 (Pa. 2004); Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 365 (9th Cir.
1995). Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).
395. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1986).
396. Only eight Justices participated. Justice Powell took no part. Id. at 480, 485.
397. Id. at 482–85; id. at 485–90 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., and
Blackmun, J., concurring).
398. Id. at 481 n.2.
399. Id. at 482. The Court relied on a historical analysis of Framers’ intent, as
evidenced in its own prior adoption of a qualified privilege in White v. Nicholls,
44 U.S. 266 (1845), and found nothing in the historical record since suggesting
the Framers intended an “unqualified right” to make defamatory falsehoods under
the panoply of the Petition Clause. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482–84. The Court’s
decision has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE 208 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002); Eric Shapper, “Libelous”
Petitions for Redress of Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74
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by the same ideals of liberty and democracy” 400 as freedoms of speech,
press and assembly. The Court found “no sound basis” for providing
different and enhanced protection for Petition Clause cases. 401 Perhaps the
defendants’ statuses as media or non-media have not been controversial in
the latter public-person-plaintiff setting because the matters at issue in
litigation almost invariably and self-apparently have been matters of
undoubted public concern. 402
By contrast, in the private person setting, the First Amendment issues
of a defendant’s status and the subject matter reported seem to be almost
incestuously related in nature. This results perhaps from a concern that
media could and would bootstrap items of marginal or no legitimate public
interest via media reportage—i.e., if the media reports sensational matter
or sleaze of a defamatory matter, it must, by definition, be of public
concern because the readership or viewership wants such and
symbiotically feeds on such. Justice Douglas was a famously leading
advocate of this knee-jerk, bootstrapping analysis. 403 Of course, this would
IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989). On the federal and state petition clauses, see ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 4:6.
400. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
401. Id. Three Justices—Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun—concurred in the
Court’s conclusions concerning the Framers’ intent and rejected any suggestion
that the Petition Clause was somehow functionally distinguishable in promoting
democratic self-governance. The four guarantees were “interrelated components
of the public’s exercise of its sovereign authority.” Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., with
Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). The concurring Justices quoted
extensively from New York Times and Garrison, including an equation of the ad
in New York Times with the letters in the case before it, and extended First
Amendment protection on “matters of public importance,” whether in a
newspaper editorial, letter to a president, or discussion among neighbors over a
fence. Id. at 485–90. Interestingly, no member of the McDonald Court interfaced
or adverted to the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985), issued a week later. See infra text accompanying notes 440–79.
For a further discussion of McDonald’s ramification for the Court’s future
adoption of neutral reportage, see infra text accompanying notes 821–29.
402. See generally the cases analyzed in ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92,
§ 7:4 nn.1–7. For the Court’s characterization of its jurisprudence as on the public
concern side of the line, see infra text accompanying notes 423, 448, 468, 478, 964.
403. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6 (1974) (“[A]ny matter
of sufficient general interest to prompt media coverage may be said to be a public
affair.”) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 501
(1975) (Douglas, J., concurring). Earlier, Justice Douglas criticized the
Rosenbloom criterion as pushing the judiciary into the “same subjective
quagmire” as in obscenity cases. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. C.R. Grove, cert.
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give the press-media the right to auto-constitutionalize the entire law of
defamation. This anomalous, erratic, and confusing inclination of
Rehnquist Era Court majorities to limit the particular cases to the media
defendant before it and to items of public concerns 404 appears to reflect
substantial disquietude about much of the content and coverage of the
media and also acts as surrogate for the Court’s concern about the need to
impose—or, at least, threaten to impose—some qualitative limits. This
concern about boundaries is not true only in defamation law405 but has
been suggested also in privacy cases involving true matter. 406
Although not explicitly acknowledged, it appears to be clear that the
Gertz and post-Gertz Courts have sought to assert general sovereignty over
the outer boundaries of legitimate discourse in two fundamental and
intertwined ways—revival of status as the determinative factor 407 and
renewal of subject-matter limitations in private-person cases 408—and
likely beyond. 409 The first occurred in the Court’s counter-revolutionary
denied, 404 U.S. 898, 904 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also supra text
accompanying note 27.
404. See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990) (following
Philadelphia Newspapers); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779
n.4 (1986) (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979)). For
the implications of the Court’s phrasing therein, see infra text accompanying
notes 409, 478–79, 938–68.
405. See infra text accompanying notes 406–511, 580, 938–68, 1026.
406. See ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, §§ 3:16–3:17. First
Amendment protection for matters of public concern is limited to matters lawfully
acquired—including those passively received from third-party unlawful
acquirers—by the publisher. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514–15 (2001)
(protecting publication of matters of public interest illegally acquired by strangers
and purely passively received by defendants but indicating First Amendment
protection would be forfeited by any even modest level of active involvement in
the unlawful acquisition); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 664 (1991)
(finding no First Amendment protection as to matters of public interest where
defendants breached rules of general applicability, in that case the contract
doctrine of promissory estoppel as to promises of anonymity made to sources).
407. See infra text accompanying notes 407–511.
408. See supra note 88; infra text accompanying notes 402–511, 580, 742,
938–68, 1026.
409. See infra text accompanying notes 410, 422, 425. In addition to Justice
Brennan’s analysis, see infra text accompanying note 410, other opinions have
strongly suggested that the private aspects of public persons’ lives may not be
subject to the New York Times standard. See Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964) (Goldberg, J., with
Douglas, J., concurring) (“Purely private defamation has little to do with the
political ends of a self-governing society. Th[is] imposition of liability for private
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defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom
protected by the First Amendment.”). See the reliance thereon in some of the cases
cited in Dun & Bradstreet, infra text accompanying note 448; Garrison v. La.,
379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964) (“[D]ifferent interests may be involved where purely
private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; therefore, nothing
we say today is to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the
constitutional guarantees in the discrete area of purely private libels.” (emphasis
added)); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (The First Amendment
limitation as to “newsworthy persons and events does not of course foreclose . . .
damages where ‘[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of
the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency’” (internal
citation omitted)); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (leaving
open the issue as to whether there was “some exiguous area” of a candidate-foroffice’s life where she or he “may have full recourse”); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (quoting approvingly Garrison’s caveat as to “purely
private libels”). Note that in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47–
48 n.12 (1971), even Justice Brennan, the media-protective author of New York
Times, emphasized that “some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall
outside the area of matters of public or general concern . . . .” Id. at 48 (emphasis
added) (citing the Court’s birth-control decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)). Justice Marshall disagreed with the Griswold reference:
[I]t is apparent that in an era of dramatic threat of over-population and
one in which previously accepted standards of conduct are widely
heralded as outdated, even the intimate and personal concerns with
which the Court dealt with in that case cannot be said to be outside the
area of “public or general concern.”
Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court’s post-Gertz
precedent hints strongly at a public-concern limitation on application of the New
York Times standard to public persons. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (“We have never considered whether the
Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public
concern.”) (emphasis added) (Powell, with Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see infra text accompanying note 470; Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S.
at 775 (After listing the “two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape
to conform to the First Amendment,” the Court said the following: “When the
speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure,
the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier
before recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the common
law.” (emphasis added)); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (“[W]here a statement of
‘opinion’ on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory
facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such
statements were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless
disregard of their truth.” (emphasis added)). See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
200, at 338–41 (noting that nothing in Justice Powell’s opinion in Dun &
Bradstreet limited it to private persons, that a Court majority was “unhappy” with
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repudiation of its toddler plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia
Inc. 410 by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 411 which resuscitated status as a
determinant focus. The Gertz Court’s slim majority opinion, with Justice
Rehnquist as controlling vote, 412 did not expressly delve into either the
media-versus-non-media dichotomy in the case before it or the nature of
the subject matter. Gertz did involve a matter of undoubted, legitimate
public concern—death of an individual at the hands of a police officer that
precipitated both criminal proceedings and wrongful-death litigation 413—
and involved a non-mainstream, press-media defendant. 414

the New York Times-Gertz regime, and projecting “[t]he future should witness
new efforts to modify or even overhaul present doctrine”). For a further analysis
of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 938–68. See, in the privacy
context, the important opinion of Justices Breyer and O’Connor in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536–40 (2001) (Breyer, J., with O’Connor, J., concurring)
discussed at infra note 964.
410. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44–54 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (extending New York Times to all matters of “public or general concern”).
Justice Brennan criticized Justices Harlan and Marshall’s proposals—the basis for
Gertz, see infra text accompanying note 36, as going further than the Court had
theretofore gone. Id. at 52–53. He opined that the difficulty as to what was within
and without the “public or general interest” criterion was no greater than other tasks
in the defamation arena. Id. at 48 n.17. Justice Marshall disagreed on the legitimacy
of defining what was “relevant to self-government” and further rejected Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion because of the “distorting light of defamation” that is a
concomitant of the fact that “all human events are arguably within the area of ‘public
or general concern.’” Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting). Note that
all Court members agreed that the matter at issue in Rosenbloom met the public
interest test. Id. at 48 n.17. Note that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion expressly
left open the issue “of what constitutional standard of proof, if any,” applied as to a
person’s actions “not within the area of public or general interest.” Id. at 44 n.12. In
rejecting the public-versus-private-person dichotomy, it is worth repeating that he
also concluded significantly that “some aspects of the lives of even the most public
men fall outside” this criterion. Id. at 48.
411. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See supra text
accompanying notes 25–68.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32, 74–75.
413. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 329–39, 343, 346 (discussing lower court decisions);
id. at 361–69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 325–26 (a magazine of the John Birch Society, an organization
warning the public of an attempt to supplant local law-enforcement entities with
a nationwide police force which could be used to support a Communist
autocracy); id. at 359–60 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the publication as
a “most controversial periodical” by an organization “many deem . . . offensive”).
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The Rehnquist Era Court’s implicit but clear Gertz holding, never
specifically discussed therein, was thus limited to matters of public
concern. 415 The Court sent mixed signals, however, with each side of the
quality-control controversy provided ammunition by the Court for its
position on the media-versus-non-media distinction. The Court often
talked of public broadcasters, the media, and the press 416 but also
referenced freedoms of speech and press as if they were both co-equally
implicated. 417 The Court majority also distanced itself in minor part from
Rosenbloom because of its supposed discomfort with courts’ making ad
hoc decisions as to what is relevant to self-government. 418
Justice Brennan, author of the Rosenbloom plurality opinion 419 and
Gertz dissenter, 420 saw no such problem although he, like Justice White, 421
agreed that Gertz had not so limited its impact. 422 In Justice Brennan’s
415. See infra text accompanying notes 447–50.
416. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 (“newspaper or broadcaster”); id. at 333, 337, 343,
348 (“press and broadcast media”); id. at 337, 341 (“news media”); id. at 339,
340, 342, 347 n.10, 350 (“media”); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“media”); id. at 340, 341, 343, 346, 347 n.10, 348, 350 (“publisher[s] or
broadcaster[s]”).
417. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325. In introducing the issue, the Court said: “This
Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation
between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by
the First Amendment.”); id. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press.”); id. at 340 (“First Amendment liberties”); id. at
342 (“freedoms of speech and press”); id. at 342 (“libel and slander”).
418. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (stating the Court “doubt[ed] the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience of judges”). Justice Powell distanced
himself from this dictum in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
See infra text accompanying notes 446–53.
419. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
420. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 361–69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court majority had
“federalized major aspects” of state defamation law by invalidating “in important
respects the prevailing defamation law” in most or all fifty states by requiring
plaintiffs “in each and every defamation action” to prove fault and actual
damages); id. at 388–89 (parallel comments).
422. Id. at 368 n.3 (noting the “novel step,” at least as to defamatory statements
making “substantial danger to reputation apparent” of extending Gertz
requirements to matters not of public interest; further importantly noting that he
would have left “open the question of what constitutional standard, if any,”
applied as to matters “concerning either a private or public person’s activities not
within the scope of the general or public interest”) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A cmt. c, § 580B cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977)
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view, distinguishing matters of legitimate public concern was both
doable 423 and had been done in the past. 424 Adding immensely to the
confusion, the prestigious post-Gertz Restatement (Second) of Torts 425
took an exceptionally broad and reputation-debilitating view of Gertz’s
likely import, finding no basis therein for any distinctions: libel versus
slander, media versus non-media, public concern versus purely private
concern. 426 With a few largely ignored caveats,427 total First Amendment
preemption had rampaged through the common law of defamation
wreaking Hugo, Katrina, or Ian-level wreckage. 428
(concluding that defamation as to the purely private aspects of a public person are
subject to the Gertz standard). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 938–68.
423. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Gertz
majority as a private-person, public-interest case); id. at 368–69 (rejecting the
argument that determining what is within and without the general-or-publicinterest area is an improper function for judges, concluding that it is one of courts’
“traditional functions” and citing the substantial precedent pre-and-post
Rosenbloom on the public-interest issue and cases involving public-figure status).
See supra notes 402, 410; infra notes 448, 469, 964.
424. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 366–69; cf. infra note 994; see the synthesis of the
detailed proposal of Professor Joseph King, supra note 371.
425. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (extending
Gertz’s negligence requirement to purely private aspects of public persons and to
all private persons without regard to subject matter).
426. Id. cmts. e, f.
427. Id. cmt. f (noting “[s]ome possibility” that the Court would limit Gertz to
statements involving matter of public or general interest or differentiate “the
spread of private gossip”). The drafters and the American Law Institute failed
dramatically as soothsayers. See infra text accompanying notes 446–79 discussing
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
428. For a particularly notorious example, Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 600 (Am. L. Inst. 1977) treated Gertz’s apparent “radical preemption” of the
common law as abrogating a majority common-law ground for abuse of a
common-law privilege—absence of probable cause—and replaced it with a
reckless disregard of falsity standard. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §
2:33. Section 600 has led a number of courts to adopt this “ill-considered, poorly
reasoned perspective,” ignoring state-constitutional provisions evidencing a
strong preference for post-Gertz rules “intruding least severely on the
fundamental private interest in reputation” with the resultant “perverse” effect that
proof of fault sufficient for private persons to collect actual damages under the
First Amendment is precluded in the purely private realm that includes most of
the sphere of application for common-law qualified privilege. Id. Under Dun &
Bradstreet, the most logical conclusion is that the common law remains wholly
intact, with all the grounds for forfeiture available under state common law. Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 480–85. Unfortunately, neither § 600 nor any
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Justice Rehnquist, writing his first libel opinion for the Court in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 429 narrowly construed both who is a public figure and the
nature of the “particular public controversy” into which the individual
thrusts himself or herself. 430 Mrs. Firestone did not qualify on either
cumulative ground. 431 The Court then went on to apply the Gertz minimalfault requirement, found the Florida Supreme Court’s fault-finding
indeterminant on the record, and remanded.432 One can read Firestone as
standing for the proposition that the facts did not meet the enhanced
criteria for a qualitative “particular public controversy” 433 and also
arguably did not meet the lower and more generalized public concern
threshold implicit in Gertz. The latter posture would have allowed the
Florida Supreme Court the flexibility to resolve the Gertz-based, faultfinding issue on remand by reaffirming its prior decisions in Firestone and
distinguishing Gertz as involving a matter of “real public concern.” 434
Since the case then dissolved on remand, 435 no state court clarification was
provided.
of the other Restatement (Second) of Torts provisions miscalculating the
significance of Gertz have been rewritten, as of now, in light of Dun & Bradstreet.
However, a Third Restatement drafting committee has been formed to look at both
defamation and privacy. See infra text accompanying note 1059.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 195–212.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 198–212.
431. Id.
432. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461–64 (1976).
433. Id. at 454–55. See supra text accompanying notes 180, 185–86, 198–99,
204, 219–25.
434. See TRIBE, supra note 30, at 881 (deeming “most plausible” the Firestone
majority’s view as “decid[ing] that gossip about the rich and famous is not a
matter of legitimate public interest”). In its lengthy analysis of Rosenbloom, the
Florida Supreme Court found no “real public concern” in the divorce matters and
concluded that defendants who “exploit[ed] mere sensationalism” as to a person’s
“private sector” did so at their own risk, since such lacked any “logical
connection” to a matter of “inquiring concern of the public . . . .” Firestone v.
Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 750–52 (Fla. 1971) (emphasis added). It reaffirmed
this analysis in its later post-Gertz opinion while attempting to comply with its
mandates. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 174–75 (Fla. 1974). Justice
Marshall in dissent feared that the Court had returned the law to this pre-Gertz,
Florida Supreme Court strict liability-based interpretation of Rosenbloom.
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
435. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 332 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1976) (vacating district
court of appeals opinion with directions to it to vacate trial court judgment and
remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision).
There is no record of further proceedings on remand.
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Possibly, Justice Rehnquist and the Firestone majority, having won
decisively on the pivotal issues before it,436 saw no purpose in trying to
further subdivide protected and unprotected subject-matter categories—
i.e., matters of public concern, maybe prefaced by real, 437 as juxtaposed
to matters of purely private concern in the context of the widely
disseminated media speech involved therein. 438 Or, possibly, Justice
Rehnquist and the majority’s views on this issue were in a state of
continued evolution. The Court thereafter had repeated opportunities to
delve into this issue in the context of credit-reporting agency defamatory
miscues. 439 Finally, it granted certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 440 a case involving a highly damaging credit
report portraying a business as bankrupt. 441 The Vermont Supreme Court
held that Gertz and its limitations did not bar common-law presumed 442
and punitive damages 443 under prevailing state-law standards despite the
436. See supra text accompanying notes 195–212.
437. See infra text accompanying notes 205, 434. But compare the later Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. comment that all of the Court’s
prior cases had met the public-concern criterion. See infra text accompanying note
448. It is very doubtful the majority that agreed on a narrow view of public
concern in Dun & Bradstreet really meant to categorize Firestone as included
within this narrowed classification. If so, there would be little, if any, matter
published by the media that would be purely private in nature.
438. The defamatory matter was published in Time magazine’s “Milestone’s”
section. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 451–52.
439. Courts had generally rejected treating credit agencies as media entities
protected by the First Amendment. Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25,
29 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Kan. Elec. Supply Co. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647, 649 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1026 (1972); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971). Justice Douglas dissented from denial of
certiorari in all three and issued an opinion in the Grove decision on First
Amendment absolutism grounds. See id. at 898–906.
440. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
441. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 461 A.2d 414, 416, 419
(Vt. 1983) (applying the actionable-per-se rule to disparagement of a merchant by
computing insolvency to it). The error resulted from a transposition by a 17-yearold of an employee’s bankruptcy to plaintiff-employer; this resulted despite
defendant’s routine practice—not followed in this case—of contacting the
business for verification prior to publication. Id. at 416.
442. Id. at 415, 419–20 (upholding $50,000 in general damages).
443. Id. (upholding a $300,000 award under common-law standards of ill will,
circumstances indicating oppression or insult, or wanton or reckless disregard of
plaintiff’s rights). These would not have sufficed for constitutional malice. See
infra text accompanying notes 620–90.
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absence of any qualified privilege under Vermont’s minority view444 on
point. The state court specifically held that Gertz was limited to media
defendants. 445
Justice Powell issued the plurality opinion for the Court in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders 446 in which Justices Rehnquist and
444. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 461 A.2d at 418–19 (rejecting incorporation of
Gertz as a part of state common law). The court specifically cited that the
“balancing [of] equities” on this issue favored the individual over large
commercial entities which were better able to absorb the losses caused by a false
report. Id. at 419. See also infra text accompanying note 470.
445. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 461 A.2d at 417–18 (rejecting Dun &
Bradstreet’s arguments that non-media defendants have “equally compelling First
Amendment” protections and that the dichotomy between media entities and other
information-collection-dissemination entities is “quite often illusory”). The court
acknowledged that the media-non-media dichotomy might pose difficulties in
certain settings but not in cases like this involving sale of financial information to
subscribers under confidentiality requirements. One “disseminates news for
public consumption” and the other “provides specialized information to a
selective, finite audience.” Id. at 417. The court followed the majority view of the
federal circuits and state cases in the credit-reporting context. Id. at 418–19.
446. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751
(1985). Modern scholarship demonstrates how what was not initially thought to
be a particularly significant Supreme Court case behind the scenes soon
“resemble[d] the maneuverings of battlefield commanders . . . seeking strategic
advantage in a constitutional war of ideas while simultaneously defending against
the salvos of their ideological adversaries.” Levine & Wermiel, supra note 39, at
11. The main players—Brennan, Powell and White, discussed hereinafter—
ultimately issued opinions in a battle “largely unseen by the public . . . .” Id. at 7.
The authors utilized notes and papers of pivotal Justices. Justice Rehnquist was a
major player throughout. Id. at 18–20, 34, 35, 51–52, 56, 62, 69, 73–75, 76–78,
87, 89. Rehnquist “push[ed] strongly” to affirm the Vermont Supreme Court, id.
at 18, considered Gertz “a last minute compromise,” but would not do so again,
and did not wish to extend Gertz. Id. at 19–20. In an amusing exchange just before
the Court’s conference vote to the effect that Brennan’s draft opinion would
overturn centuries of common law, Rehnquist retorted: “‘Why, Lewis, I thought
you did that in Gertz.’” Id. at 39. All in all, the authors conclude that “Rehnquist
appeared satisfied to leave the common law where it was in all respects.” Id. at
51. Rehnquist also pushed for retaining punitive damages. Id. at 56, 69–72. Justice
Powell’s notes also indicated that Rehnquist agreed with Justice White that New
York Times was a “mistake” although the authors say such “may or may not have
reflected what Rehnquist actually said at Conference . . . .” Id. at 52. In the
author’s view, Rehnquist was particularly effective in getting Powell to drop a
“private expression” qualification or limitation to his purely private-concern
analysis: “I don’t think it should be freighted with the additional requirement that
the circulation or expression be ‘private.’” Id. at 73–74, 76–77. While Justices
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O’Connor joined. The plurality specifically interpreted Gertz as limited to
matters of “undoubted public concern” 447—a characterization that applied

White and O’Connor were forceful advocates in getting Powell to adopt the purely
private-concern standard for distinguishing Gertz, Rehnquist and White were the
Justices pushing and prodding Powell, ultimately successfully, to essentially drop
the “private expression” limitation. Id. at 20–23, 52, 62–63, 67–68, 72–79.
Rehnquist ultimately joined Powell’s draft and thanked Powell for being receptive
to his suggestion on this issue. Id. at 78 n.462. This Rehnquist-generated change
meant and means that the ultimate language used in Dun & Bradstreet, “purely
private concern,” should be logically construed as applying to media
disseminations—and without any First Amendment protection. See the powerful
language in Powell’s opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). See
infra text accompanying notes 449–50; see generally supra text accompanying
notes 402–45; infra text accompanying notes 447–511, 580, 742, 938–68, 1026.
447. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756–57. See id. at 751, 757–63.
Justice Powell noted the specific concession by the dissenters on this issue. Id. at
757 n.4 (quoting id. at 777 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and
Stevens, J., dissenting)). The dissenters stated that Gertz involved defining the
appropriate First Amendment standard in cases of “central First Amendment
value of robust debate of public issues . . . .” Id. See also Milkovich v. Lorain J.
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990).
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to all the Court’s preceding cases. 448 By comparison, speech of purely
private concern 449 was quite different:

448. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 755–57. For exemplars of non-public
interest, purely private speech cited positively by Justice Powell—except for the
courts’ partial reliance on the non-media, media dichotomy—see HarleyDavidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362–66 (Or. 1977) (suit
by an operator of a dealership over a false complaint by a purported patron sent
by defendant dealer’s supervisory employee about the poor service and treatment
of the patron); Rowe v. Metz, 579 P.2d 83, 84–85 (Colo. 1978) (slander-per-se
case involving imputations relating to plaintiff’s business affairs in a purely
private context); Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 142–43, 152–53 (Wis. 1982)
(Unlike the media codefendant, a libel action against a source for a magazine
article who characterized plaintiff as having been fired from an earlier position
involved a purely private defamation with no First Amendment protection;
liability was dependent on Wisconsin common law.); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 254–60 (Minn. 1980) (In a slander-per-se case based on
an abuse of a common-law privilege by an employer to a prospective employer,
the court upheld presumed damages for slander per se as to an outrageous job
reference imputing incompetence as a salesperson, upheld a punitive damage
claim based on common-law ill will, found forfeiture of privilege based on
common-law malice (and rejected the New York Times test), and found no
substantial truth under the truth defense.). Rowe, 579 P.2d at 84–85, Denny, 318
N.W.2d at 153, and Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 260, relied on Justice Goldberg’s
concurrence in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964). See
supra text accompanying note 409. For discussions of “public concern,” see supra
text accompanying notes 402, 423; infra text accompanying note 964. Note that
in the Court’s non-defamation, funeral-picketing case, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443 (2011), the Court defined narrowly what fell within “matters of public
interest”: “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can ‘be fairly
considered as relating to any . . . news interest[,] that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Id. at 453–53 (emphasis added).
449. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 759. The Powell opinion framed the
issue as one of the public-concern-versus-non-public-concern and did not
specifically address or reject the media-non-media dichotomy. Id. at 751, 753.
Five members of the Court seem to have taken to heart the eloquent argument of
counsel for plaintiff-respondent that under Dun & Bradstreet’s proffered
perspective: “the Gertz doctrine will apply irrespective of the significance of the
speech, so that no matter how trivial, unimportant, or meaningless the speech is,
it always will be deemed more constitutionally significant than the state’s interest
and reputation.” Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 152 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1986) (argument by Thomas F.
Heilman) (emphasis added). The Court affirmed for reasons differing from the
Vermont Supreme Court. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753.
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[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues;
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of
ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of
liability causing reaction of self-censorship by the press. The facts
. . . are wholly without the First Amendment concerns with which
the Supreme Court . . . has been struggling. 450
Accordingly, as to the specific issues of presumed and punitive damages,
only common-law standards 451 applied. Were the dissenters’ First
450. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added) (quoting HarleyDavidson Motorsports, 568 P.2d at 1363). In other words, Justice Powell
concluded that the Gertz accommodation process involved the same state interest
in protecting a private person’s reputation but a subject matter deserving lesser
First Amendment protection. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757–61. Greater
deference to the experience of the common law in redressing incalculable harm
and deterring misconduct warranted presumed and punitive damages under statelaw standards. Id. at 760–61. Justice Powell quoted from a provocative article by
a First Amendment scholar to the following effect: “If the [F]irst [A]mendment
requirements outlined in Gertz apply [to the setting before the Court], there is
something clearly wrong with the [F]irst [A]mendment or with Gertz.” Id. at 759
n.6 (quoting Steve Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation:
Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 N.W.U. L. REV. 1212,
1268 (1983)). See Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1539 (noting
Powell’s opinion “rests squarely on a rather restricted interpretation” of the First
Amendment that “protects the free expression of ideas to effect political change”).
Justice Powell referenced an empirical study cited by a federal appellate court
contrasting jurisdictions with and without a qualified privilege as to creditreporting agencies, which found no inhibition of such reportage in those following
the minority view rejecting such a privilege. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at
763 n.9. But compare Justice Brennan’s critique that the reputation at issue in the
case before it was corporate, which diminished the need for presumed damages,
as actual damages would be easily provable. Id. at 793 n.16 (Brennan, J., with
Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
451. Id. at 755, 760–61, 763. Ultimately, note that Justice Rehnquist played a
pivotal role in saving punitive damages in libel cases whether or not the
constitutional malice standard applied. See discussion supra note 446; Levine &
Wermiel, supra note 39, at 51 (quoting Rehnquist as saying “if punitive damages
are ok in other types of litigation, they are ok in libel cases” and that he would not
abrogate punitive damages unless “we [overturn] Gertz.”). The authors note that
the Supreme Court had approved punitive damages in two recent types of cases
in which Brennan was in the majority: Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34–36 (1983).
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the availability of
punitive damages in § 1983 cases under ordinary tort common-law rules and did
not mandate a threshold of “evil motive or intent”—“reckless or callous
indifference” sufficed. The majority emphasized that Gertz had not mandated
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Amendment views to be adopted, Justice Powell opined that the entirety
of defamation law would be constitutionalized. 452 Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White concurred in the judgment on the ground that the subject
matter at issue was essentially of private, not public concern or
importance. 453
such an “actual intent standard” and that defendant below had not demonstrated
why § 1983 cases mandated “higher protection than we have demanded under the
First Amendment.” Justice Rehnquist wrote a detailed critique of the Court’s
refusal to require such a “wrongful animus” requirement, interpreting the
prevailing “solid majority” view at the time of the statute’s passage in 1871 as so
requiring. Id. at 65–84 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters criticized the standard adopted: “It would have been
difficult for the Court to have fashioned a more effective Damoclean sword than
the open-ended, standardless and unpredictable liability it creates today.” Id. at
89. In the second case, Justice Rehnquist was in the majority, with Justice
Brennan, which declined to find punitive damages preempted by federal statutory
law in nuclear irradiation cases in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
249–58 (1984). Note that in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 909
(1974), the Court approved a common-law malice requirement under state law in
addition to constitutional malice for the availability of punitive damages.
452. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 n.7. Applying an analogy to
commercial speech, Justice Powell cited a list of factors warranting less protection
for non-public-concern speech: the commonality of interest between the publisher
and its specific business subscribers; its confidentiality and the concomitant
absence of any strong argument for interrupted commercial-information flow; the
unlikelihood the speech would be deterred or self-censored by common-law
defamation law; that this speech-for-profit, like advertising, would be less likely
to be self-censored; the greater verifiability of the speech at issue; and the
market’s potent inducement of accuracy, because wrong information is useless to
creditor-subscribers. Id. at 762–63.
453. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 772–74 (White, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger concurred generally with Justice White’s views about Gertz
and New York Times and stated that the latter should be reconsidered in favor of
a negligence standard. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing the “aphorism
of journalism that ‘too much checking on the facts has ruined many a good news
story’”). See id. at 769 (White, J., concurring) (rejecting New York Times’s
“grossly perverse results” in favor of a “reasonable effort to investigate”
standard); id. at 774 (doubting any self-censorship under any “decent journalistic
standards” regarding belief in truth). Justice White powerfully critiqued New York
Times as “countenanc[ing] two evils . . . the stream of information about public
officials and public affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false
information . . . the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may
be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort
to investigate the facts.” Id. at 769. Justice Brennan responded that New York
Times was not at issue and still had the Court’s “solid allegiance.” Id. at 776–77
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Justice Brennan filed a dissent in Dun & Bradstreet for four members
of the Court. 454 Although admitting that the factual scenario before the
Court was unusual 455 and “at some remove” 456 from prior cases
precipitating Court intervention, he nonetheless viewed the Court majority
as adopting an “impoverished” 457 definition of subject matter entitled to
First Amendment protection while providing de minimus guidance 458 as to
what matter was purely private. 459 In his view, the Court had measurably

(Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
White and Chief Justice Burger have not been alone in criticizing the devastation
wrought by New York Times. Justice Rehnquist joined Burger in a denial of
certiorari dissent suggesting that the Court reconsider the appropriateness of this
mandate. See supra text accompanying note 77. He later backed away from this
position, at least publicly. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. Other
commentators and judges have concurred. See infra text accompanying notes 994,
1017–80. Privately, during a Dun & Bradstreet conference discussion, Rehnquist
viewed New York Times as a “mistake.” See supra the discussion in note 446.
454. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 774 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Brennan’s opinion
does not mention or otherwise allude to either Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) or Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), Levine and Wermiel conclude “it seems obvious that Brennan had” these
cases in mind when drafting his dissent:
These cases . . . only recently concluded in New York, had spawned
much discussion and criticism of the role of Sullivan in those
extraordinarily expensive examples of litigation viewed by many as
designed to yield a definitive ‘verdict’ on the truth of issues such as the
propriety of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Israeli incursion into
Lebanon. It is indeed difficult to read Brennan’s opinion and not
conclude that he was, at the same time, attempting to both rebut White’s
attack on Sullivan, and to explain how it had since been misperceived by
litigants and misconstrued by courts . . . .
Levine & Wermiel, supra note 39, at 80–81.
455. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 776 (“idiosyncratic facts”).
456. Id. at 774–75.
457. Id. at 786.
458. Id. For a discussion of Justice Powell’s other example, see infra text
accompanying note 494.
459. Justice Brennan viewed the crux of the Powell opinion as the matter’s
circulation to a very limited audience. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 775, 786
n.12 (The confidentiality limitation may be “crucial to the outcome . . . .”); id. at
789, 795 n.18 (Since the same matter—bankruptcy of a local company—would
have received protection had it been publicly published, such limited distribution
is “perhaps . . . the linchpin” of Justice Powell's opinion.).
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“cut away [from] the protective mantle of Gertz” 460 and resurrected
Rosenbloom but at a lower fault level—negligence—in public-concern
cases. 461 However, Justice Brennan noted one matter on which the four
dissenters and two concurrers 462 were in explicit agreement: a mediaversus-non-media dichotomy (1) was inconsistent with First Amendment
values; 463 (2) posed difficult First Amendment definitional difficulties; 464
and (3) would be imminently anachronistic in light of technological
changes. 465

460. Id. at 781; id. at 778 (The availability of presumed and punitive damages
sans New York Times compliance is “too blunt a regulatory instrument” to meet
First Amendment standards even in the type of speech before the Court.).
461. Id. at 785 n.11.
462. Id. at 781–84; id. at 782 n.6 (noting that it “would be paradoxical to
increase protection . . . as the size of their audience, and hence their potential to
injure, grows”); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had
repulsed such a dichotomy at every opportunity and that it was senseless to
provide the greatest protection to those that reach the widest audience, do the
greatest damage to private reputation, and “pollute the channels of communication
with the most misinformation”).
463. Id. at 781–84 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens,
J., dissenting).
464. Id. at 782 n.7. Justice Brennan hints at an equal-protection problem posed
by such a distinction: “The free speech guarantee gives each citizen an equal right
to self-expression and to participation in self-government.” Id. at 783 (emphasis
added). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Abrahamson in Denny v. Mertz,
318 N.W.2d 141, 158–59 (Wis. 1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting Art.
I, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution imposing liability for abuse of free speech
without distinguishing media and non-media defendants and opining that such a
dichotomy would violate the equal-protection clause of the state constitution).
Regardless of such constitutional limitation, drawing such a distinction posed
difficult categorization problems: “Are the publishers of handbills, labor union
newspapers, local labor union newsletters, or neighborhood association
newsletters media or non-media?” Id. at 159.
465. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 782 n.7 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “increasing convergence”
of non-media and media entities). The emergence of the internet has largely
shattered the defensibility of such a dichotomy. For an example of the importance
of bloggers, witness their lead position in exposing both the unprofessionalism of
prosecutor Michael Nifong and the rush to judgment by the national media. See
Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375, at 152–78. On the harm that mass
dissemination can cause, particularly via social media and the internet, see supra
text accompanying note 172; infra text accompanying notes 1032, 1049–52, 1059,
1069, 1072.
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What is undeniable is that at least six Court members rejected any nonmedia-versus-media dichotomy. 466 The Powell plurality joined by
Rehnquist did not reach the issue. 467 Five members found Gertz did not
apply in purely private-concern cases, at least as to presumed and punitive
damages. 468 What remains of Gertz and its careful balancing act post-Dun
& Bradstreet is not clear. Several Court members clearly interpreted Gertz
as totally constitutionalizing defamation law. 469 Since a five-member
majority repudiated this in Dun & Bradstreet, the eminently logical
corollary is that all the common law remains intact in purely private
concern cases with defendants protected only by common-law absolute
and qualified privileges.
However, Justice Powell’s opinion left the latter corollary unclear.
After analyzing New York Times and Gertz and progeny, he then broadly
and all-inclusively stated that the Court had “never considered whether the
Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of
public concern.” 470 But later, Powell opined in dictum that purely private
speech is “not totally unprotected” 471 by the First Amendment. One way,
and the most defensible way, of resolving this ambiguity is to interpret
Justice Powell’s opinion as allowing lower courts to find that the common
466. See supra text accompanying notes 461–65. Few commentators defend
the non-media-versus-media dichotomy. See Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra
note 151, at 1529 (terming the dichotomy “perverse”).
467. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757–63; id. at 784 n.10 (Brennan, J., with
Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Powell
opinion did not explicitly reject the media-versus-non-media dichotomy but had
expressly refused to use that distinction to resolve the matter at issue).
468. See supra text accompanying note 451. The public-concern criterion may
be more limited than the “public or general interest” test adopted in Rosenbloom.
See supra text accompanying notes 26–27. Others have agreed. See, e.g., Smolla,
New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1541. See also the Court’s parallel,
narrow definition in Snyder v. Phelps in cases involving true matter, discussed
supra note 448.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 412–28; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S.
at 785 n.11 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., joining,
dissenting) (Agreeing with Justice White, Justice Brennan stated that Gertz
rejected a public-concern limitation because of the problem posed by the
Rosenbloom plurality, i.e., “[d]istrust of placing in the courts the power to decide
what speech was of public concern . . . .”).
470. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., with Rehnquist, J., and
O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
471. Id. at 760. See also other language suggesting a broad, all-inclusive
ratification of the common law in non-public-concern cases. Id. at 753, 755, 757–
58, 761 n.7.
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law’s aforementioned, speech-protective privileges also suffice for First
Amendment purposes 472—a position the Court took in the Petition Clause
setting. 473
Justice Brennan attempted, albeit unpersuasively, to creatively cobble
together the dwindling residue of Gertz into a reduced mantle of
protection, opining that the parties, and presumably the Court, had not
questioned respondent’s burden of proving fault to get actual damages. 474
However, that point is not at all clear. The common-law triad of
presumptions—malice as a subterfuge for strict liability, presumed
damages in defamation-per-se cases, falsity and placing the burden of
proof on defendant to prove the truth 475—were apparently operational in
Vermont and implicitly ratified in the Vermont Supreme Court’s
opinion. 476 Indeed, Justice Brennan himself emphasized at the very end of
his opinion that one of the jury instruction errors warranting reversal was
472. See, e.g., the discussions of the rationale for common-law privileges.
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1977), 243–44, 258–59. See also
Epstein, supra note 50, at 791 (noting that the common law “operates from a deep
conviction in the importance” of freedom of speech and suggesting this as the
basis for the general level of satisfaction with defamation law pre-New York
Times). See the recent parallel views of Justice Thomas discussed in infra text
accompanying notes 1019–23.
473. See supra text accompanying note 399.
474. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Levine and Wermiel view Brennan’s
dissent as a “small victory” in that New York Times and Gertz were not limited to
media defendants, that the opinion did not put matters not of public concern
“entirely outside” the First Amendment, and that no Court opinion questioned
New York Times. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 39, at 100. The authors view Dun
& Bradstreet as appearing to preserve, “albeit without fanfare,” “a fundamental
tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence at a point in history when it very much
remained vulnerable.” Id. at 101. The authors also note that “at least inside the
Court support was clearly eroding” for “the landmark that had universally been
considered the solid and immutable foundation of First Amendment
jurisprudence”: “Although Brennan tried to convince himself otherwise, it must
have shaken his faith in his own legacy as the Justice who had both discovered
and articulated the ‘central meaning’ of the First Amendment. As the drama
entered its final Act, at least from Brennan’s perspective, there was no ‘occasion
for dancing in the streets.’” Id. at 89 n.531 (quoting Henry Kalven, Jr., The New
York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment”,
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964)).
475. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 6:11.
476. Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417–21 (Vt.
1984) (adopting in general common-law rules except as to the qualified privilege
for credit-reporting agencies). See supra text accompanying notes 442–45.
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the failure to impose a negligence burden on respondent Greenmoss
Builders. 477
In sum, the most defensible and logical interpretation of Dun &
Bradstreet’s import, supported by the clear Court majority’s broad
phrasing in later caveats in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 478 and
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 479 is that the common law of the states
remains presumptively 480 intact as a pristine collective in purely private477. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
478. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1985) (“When the
speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the
constitution still supplants the standards of the common law . . . . When the speech
is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun &
Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in
at least some of the features of the common-law landscape.”). The clear majority
adopts these distinctions. One could argue that the Court does so unanimously, as
the four dissenters, including Justice Rehnquist, see supra text accompanying
notes 148–54, evidenced no disagreement with the majority on this issue. The
majority viewed the matter before it—links to organized crime used to influence
state-governmental processes—as a matter of public concern. Phila. Newspapers,
475 U.S. at 769, 776, 778. The Court also viewed its prior jurisprudence as
supporting a public-concern, purely private-concern dichotomy. Id. at 774–78.
See also discussion infra note 964.
479. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 n.6 (1990) (Philadelphia
Newspapers was interpreted as “stand[ing] for the proposition that a statement on
matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability
under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media
defendant is involved.”); id. at 20 (“[W]here such a statement [reasonably
implying false, defamatory facts] involves a private figure on a matter of public
concern, a plaintiff must show that the false connotations were made with some
level of fault as required by Gertz.”). But cf. Randall Bezanson, The Libel Tort
Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 535 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter, Bezanson, Libel
Tort], who interprets Dun & Bradstreet’s private-libel scenario as limited to
“essentially private, commercial, or special purpose information to a defined and
strictly limited audience” that reflects the realm of common-law privilege. In his
view, the category of private libel is so limited as to “be de minimus, and perhaps
irrelevant” to the present or future libel tort. Id. On the other hand, in cases of
“mass communication or communication available to an undifferentiated
audience,” First Amendment privileges “apply in full force,” id. at 548, “freed of
the moorings of the common law.” Id. at 556.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 70–144. See also King, supra note
371, at 695 n.251 (concluding that such broad statements support an equally broad
conclusion that matters of defamation law involving no matters of public concern
are left solely to the states); Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, 1548
(stating a “neutral reading” of Dun & Bradstreet would view it as “something of

210

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

concern cases. This collective includes: presumed and punitive damages 481
available under state-law standards; presumed falsity with truth as an
affirmative defense and the defendant-defamer having the burden of
proof; 482 presumed malice as a subterfuge for strict liability; 483 absolute
and conditional privileges subject to any limitations imposed by state law,
including qualified privileges subject to defeasance by any of the forfeiture

an exercise in federalism” according states “a powerful plaintiff’s weapon” more
likely to effectuate states’ interests than Dun & Bradstreet’s damage rules); id. at
1569 (“In private figure cases involving issues of private concern . . . the [Gertz]
negligence standard cannot hold, and the pressure of the analysis in Dun &
Bradstreet will probably eliminate any [F]irst [A]mendment requirements in such
cases.”).
481. See supra text accompanying note 451.
482. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §§ 2:3, 6:11. For cases adopting this
point of view, see supra text accompanying notes 448, 500. But cf. Smolla, New
Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1526–31 (noting that the burden of proof of
falsity in either public-person or private-person and private-concern cases was
open but arguing plaintiffs should have the burden of proving falsity as consistent
with the general rules of torts).
483. See supra text accompanying notes 434, 448, 480; infra text
accompanying note 500; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 6:11. See also
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 117,
234 n.33 (1990) (concluding strict liability is the “most common reading” of Dun
& Bradstreet); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberations and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 667–68 n.327 (“clear implication”); Richard Tofel,
Private Affairs and Public People: The Next Horizon, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 8,
1986, at 16 (“[T]he common law of libel survives”). At least five members of the
Court would likely interpret strict liability as viable after Dun & Bradstreet in
non-public-concern cases. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 773–74 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he Gertz requirement of some
kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as
this.”); id. (arguing for repudiation of Gertz); id. at 763–64 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (agreeing with White, J., that Gertz was “ill-conceived” as to the
“ordinary private citizen” and should be overruled); id. at 757 (Powell, J., with
Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor) (“We have never considered whether the Gertz
balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public
concern.”). See also the all-inclusive quote from Harley-Davison Motorsports,
Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359 (Or. 1977). See supra text accompanying note 450.
Cf. Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1545–61 (conceding that Dun
& Bradstreet likely allows strict liability even in public-person, non-publicconcern cases but arguing against such as a matter of torts and public policy).
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grounds permitted by state law; 484 and liability for opinionative
defamation. 485
As stated above, the most logical and compelling interpretation of the
Court’s jurisprudence after Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. is an all-inclusive
sphere of exemption from the First Amendment constraints of Gertz and
progeny in the purely private defamation setting. A then-contemporaneous
state criminal-libel decision, People v. Heinrich, 486 illustrates this clearly.
In the latter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction 487 during the pendency of and just prior to issuance of its Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. decision. 488 The criminal defendant in Heinrich was
convicted for distributing to members of the general public and the
victim’s mother a newsletter imputing extraordinary sexual misconduct
and parental unfitness and urging recipients to contact church groups or
the Illinois Department of Child and Family Services to protect the
victim’s non-marital child from her mother’s “deviate moral behavior.” 489
Both the state’s criminal-defamation statute and the Illinois Constitution
limited a truth defense to only matters published “with justifiable ends”

484. See supra text accompanying note 448. Note that the Dun & Bradstreet
majority found no First Amendment protection despite the absence of any
qualified privilege in the credit-reporting context, following the minority view.
See supra text accompanying note 444. It also cited favorably a case, Stuempges
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 254, 257–60 (Minn. 1980), that rejected
New York Times for both punitive damages and abuse of a qualified privilege. In
the latter setting, protecting a job-seeker—especially when defendant was a listed
reference—from “malicious undercutting” by a prior employer was very
important. In this context, the former employer’s “state of mind” was “more
significant” than knowledge of falsity. Id. at 258.
485. The Court has clearly limited its provability-as-factually-false
requirement to matters of public concern: “Hepps ensures that a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably
false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich v.
Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §§
6:11, 8:25. See also supra text accompanying note 580.
486. People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. 1984).
487. Heinrich v. Ill., 471 U.S. 1011 (1985).
488. The Court dismissed the appeal in Heinrich on April 15, 1985, and issued
Dun & Bradstreet on June 26, 1985.
489. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d at 967–68.
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and “good motives” 490—the U.S. minority view. 491 The Illinois Supreme
Court unanimously rejected any suggestion that the Court’s defamation
jurisprudence in New York Times and Gertz mandated an absolute,
unqualified truth defense in cases not involving public persons or matters
of public interest. 492 The Supreme Court apparently concurred, as all
Justices agreed to the denial of certiorari. 493
Of course, this proposed interpretation, i.e., the availability of
common-law liability limited by the truth defense and common-law
privileges, terrifies the print and electronic media—and it should. Justice
Powell provided a telling Heinrich-type illustration involving a woman of
unblemished reputation branded a whore by a neighbor and suggested that
the dissent’s approach would effectively “constitutionalize the entire
common law of libel.” 494 For an example of a proper construction of Dun
490. Id. at 968, 970. See also Noonan v. Staples, 556 F.3d 20, 28–31 (1st Cir.
2009) (holding that an employer’s e-mail to all employees stating that plaintiff
was terminated for violation of travel- and expense-reimbursement policies was
actionable despite the charge’s truth because of the employer’s common law
malicious intent or ill will and excessive publication, rejecting the specialized
definition of malice in First Amendment cases as to matters of public concern and
further finding such evidence sufficient for abuse of any common-law qualified
privilege).
491. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 2:3; Restatement (Second) of
Torts §581A cmts a, b (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
492. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d at 970–72. The court quoted from Garrison v.
Louisiana, concluding that true speech could not be sanctioned in cases involving
discussion of public affairs, Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), but noted
that the Court had appended a caveat as to an unqualified truth defense in cases
of “purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs . . . .” Heinrich, 470
N.E.2d at 971 (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8 (“[N]othing we say today is
to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitutional
guarantees in the discrete area of purely private libels.” (emphasis added))). See
supra text accompanying note 409; infra text accompanying notes 938–68. Note
that scenarios like Heinrich reflect the same policy underpinnings as the publicdisclosure-of-embarrassing-true-private-facts tort, which provides no commonlaw or First Amendment privilege as to items not of public interest. See ELDER,
PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, § 3:17. As the author has said, “A truth-asdefense First Amendment requirement in ‘purely private’ cases would completely
eviscerate the privacy tort of public disclosure and allow newspaper-defendants
to ‘bootstrap’ themselves out of publication liability for trespassory or intrusive
conduct resulting in the publication of true matter.” ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra
note 92, § 6:11 n.10.
493. See supra text accompanying note 487.
494. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
n.7 (1985) (Powell, J., with Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor, J., concurring).
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& Bradstreet’s impact, consider Lassiter v. Lassiter, 495 a case in which
plaintiff, a state-university law professor, sued his ex-wife, also a stateuniversity law professor, 496 for statements made in a confessional book
that charged him with spousal abuse and adultery. 497 The federal trial and
appellate courts correctly held that plaintiff was not a public official or
figure 498 and that the issue was not of public concern. 499 Only Kentucky
common law applied. 500 Ultimately, this provided ample protection under
Kentucky law, as the two libel claims were covered by Kentucky’s
substantial-truth doctrine as to the domestic-violence charges 501 and broad
supra-constitutional opinion doctrine as to the charges of adultery with
students. 502

495. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880–82 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d
per curiam, 280 F.App’x 503 (6th Cir. 2008).
496. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 877, 880.
497. Id. at 878–81.
498. Id. at 880.
499. Id. (Following controlling Kentucky precedent, the court concluded that
the matter before it “does ‘not implicate [those] constitutional protections.’”)
(quoting Stinger v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Ky. 2004) (as
standing for the proposition that no constitutional protection extends to
defamation cases involving “a purely private concern about private persons . . .”)).
500. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 880–82. The court correctly found the
imputation of domestic violence libelous per se as an imputation of crime and
both statements libelous per se as calling into question plaintiff’s fitness as a law
professor. Id. at 880–81. These conclusions gave rise to the traditional, commonlaw conclusions in Kentucky and elsewhere—a presumption of falsity with
defendant having a burden of refutation by a preponderance of evidence,
presumption of damage, and presumption of malice as a veil for strict liability. Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 448, 481–83.
501. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 879.
502. Id. at 879–82. The court interpreted Kentucky case-law interpretation of
Restatement (Second) of Torts §566 (Am. L. Inst. 1977) as providing common
law protection to the adultery-with-students charge as long as defendant’s
evidence—circumstantial evidence and existent but inadmissible-as-hearsay
rumor which defendant found persuasive—was fully disclosed. Lassiter, 456 F.
Supp. 2d at 879–82. The court may well be right regarding Kentucky precedent.
However, this conclusion is not consistent with the Court’s decision in Milkovich
v. Lorain J. Co., where the Court held that opinions based on omitted or inaccurate
facts or a wrongful assessment thereof might imply a factual statement that would
be actionable under the First Amendment. See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497
U.S. 1 (1990); supra text accompanying notes 584–86. Significant reliance on
rumor would seem to support a legitimate argument that the basis for the adultery
charge was actionable as a statement of fact and not opinionative under Milkovich.
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The Lassiter result appears persuasive and in sync with Dun &
Bradstreet’s majoritarian repudiation of the media-versus-non-media
anomaly 503 and adoption of a purely private-concern-versus-publicconcern dichotomy. 504 Would Lassiter have been decided differently had
the libel been published in a tabloid gossip column rather than by a vanity
book publisher or where self-published? 505 Would Heinrich have been
decided any differently had the scandalous charges been published in a
small-town newspaper, by a city television station’s resident gossipmonger, or by a local radio “shock jock” or the like? What if the
defamation at issue in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., and bankruptcy had been
imputed to an identified garden-variety employee in the media—would it
have been a matter of purely private concern? All would be very doubtful
candidates for First Amendment protection under Dun & Bradstreet. Of
course, the specter of civil—and/or criminal libel—liability outrages the
media. After all, a certain segment of its readership enjoys, even salivates,
over such sleaze. It must be protected, so goes the argument, or rabid
chilling-effect-self-censorship will ensue! 506 Merely articulating the
media’s argument suggests its own compelling refutation. If publishers do
not or will not censor such drivel, the common law and the criminal law
will—and appropriately so in defense of the states’ wholly legitimate
interests in protecting maligned reputation 507 and regulating pollution of
public discourse 508 in areas outside the “necessarily broad” 509 realm of
legitimate public discussion. 510 This is a small but necessarily important
reminder that Gertz, Dun & Bradstreet, and progeny collectively allow
503. See supra text accompanying notes 462–66.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 446–53.
505. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 878 n.1, 879–80 (noting that the codefendant
vanity publisher had been initially sued but was dismissed after it ceased
publication and declining to treat the author-codefendant-self-publisher of a
limited-circulation book as a media defendant).
506. For critical discussions of the chilling-effect-self-censorship issue, see
supra text accompanying notes 50–52, 167, 339, 457; infra text accompanying
notes 880–93, 925, 1019–36, 1066–67.
507. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 30, 44–45, 93–95, 168–69, 257;
infra text accompanying notes 599–600, 868–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 453, 462; infra text
accompanying notes 702–04, 724–29, 767, 870–81, 907, 925, 973, 1017–81.
509. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court has clearly indicated limitations on this “necessarily broad”
standard. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 448, 468 (discussing Snyder v.
Phelps); supra text accompanying note 450.
510. See supra notes 88 and 402–511; infra text accompanying notes 580, 742,
938–68, 1026.

2022]

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

215

courts to draw a line in the sand and admonish the media—and nonmedia—purveyors of sleaze and defamatory drivel to breach the line at
their peril. 511
VII. THE “OPINION” DOCTRINE
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
issued a closely divided opinion, Ollman v. Evans, 512 in which the bare
majority 513 accorded absolutely protected, First Amendment, pure-opinion
status 514 to defendant-columnists’ characterization of plaintiff-Marxistacademic-candidate to chair a major university’s politics-government
department as having “no status within the profession” and as “a pure and
simple activist.” 515 The quote was attributed to an unidentified political
scientist at a “major eastern university, whose scholarship and reputation
as a liberal are well known.” 516 The clear intimation was it came from a
highly responsible, reputable source. 517 The majority denied plaintiff’s
claim despite the exceptionally damning nature of the characterization, 518
relying on a brief, platitudinous dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 519
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 520 Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, termed this result “nothing less than

511. Id. On the impact of the internet, see supra text accompanying notes 172,
329–30, 465; infra text accompanying notes 1032, 1049–52, 1059, 1069, 1072,
1081.
512. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
513. The vote was 6-5. Id. at 971.
514. Id. at 978–92 (applying a four-factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test).
515. Id. at 973 (emphasis omitted).
516. Id. (emphasis omitted).
517. Id. at 1034 (Wald, with Edwards, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting in part)
(concluding the cited source provided the defamatory statement “more rather than
less of a factual and verifiable quality”); id. at 1037 (Scalia, J., with Wald, J., and
Edwards, J., dissenting in part) (suggesting such equated to the imprimatur of “an
impartial and indeed sympathetic expert”).
518. Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1128–29 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., with
Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing the consensus actionableper-se doctrine for statements defamatory of an individual’s business, profession,
or office). See infra text accompanying notes 521–22.
519. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”).
520. See Ollman, 471 U.S. at 1127 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting).

216

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

extraordinary” 521 as to a profession where peer assessment is “virtually the
sole component” 522 of professional repute. In joining in Gertz, Justice
Rehnquist said he had viewed this language as a quintessential statement
of the marketplace-of-ideas theory. 523 Yet, petitioner-Ollman cited cases
on appeal that interpreted this same language as a mode of “solv[ing] with
a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question,” 524 oblivious to the
common law’s “rich and complex history” in struggling with this
dilemma. 525 Quoting Judge Wald in dissent, Rehnquist and Burger viewed
the statement as an actionable factual assertion. 526
Contemporaneous with the above development, the Court denied
certiorari, with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting on other
521. Id. at 1128.
522. Id. at 1129 (comparing the consolation and “healthy recourse” lawyers
and doctors have through professional fees). On the concern Justice Rehnquist
had for protection of professional reputation in another context, see infra text
accompanying notes 569–611.
523. Ollman, 471 U.S. at 1129 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(interpreting the Gertz dictum as reflecting the “classical views” of Thomas
Jefferson and Oliver Wendell Holmes “that there [is] no such thing as a false
‘idea’ in the political sense, and that test of truth for political ideas is indeed the
marketplace and not the courtroom.”)
524. Id.
525. Id. (quoting Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1239 (1976)). See Halpern, supra note 50,
at 301, 306 (terming the law just prior to Milkovich “probably the most confusing
and least principled aspect” of constitutionalized defamation law and noting the
barring of jury involvement by lower courts). Justice Rehnquist earlier quoted
Professor Hill as a respected scholar in dissenting from denial of certiorari in
Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 459 U.S. 923, 925 (1982), a case in which
petitioner, candidate for the U.S. Senate, was portrayed in an editorial as having
“sunk to a new low in Oklahoma political rhetoric—and for him that takes some
doing.” Miskovsky v. Okla. Publ’g Co., 654 P.2d 587, 594 (Okla. 1982). Justice
Rehnquist viewed the Oklahoma decision as suggesting that absolute immunity
was mandated by the preemptive Gertz dictum. See Miskovsky v. Okla. Publ’g
Co., 459 U.S. 923, 925 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., with White J., dissenting).
526. Ollman, 471 U.S. at 1130 (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1032
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wald, J., dissenting)). Judge Wald concluded that the no statusstatement “undoubtedly admits of a sufficiently ascertainable and stable core of
meaning: a decisive plurality [or “overwhelming consensus”] of his fellow
political scientists do not regard him as a good scholar.” Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1033.
See id. at 1035–36 (Edwards, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing
with Judges Wald’s and Scalia’s opinions and concluding, as a former academic,
that professional reputation is “easily verifiable” and should not be “so freely and
glibly libelled”).
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grounds, 527 in Milkovich v. News-Herald. 528 In this Ohio case, the Ohio
Supreme Court majority, and apparently all members of the United States
Supreme Court, viewed defendant’s characterization of plaintiff-teachercoach Milkovich as lying under oath in a court proceeding—but without
ever using the word “perjury” 529—as factual in nature.
The year after denial of certiorari and less than two years after
Milkovich II, 530 the Ohio Supreme Court abruptly reversed itself in the
companion case involving the school superintendent, Scott v. NewsHerald. 531 Scott then became binding in the ongoing Milkovich
litigation. 532 Why the sudden, dramatic reversal disregarding stare decisis?
The new 4-3 533 majority in Scott suggested that its earlier decision in
Milkovich was ill-conceived. 534 Angry dissenters suggested more
Machiavellian considerations. 535 What is quite clear is that the reversal of
Milkovich on the fact-opinion issue was unnecessary, as all seven members
of the court agreed that Scott, the superintendent, was a public official and
could not prove constitutional malice. 536
Writing for the Scott majority, Justice Lochner conceded that the first
two factors of Ollman’s four-factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test 537
527. See supra text accompanying notes 241–50, 270–86.
528. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196–97 (Ohio 1984).
529. See supra text accompanying notes 241–50, 270–86.
530. See supra text accompanying note 528.
531. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 705–09 (Ohio 1986).
532. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989),
appeal dismissed, 540 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1989).
533. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 699.
534. Id. at 705.
535. See infra text accompanying notes 548–66.
536. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 702–05; id. at 709 (Holmes, J., concurring); id. at
710–12 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 714 (Wright, J., concurring); id. at 716,
718 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 718
(Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 721 (Brown,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The consensus view on point is
undoubtedly correct. See infra text supporting notes 620–90.
537. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 706–09. Justice Lochner attempted, in detail but
inartfully, to ensure that the case could not be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court by indicating that the case was resolved on independent-and
adequate-state-constitutional grounds. Id. at 701, 702, 703 n.2, 709. Respondents
relied on this in claiming that the Milkovich-Scott tandem were insulated from
Court review under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The Court rejected
this contention, Milkovich v. News-Herald, 497 U.S. 1, 10–12 n.5 (1990), but
noted that the Ohio Supreme Court was free to resolve this issue on remand. Id. It
later did so but not in Milkovich. See infra text accompanying note 615.
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would have resulted in affirming the court’s earlier Milkovich opinion.
Both the specific language 538 and the charge’s verifiability supported
factuality. 539 However, the other two Ollman factors dictated otherwise.
The third factor, general context, 540 emphasized the caption and other
language that the columnist says 541 a lie occurred and parallel indicators
suggesting that the columnist made no attempt at impartiality.542 The
fourth, broader-context 543 factor weighed very heavily, 544 if not
conclusively, 545 against factuality. The column appeared on the sports
page—“a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole.” 546
538. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 706–07 (concluding there was “little question” that
the language alone would have stated a claim).
539. Id. at 707 (Whether plaintiff indeed perjured himself could be verified
through a perjury prosecution with evidence provided by transcripts and witnesses
present during the judicial hearing the columnist referred to: “Unlike a subjective
assertion the averred defamatory language is an articulation of an objectively
verifiable event.”). For a further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes
593–97.
540. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 706.
541. Id. at 707 (While cautionary terms are “not dispositive, particularly in
view of the potential for abuse,” they “strongly militate” in favor of opinionative
status.).
542. Id. at 708 (emphasizing the prefatory language—that anyone attending
the event “knows in his heart”—to the primary basis for the claim, i.e., “Milkovich
and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth”). But cf. id. at 718 (Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (conceding the article was undoubtedly biased, nonetheless its criminal
ramifications were not carefully analyzed by the majority).
543. Id. at 706.
544. Id. at 708–09.
545. The majority appears to adopt a per se non-liability rule in a wide expanse
of defamatory arenas. Id. at 715 (Wright, J., concurring) (“[R]ather than rely on a
legacy of confusion” [of irreconcilable case law], the court adopted a fundamental
assumption of the media’s responsibility and right to inform the citizenry through
all manner of “editorial comment, however harsh, on any matter of genuine public
interest.”). All opinions in columns, cartoons, and editorials were absolutely
protected. Id. This would extend to all opinion, whether pure or mixed, under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §566 (Am. L. Inst. 1977) rule. Justice Wright
would have ratcheted up protection an additional notch: any article specifically
identified as opinion would be absolutely protected. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 715. The
same would be applied to the electronic media. Id. Under this view, no trial court
would be required to attempt to decide whether defamation was capable of being
proved true or false. Id. Such an approach would provide predictability instead of
the present “legal morass.” Id.
546. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
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Unlike a legal correspondent, the reader would not expect a sports
columnist to be knowledgeable about due process or perjury. 547
Three Scott dissenters were brutally frank, and their characterizations
of the majority were withering. 548 The defamatory statement at issue
undoubtedly charged criminality 549 and apparently an objective
disinterested source had supported it. 550 The libel was thus factually
verifiable, 551 which the majority had largely ignored or deemed
irrelevant. 552 The majority’s references to says were silly and meaningless.
Clearly, such merely identified the author and sourced his charge of
criminality. 553 Even worse, the test amounted to no more than

547. Id.
548. One judge specifically accused a member of the majority of hypocrisy in
his result-oriented shifts of view on the issue of stare decisis. Id. at 723–24
(Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
549. Id. at 717–18 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part); id. at 718 (Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(noting the majority’s concession of actionability under the first factor); id. at 722
(Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (also noting the concession
such charged perjury).
550. Id. at 717 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part) (Such a source reinforced the factual assertion) (“Try as it may, the majority
cannot drown this fact [charge of perjury] in a sea of opinion.”); id. at 723 (Brown,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even the majority deemed “troubling,”
id. at 708, an OSHAA commissioner’s statements at the administrative hearing and
who had also later testified at the judicial hearing at which the purported perjury
occurred—i.e., that the stories told the judge “sounded pretty darned
unfamiliar . . . certainly sounded different from what they told us.” Id. at 708.
551. Id. at 716–17 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (noting that the majority conceded verifiability); id. at 718 (Sweeney, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 722–23 (Brown, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the resolution of the
first two factors should conclusively resolve a finding of actionable factuality).
552. See supra text accompanying notes 537–47.
553. Id. at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part); id. at 723 (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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“unintelligible gibberish” 554 or a “verbal orgy of nonsensical jargon” 555
attributable to a court’s recently shifting membership 556 deliberately
cultivating media prejudices 557 by adopting a media-always-wins 558
“Jekyll and Hyde transformation” 559 of fact-into-opinion rule. The rule
leaves little, if anything, actionable 560 if put on the sports page 561—with
sports journalists treated in ridiculous fashion and stereotyped as “colorful
554. Id. at 722 n.11 (concluding that the four-factor test adopted by a “resultoriented” majority was a “standardless standard”). See id. at 717 n.8 (Celebrezze,
C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (Under the majority’s
elastic test, “the only thing which is clear is that a statement’s characterization as
fact or opinion is truly in the eye of the individual judge. . . . with as much
guidance as . . . the newspaper’s daily horoscope.”); id. at 719 (Sweeney, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (This is “no test at all” because it
can be manipulated to effectuate any desired result—such a test is “patently
arbitrary . . . .”); id. at 723 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(The majority’s test was so malleable and spongy as to permit any judge or
appellate court to designate any undoubtedly defamatory factual statement as
opinionative and accord “for all practical purposes . . . absolute immunity for
every congenital liar . . . .”); id. at 723 (The majority test is “no more than a geyser
spouting judicial steam, fog, and mist.”).
555. Id. at 725 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
556. Id. at 724–25.
557. Id. at 725 (noting that such was “particularly beneficial” to one of the
majority opinion members).
558. Id. at 721 n.10 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting “the real rule adopted by the majority: in a libel case, the newspaper
always wins”).
559. Id. at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is “not only unworkable” but
was used “in self-contradictory fashion to reach an untenable result”); id. at 722–
23, 723 n.12 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analogizing to
Orwell’s Big Brother, where via “convoluted reasoning, contradictory terms or
concepts are considered to be synonymous”); id. at 726 (noting that every factual
statement becomes opinion under the majority’s “vacuous nonsense”).
560. Id. at 725 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that judges should in the future routinely direct verdicts or grant
summary judgments in media libel trials after the majority edict).
561. Id. at 717 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (posing the only half-humorous question whether such a “probably” opinion
rule would result in editors unsure of factual accuracy running a news article in
the comics section or sports section); id. at 719 (Sweeney, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part) (denominating such “a veritable per se rule”);
Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (The “clear message” is put
it on the sports page to avoid liability.).
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and opinionated but innately lacking in credibility . . . .” 562 This
obfuscation 563 ignored the Ohio Constitution’s explicit limitation on
abuse 564 of freedoms of expression and specific protection of the right of
reputation. 565 The majority did not frankly admit, as had Justice Black, that
it was according the media absolute immunity. 566
The Ollman-Scott, multi-factor test and its hugely protective, if not
nearly-always-absolute, immunity for all manner of factual statements
transmuted to opinion 567 appeared before the full Supreme Court in the
Ohio case’s third iteration 568 in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal. 569 Now-Chief

562. Id. at 716–17 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part). See id. at 719 (Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(terming such disparagement of sports writers and their readers “tasteless and
unwarranted . . . haughty and snobbish”).
563. Id. at 726 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
564. Id. at 720 (Sweeney, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part)
(quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11, which expressly limits rights of free expression
by imposing a condition, i.e., “being responsible for the abuse of the right,” and
noting such was intended to subsume the limits imposed by defamation law).
Incredibly, the majority made a reference to § 11 in support of its position. Id. at
702. This is a kangaroo leap in logic.
565. Id. at 720 (Sweeney, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part) (citing
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16); id. at 725–26 (Brown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting the same article, the “open courts” provision,
specifically guaranteeing “remedy by due course of” for injury to reputation,
treated as equal in stature to person, land and goods). Any such preferential
treatment for the media runs afoul of “equal justice for all” concerns
underpinnings of the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 720 (Sweeney, J.,
concurring in result and dissenting in part); id. at 726 (Brown, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1 (Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses)).
566. Id. at 726 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
567. See supra text accompanying notes 512–26.
568. See the earlier certiorari denials in the Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 474
U.S. 953 (1985); see also supra discussion and text accompanying notes 241–50,
270–89; Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980).
569. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The case involved a libel
in a sports column in which the columnist imputed perjury to Milkovich, a high
school teacher-wrestling coach, and Scott, the municipal school superintendent,
following a court hearing in which parents challenged an Ohio High School
Athletic Association ban on the high school’s participation that year in the state
tournament. Both Milkovich and Scott had testified in the administrative hearing
before the OSHAA and during the legal proceedings contesting the ban. The
columnist had attended the match in question, at which a fight had occurred, and
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Justice Rehnquist pounced. He rejected any suggestion the Gertz dictum 570
was anything other than a restatement of the Holmesian marketplace of
ideas 571 theory. Delineating in detail the Court’s extensive
jurisprudence, 572 he found such wholly adequate 573 to protect the First
Amendment’s fundamental guarantee 574 of free discussion of public
issues. No separate “artificial dichotomy” 575 of opinion versus fact was
either defensible or necessary. Indeed, previously, the Court broadly
protected imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole. 576 Further, its
decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 577 barred any action
the OSHAA hearing but not the court hearing. Id. at 3–4. The entire article is
contained in the Court’s opinion. Id. at 5–7 n.2.
570. See supra text accompanying notes 519, 525. Importantly, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted on the opinion’s first page an “odyssey of litigation spanning
nearly 15 years.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3. This evidences unequivocally both his
awareness of and suggested disquietude at both the length of litigation and the
media’s go-to-the-mattresses-and-bleed-them-dry mentality in countering
attempts to redress reputational and other damage. On the same page an asterisk
listed the amicus curiae briefs by the “usual suspects” in the media-law
community. On the issue of the disparate nature of the resources available to
plaintiff and defense counsel, see infra text accompanying notes 861–65, 618–19,
845, 861–65, 916, 926–28, 982–85, 999, 1077.
571. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18. Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist had cited the
Gertz dictum positively in his unanimous opinion Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988).
572. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14–21.
573. Id. at 19–21.
574. Id. at 22.
575. Id. at 19.
576. Id. at 16–17, 20. The cases cited were: Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970) (treating media defendants’
characterization of plaintiff’s public and wholly legal negotiating posture as
“blackmail” as “no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet” in light of
defendant’s full and accurate depiction of plaintiff’s proposal); Nat’l Ass’n of
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974) (finding the word “traitor”
as used in Jack London’s definition of “scab” to be “rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty
and imaginative expression” in a labor setting); Hustler Mag., Inc., 485 U.S. at
50–57 (finding that an ad parody of Reverend Falwell was absolutely protected);
see also infra text accompanying notes 1000–17. This line of precedent shares a
common feature—absolute protection is provided because none of the statements
could “‘reasonably [be] interpreted as starting actual facts’ about an individual.’”
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc., 485
U.S. at 50). For a suggestion this non-provability-as-factually-false is the true,
limited holding of Hustler, see supra text accompanying note 773.
577. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1985).
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by any plaintiff, public or private, 578 against a media defendant 579 on an
issue of public concern 580 unless plaintiff could show the defamatory
matter at issue was provable as factually false. 581
Philadelphia Newspapers’s provability-as-factually-false mandate
could be demonstrated where the publisher or speaker implies knowledge
of substratal facts supporting a conclusion. 582 For example, a bald
statement that “in my opinion John Jones is a liar” would thus be
actionable. 583 In addition, a statement may state a false, factual assertion
where the speaker or publisher discloses the substratal facts but where such
are incorrect or incomplete 584 or defendant’s assessment of them is in
error. 585 Merely framing statements in opinionative language does not
578. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16, 17, 20 n.6. The Court’s focus on its statusdetermining, fault criteria and its silence otherwise as to the political nature of the
plaintiff or the political context of publication seems to unequivocally reject the
political-arena doctrine of Judge Bork, see supra text accompanying note 92,
outside the imaginative-speech or rhetorical-hyperbole context. See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 8:18 (internal quotation omitted).
579. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16, 19–20 n.6 (following its reservation as to nonmedia defendants in Philadelphia Newspapers); see supra text accompanying
notes 446–511.
580. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16, 19–21 (again, following its non-media
reservation); see supra text accompanying notes 446–511. As to opinion in nonpublic-concern cases, see supra text accompanying note 485. On the purely
private-concern limitation in general and its import for limiting First Amendment
protection, see supra text accompanying notes 88, 402–511; infra text
accompanying notes 742, 938–68, 1026.
581. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–23.
582. Id. at 18–19.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 19.
585. Id. The first two emphasized phrases merely restate versions of mixed
opinion actionable if the fault-regarding-falsity requirement is met. ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §§ 8:2, 8:16. However, the third erroneous-assessment
aspect would seem to repudiate that aspect of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§566 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1977) that provides pure opinion and absolutely protected
status to any opinion when the underlying facts are stated or assumed “no matter
how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is.” Id.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 8:16 (“[T]he post-Milkovich plaintiff is
not powerless in the face of a defendant which discloses innocuous facts or facts
capable of differing interpretations and then, by a quantum leap in logic, adopts the
most condemnatory interpretation possible.”); see also id. § 8:2. The Court’s most
recent denial of certiorari case involving a challenge to New York Times also raised
the issue of whether designation as a “hate group” was provable as factually false
under Milkovich-Philadelpia Newspapers, Inc. Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc.
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refute such connotations. 586 In such cases there is no difference between
stating “Jones is a liar” and prefacing it with “in my opinion”—they may
be equally damning, defamatory, and damaging. 587 Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted and heavily relied on Judge Friendly’s elegant critique
of the opinion doctrine: “[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a
writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct]
simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words ‘I think.’” 588
v. S. Poverty L. Ctr., 142 S. Ct. 2453 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). See infra note 1020.
586. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
587. Id. The Court contrasts the following statement as nonactionable: “In my
opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of
Marx and Lenin . . . .” Id. at 20. Of course, what is not provably false and
nonactionable is the abysmal-ignorance comment. The charge that he is a MarxistLeninist advocate or acolyte would be actionable under the general rule. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331–32 n.4 (1974).
588. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Cianci v. New
Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)). Two scholars propose a “broad
reading” of the opinion rule in the internet-social media setting, emphasizing “the
unique aspects of the medium” and
based on a thorough understanding of both the internal and external
concept of social-media expression. . . . In addition to the specific
language that comprises each statement, courts must become familiar
with the architectural constraints that govern social-media usage,
conventions of discourse within each social forum, and even patterns of
communication between different subgroups within the particular
medium.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and
Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 155, 156–61 (2016). Given the § 230 immunity of internet service providers,
admittedly under attack, see infra text accompanying notes 1032, 1049–52, 1068,
1071, the author has serious concerns about this proposal. In light of the vast
potential for dissemination and possible permanence of libel on the internet, is it
wise—or required by the First Amendment—to adopt this broad reading of
opinion in such suits against social-media libel posters, the only possible parties
that internet libel victims can currently pursue? Would such a rule not merely add
to the debasement of public discourse that many view as a threat to American
democracy? Should or does it not matter that the law of libel views as actionable,
factual libel what social-media posters themselves now assume they can do with
impunity? As a society, do we really want to totally eliminate the deterrent effect
that libel law may have on social-media discourse by adopting what is, in essence,
a bootstrapping rule for internet libelers based in their own very relaxed, if not
boundary-less standards of communication? Would such a proposed rule apply at
all in the purely private-concern realm, where Milkovich does not apply and where
only state common-law defenses and privileges apply? Arguably more defensibly,
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In sum, the Court rejected the proposed Scott multi-factor test as based
on misguided reliance 589 on the Gertz dictum and proceeded to analyze the
specific language at issue in Scott-Milkovich. Quoting the Scott opinion’s
concessions on factors one, specific language,590 and two, verifiability, 591
the Court refused to “trump[]” 592 such—as had the Ohio Supreme Court—
by factors three and four. The connotation of perjury at issue was
“sufficiently factual to be susceptible” of proof as true or false. 593 A factual
determination—that Milkovich lied under oath—could be made via “a
core of objective evidence” 594 by, among other means, comparing
Milkovich’s testimony before the OSHAA board and his later court
testimony. 595 The Scott court had conceded as much. 596 Such a defamatory
statement constitutes “an articulation of an objectively verifiable

the authors note that social-media libel cases may and should “prompt rethinking”
of constitutional malice in such cases and whether courts should restrict it in cases
where “delusional defamers pursue imagined vendettas based on invented
‘facts.’” Lidsky & Jones, supra note 588, at 159, 173–78.
589. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
590. Id. at 21 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio
1986)) (“[T]he clear impact in some nine sentences and a caption is that
[Milkovich] ‘lied at the hearing after . . . having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth.’” (alteration in original)). See supra text accompanying notes 538, 549–50.
The Court then said of the aforementioned quoted language from Scott: “This is
not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language [clearly alluding to the
Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell cases discussed in the text supported by supra
note 576] which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously
maintaining that [Milkovich] committed the crime of perjury. Nor does the
general tenor of the article negate this impression.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
Although mildly ambiguous, the concluding general-tenor language appears to
refer only to the imaginative-speech or rhetorical-hyperbole cases specifically
referenced and “does not justify a wholesale revivification and application of all
the cited ‘signals’ developed before and after Ollman to ‘trump’ or negate
otherwise verifiable statements.” ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 8:15.
591. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21–22 (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707
“[W]hether or not . . . [Milkovich] did perjure himself is certainly verifiable by a
perjury action with evidence adduced from the transcripts and witnesses present
at the hearing.” (first alteration in original)). See infra text accompanying notes
594–98.
592. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 9.
593. Id. at 21.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id.
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event.” 597 This commonsense fact-finder focus 598 recognized the states’
“pervasive and strong interest” 599 in protecting reputation and “holds the
balance true” 600 between the competing interests.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented only from the majority’s
application of its opinion doctrine now subsumed into a Philadelphia
597. Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707). This
reflects the Court’s undoubted view that “if the particular issue in question . . . is
one capable of or regularly resolved through the normal processes of the law and
means, methods, and rules of proof, then it is likewise appropriate for resolution
in the context of defamation litigation.” ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §
8:19.
598. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (emphasizing that the “dispositive question”
revolved around whether a “reasonable factfinder” could find an implied
imputation of perjury). Applying the Ollman or an equivalent set of criteria, courts
had theretofore engaged in a supposed “reasonable” person analysis that had, in
fact, become a “reasonable” person “capable of making sophisticated and astute,
if not metaphysical, distinctions based on such factors. . . . a modern version of
the long disavowed in mitiori sensu doctrine . . . a new mandatory . . . innocent
construction rule applied to the opinion-fact dichotomy rather than . . .
interpretation of the matter as defamatory.” ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92,
§ 8:17. Milkovich attempted to refute this approach and to reaffirm traditional,
court-jury functions. Id. The Court’s emphasis on a revitalized jury function is
consistent with the time-honored experience dating from the trial of John Peter
Zenger, where the jury’s nullification of a criminal-libel charge was widely
viewed as a blow for free expression. Modern libel law has, by contrast, been
“devoted to protecting speech from the jury.” Frederick Schauer, The Role Of The
People In First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 763, 764–65 (1986)
[hereinafter Schauer, First Amendment Theory]. Professor Schauer proposes that
the law “value popular decision making more with respect to free speech issues”
in a non-dispositive fashion. Id. at 783. He notes the anomaly of the anti-jury
mindset of the law: “But in an age of [F]irst [A]mendment complexity, it is hard
to justify excluding popular imputs as we increasingly rely on popular power to
provide the theoretical foundations for the [F]irst [A]mendment.” Id. at 785. See
John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 559 (2002) (citing the
Zenger trial and noting that the jury “brings to bear local social norms” to legal
norms from centralized democratic institutions and remains “a key institution to
inject popular sentiment into the legal system”). Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Court strongly reflected a parallel sentiment in Milkovich. See generally
Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1990).
599. Id. at 22 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). See supra
text accompanying notes 14, 30, 44–45, 93–94, 102–03, 108, 135, 154, 257, 450;
infra text accompanying notes 858, 868–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
600. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22–23 (emphasis added).
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Newspapers-based requirement of provability-as-factually-false. 601 In
interpreting the latter, the dissenters opined—grandiosely and quite
incredibly—that the majority applied the “same indicia” 602 as Ollman. A
careful reading of the dissent’s analysis shows just how dramatically the
majority deviated from Ollman’s approach. The dissenters provided a
laundry list of factors that “signaled repeatedly” 603 to the reader that the
columnist did not know what had been said at the legal hearing and that
he was engaged in protected patent conjecture, i.e., an “author’s ‘best
guess.’” 604 This list included: multiple uses of cautionary language; 605
clear indicators as to where facts stopped and the columnist was “simply
guessing”; 606 a tone that is “pointed, exaggerated, and heavily laden with
emotional rhetoric and moral outrage”; 607 a format signaling the reader to
look for commentary; 608 and a one-sided, partisan point of view. 609
In the face of the dissenter’s litany—justified by a devout claim that
First Amendment protection must be accorded to conjecture as a
“genuinely useful mechanism for public debate” 610—Chief Justice
Rehnquist and a large majority of the Milkovich Court issued a resounding
rejection of the Ollman multi-factor approach and its almost open-ended
expansion of coverage to matters deemed opinionative. This was intended
as a broad shot across the media bow indicating that the right to redress
reputational injury is vital and strongly defended by the Rehnquist Era
Court against fanciful interpretations of non-factuality.
Yet, the Court’s attempt to “hold[] the balance true” 611 has largely
failed—or so the media have decreed. In a media law conference postmortem 15 years after Milkovich, participants reflected the general
601. Id. at 23 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that the
Court’s opinion delves into the opinion issue “cogently and almost entirely
correctly”).
602. Id. at 24.
603. Id. at 33.
604. Id. at 28 n.5.
605. See id. at 29, 31–32.
606. Id. at 28, 31, 33.
607. Id. at 32.
608. Id. at 32–33 (“Certain formats—editorials, reviews, political cartoons,
letters to the editor—signal the reader to anticipate a departure from what is
actually known by the author as fact.”).
609. Id. at 33 n.8 (One-sidedness warns the reader that the opinions “rest on
passion rather than factual foundation.”).
610. Id. at 36; id. at 35 (“Conjecture is a means of fueling a national discourse
on such questions [of national concern] and stimulating public pressure for
answers from those who know more.”).
611. Id. at 23 (alteration in original).
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consensus that Milkovich was not the catastrophe initially envisioned and
was generally ignored. 612 Some even talked of Milkovich’s demise. 613
Others fulminated that Ollman’s four factors had “become the
touchstone” 614 of factuality-opinion determinations—a view that no doubt
would have caused Chief Justice Rehnquist to scratch his pate in disbelief.
Ignoring Milkovich is only permissible, of course, if a state accords

612. 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) “News Notes,” 2 (Feb. 1, 2005) (on file with
author) [hereinafter, “News Notes”].
613. Id. at 3.
614. Id. See also Wermiel & Levine, supra note 28. Using Justice Brennan’s
notes and drafts, the authors demonstrate how Chief Justice Rehnquist was
readying a draft dissent from the Court’s projected refusal to grant certiorari in
Milkovich. Id. at 43. Justice Kennedy then decided to join the dissent. Id. at 43–
44. At conference, Justices White and Scalia also agreed, so certiorari was
granted. Id. at 44. Justice Brennan then wrote a dissent based on what he viewed
Rehnquist’s opinion as doing: “‘apply[ing] a kind of truncated Ollman test . . . .’”
Id. The article authors conclude that Brennan’s final defamation missive “paid off
in spectacular fashion,” with lower courts, “guided by Brennan[] . . . read[ing]
Rehnquist’s holding as doing little more than disassociating the Gertz dictum from
such protection by grounding it instead in cases like Hepps and Falwell.” Id. at
44–45. The authors conclude that “in the more than two decades since Milkovich,
the Ollman factors have largely survived unscathed . . . .” Id. at 45. But cf.
Ashdown, supra note 172, at 750 (Surveying the Rehnquist Era Court’s
“leavening of the Supreme Court’s deference to the press in the wake of New York
Times,” Professor Ashdown concludes that the Court’s decisions in Masson and
Milkovich are “the clearest examples of the Court’s unwillingness to tolerate
damage to reputations and the marketplace of information caused by the media
venturing from good faith efforts at accuracy.”).
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Ollman-level protection as a matter of state constitutional law, as in
Ohio 615 and New York. 616
However, this dubious, debilitating, defiant, and devious death
declaration by the media for reputation—purportedly as First Amendment
doctrine—is unjustified by a reasoned, objective comparison of the
majority and dissenting opinions in Milkovich and the actual result
achieved in the case before the Court. As counsel for Milkovich opined at
the conference, for the most part courts do not engage in adequate analysis
but “simply conclude that the allegedly defamatory statement ‘sounds’
like opinion . . . .” 617 To anyone who has done plaintiffs’ libel work, this
exceptionally sad but eminently predictable scenario reflects not a
considered and careful analysis of Milkovich and its broader implications
but the gross disparity in available resources as between plaintiff and
defense counsel. 618 It also reflects a collective media herd mentality which
615. In Vail v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 649 N.E.2d 182, 184–86
(Ohio 1995), the Ohio Supreme Court ignored the view that the Ohio
Constitution’s “abuse” and other limitations on free expression strongly militated
against granting more protection than the First Amendment provided. Id. at 184,
186. As Justice Pfeifer noted in dissent, the majority conclusion that the Ohio
Constitution was “more restrictive” than its federal counterpart was a mere “naked
assertion” with “no constitutional analysis” supporting its analysis. Id. at 188
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The majority treated its revival of Scott and the Ohio
Constitution-First Amendment dichotomy as a “distinction without a difference.”
Id. at 185. This is undoubtedly wrong and wholly at odds with Milkovich. As
Justice Pfeifer stated, the majority’s adoption of a fluid totality-of-thecircumstances test focusing on context “unnecessarily enters treacherous
territory”; “Newspapers should not be shielded . . . for printing lies by labeling
them as commentary.” Id. at 188. Other jurisdictions have cited the “abuse”
limitation as auguring against a supra-Milkovich approach. Cf. ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 6:2 (discussing jurisdictions opting for a simplenegligence standard post-Gertz, relying on the “abuse” qualification and parallel
protection-of-reputation provisions).
616. The pivotal New York decision was issued after the Court had vacated an
earlier opinion based on Milkovich. See Immuno v. Moor-Jankowski, 497 U.S.
1021 (1990); see also Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277
(N.Y. 1991) (citing its status as “a cultural center for the Nation, [which] has long
provided a hospitable climate for the free exchange of ideas” and following its
“consistent tradition . . . of providing the broadest possible protection” to free
expression). See Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (N.Y. 1993)
(reaffirming Ollman as “more flexible and . . . decidedly more protective of ‘the
cherished constitutional guarantee of free speech’”).
617. See News Notes, supra note 612, at 4.
618. For illustrative examples, see supra text accompanying note 569; infra
text accompanying notes 863–65; David A. Elder et al., Establishing
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views any attempt at achieving fundamental fairness for victimized
plaintiffs as only one step short of constitutional Armageddon. 619
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL MALICE
The Rehnquist Era Court largely reaffirmed the Court’s traditional
jurisprudence mandating proof of New York Times’s concededly illadvised 620 rubric of actual malice—knowing or reckless disregard of
falsity 621—via evidence of convincing clarity 622 or clear-and-convincing
Constitutional Malice for Defamation and Privacy/False Light Claims When
Hidden Cameras and Deception Are Used by the Newsgatherer, 22 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 323, 363, 410–11 n.486 (2002) (noting media defendants’ mutual
support system via numerous interlocking mechanisms—amici curiae briefs,
“even in the wackiest cases and those engag[ed] in the most controversial
examples of investigative and hidden-camera journalism”; specialized programs,
such as the Practicing Law Institute, helping media lawyers keep abreast of recent
developments; a pro-media and data gathering institute, the Libel Defense
Resource Center; a public lobbyist, The Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the
Press, with an informational website and toll-free number for journalists; effective
limitation of plaintiff lawyers to small firms or solo practitioners since insurance
policies generally bar a firm representing the media from accepting plaintiff
defamation cases; the media’s ability on occasion to manipulate a court into
withdrawing a prickly anti-media opinion); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth
Reforming?, supra note 51, at 545 (“The root of the problem is that media
defendants, as a class, have the means and the incentive to spend what it takes to
make sure libel does not become an effective remedy.”); Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 51, at 442 (“Sullivan could not help but attract repeat-player defendants
and their well-trained, well-paid attorneys to push for more protection against
liability. No countervailing concentrated interests or professional expertise stood
against them—defamation plaintiffs were typically represented by personal injury
attorneys with no special expertise in that somewhat arcane body of law.”).
619. See generally Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 551–830. See
also supra text accompanying note 570; infra text accompanying notes 845, 861–
65, 867, 916, 926–28, 982–85, 999, 1077.
620. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991) (noting the
possibly unfortunate use of actual malice and stating a preference for knowing or
reckless disregard as to truth or falsity); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657, 666 n.7 (1989) (noting the confusing nature of the term actual
malice, suggesting “‘plain English’ . . . [instructions] at appropriate times” during
trial and suggesting alternative rubrics than “actual malice.”).
621. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964).
622. Id.; Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 US at 659; Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 511, 514 n.31 (1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 111–12.
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evidence. 623 The Court repeatedly reconfirmed the subjective nature624 of
this constitutional-malice 625 inquiry under the “honest liar” 626 fraud-ordeceit formula and the continuing validity of its pivotal elaboration in St.
Amant v. Thompson, 627 with its “in fact entertained serious doubts” 628 or
negligence-is-never-enough standard. 629 Moreover, the Court has
continued to emphasize that this “com[ing] close to willfully blinding” 630
standard is significantly different 631 from common-law malice. As the
Court said, “utterances honestly believed contribute to the free
entertainment of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” 632 Under this view,
common-law malice never suffices 633 for constitutional malice.

623. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990); Harte-Hanks
Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 659, 661 n.2, 663, 668, 681, 690; Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
490, 491, 491 n.6, 512, 513. For a discussion of the importance of this heightened
standard, see infra text accompanying note 1048.
624. For a small sampling, see for example Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S.
at 667–68, 682–85, 688; Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 172 (1979) (“necessary
awareness of probable falsehood”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
334–35 n.6 (1974).
625. On the constitutional-malice issue, see generally the lengthy chapter in
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, ch. 7.
626. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 502 n.19.
627. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1968) (The Court
provided oft-quoted broad tests: “Professions of good faith [belief in truth] will
be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the
defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified
anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher’s
allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put
them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious
reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.”).
628. Id. at 731.
629. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 615–16. For illustrative
discussions, see Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991); HarteHanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 665–68, 688; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334–35 n.6.
630. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 783 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
with Burger, C. J., White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
631. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974). For further
discussions of Cantrell, see infra text accompanying notes 647–48, 734–35, 749–50.
632. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
633. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 667–68 (Constitutional malice
cannot be proven “merely” through common law malice in the “ordinary sense of
the term.”); Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
754–55 (1985) (Powell, J., with Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor, J., joining);
Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 252–53; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334–35 n.6; Nat’l Ass’n of Letter

232

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Accordingly, the Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 634 an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, unanimously refused to equate the intent or
reckless and extreme and outrageous conduct elements of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress-“outrage” tort 635 with New York Times and
its pivotal scienter or knowing-or-reckless-disregard-of-falsity focus. 636
With one major exception to be discussed hereinafter, the Rehnquist
Era Court’s post-Rosenbloom analyses of this “critical element” 637 of
constitutional malice have been abbreviated. Nonetheless, the cases
broadly construed 638 the type and quality of evidence that can be relied on
to prove constitutional malice by the defamation’s author acting within the
scope of employment. 639 For example, in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 640 the Rehnquist Era Court’s three-decades old but most recent
significant 641 decision, the Court identified several sources of relevant
information collectively warranting submission of the constitutionalmalice issue to a jury. This included such commonsense factors as the
absence of a tight deadline schedule 642 and the author’s inconsistent

Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1974). Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Letter Carriers on other grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 145–47.
634. Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
635. Id. at 48–57. For further discussions, see supra text accompanying notes
571, 576; infra text accompanying notes 773, 1000–17.
636. Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. at 48–57. For a suggestion that the constitutionalmalice aspect is dicta, see supra text accompanying note 773.
637. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155, 168–70 (1979). For discussions of
Herbert, see supra text accompanying notes 106–10; infra text accompanying
notes 644–46, 692, 710–23, 806, 809, 873.
638. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (noting that an
author’s deliberate alteration of a quotation did not in and of itself connote
constitutional malice if it did not involve a material alteration therein but did
“bear[] in a most important way” on this issue); Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497
U.S. 1, 20 n.7 (1990) (noting that defendant’s statement plaintiff had lied without
believing it to be true “may serve to establish malice”).
639. See infra text accompanying notes 749–50.
640. Masson, 501 U.S. 496.
641. More recently, the Court has issued a libel, prior-restraint decision. See
infra text accompanying notes 779–88.
642. Masson, 501 U.S. at 521 (Unlike a “hot news” case, the author could not
contend she lacked the time to compare her drafts with interview tapes with
plaintiff.).
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explanations. 643 In another decision, Herbert v. Lando, 644 the Rehnquist
Era Court correctly rejected 645 Justice Stewart’s nonsensical suggestion
that what editorial decisionmakers had decided not to include related only
to common-law malice and was irrelevant to knowing or reckless
disregard of falsity. 646 In a third decision, Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 647 the Rehnquist Court affirmed that a fabrication
undeniably met the constitutional-malice test, finding that the author must
have known that his false-light depiction of the plaintiff-mother was false
since she was absent when he visited the family abode. 648
The Court’s most-detailed discussion of constitutional malice in its
defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence occurred in Harte-Hanks

643. Id. (as to the location and timing of unrecorded conversations during
which petitioner purportedly made some of the statements quoted). Other
evidence included the following: (1) resemblance of the quotes to tapes in the
author’s possession except for changes in phrasing suggesting alteration of
plaintiff’s statements; (2) the author’s assurances to the magazine editor that all
quotations were from the tapes; and (3) manuscript changes during the evolution
from notes to draft to galleys. Id.
644. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
645. In discussing why all evidence, both direct and indirect, would produce
greater accuracy, the Court posed the example of a reporter with two contradictory
reports who published only the false account. Id. at 173. In resolving the
constitutional-malice issue, the Court said it was “only common sense” to assume
that inquiry of the author and an opportunity to justify such selective use would
enhance accuracy: “On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had serious doubts
about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no undue self-censorship will result
from permitting the relevant inquiry.” Id. Even Justice Marshall in dissent
disagreed with Justice Stewart on this issue, acknowledging that “surely” such
would be “germane” to the knowing or reckless disregard of truth issue. Id. at
205–06 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the extensive case law finding known
contradictory matter to be substantial, powerful evidence of constitutional malice,
see ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:12. For recently filed litigation
making extremely effective use of such evidence, see infra text accompanying
note 970.
646. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 200–01 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Of course, as
suggested by the majority, id. at 160–70, direct evidence of common-law malice
had been viewed as relevant to common-law issues of abuse of qualified privilege,
punitive damages, and the Court’s earlier constitutional-malice determinations.
The Court later drew on this analysis in affirming the admissibility of such as
supportive evidence of constitutional malice. See infra text accompanying notes
652–62.
647. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
648. Id. at 247–48.
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Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 649 an elaborate, fact-intensive
opinion by Justice Stevens in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. 650 The
case involved a respondent-defeated candidate for municipal judge
defamed by petitioner-newspaper-supporter of the incumbent, portraying
the candidate as having engaged in political dirty tricks, including offering
jobs to a grand-jury witness and her sister in appreciation for testifying
before a grand jury investigating bribery allegations against the opponentincumbent’s director of court services. 651 The Court’s opinion clarified its
constitutional-malice standards and measurably enhanced the likelihood
of a libel plaintiff’s success in several ways.
First, the Court clarified how proof of common-law malice may assist
significantly in proving constitutional malice. This elucidation arose from
the Sixth Circuit’s partial reliance on evidence of (1) common law malice
—ill will, partisanship, and economic motivation652—and (2) grossly
negligent653 deviation-from-professional-journalistic standards. Analyzing
the record as a whole654 while implicitly rejecting other courts’ mediapromoted, divide-and-conquer strategy in reviewing evidence of
constitutional malice,655 the Harte-Hanks Court held that such types of
evidence, while insufficient alone or together to prove constitutional
malice, 656 were nonetheless admissible, probative, supportive evidence657 of
constitutional malice. For example, petitioner-newspaper’s nonactionable,
649. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
650. See id. at 658–59.
651. Id. at 659–60.
652. Id. at 664–65, 667–68, 675–76, 689 n.36, 689–90.
653. Id. at 663–68, 688. Petitioner argued that the Sixth Circuit applied the
plurality view of Justice Harlan for four members of the Court in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 158–59 (1967), that it sufficed for public
figuredom that defendant engaged in “highly unreasonable conduct constituting
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers.” Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 664–
65. This had never constituted a Court majority, and the present Court
unanimously rejected it as the appropriate standard. Id. at 666–67.
654. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 667, 688–89, 693.
655. Elder et al., supra note 618, at 339–42.
656. Harte-Hank Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 665–68. If publication of defamatory
matter for profit were alone sufficient, the Court’s precedents were “little more
than empty vessels.” Id. at 667.
657. Id. at 667–68 (“Although courts must be careful not to place too much
reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of
mind through circumstantial evidence [citing Herbert v. Lando] . . . and it cannot
be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the
actual malice inquiry.” (emphasis added)); id. at 675–76.
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editorial opinion two days before the defamatory broadside—and before
defendant had proceeded far with its investigation—predicting forthcoming
evidence of a candidate’s deceitful lack of integrity suggested that the editor
had already determined to publish the source’s allegations “regardless of
how the evidence developed and regardless of whether or not [the source’s]
story was credible upon ultimate reflection.”658 Thus, the Court
unambiguously affirmed the strong tradition of the state and lower-court
decisions659 and disavowed occasional, other ambiguous asides 660 to the
contrary. This exceptionally important development661 made clear that
defamation plaintiffs continue to have multivariate forms of common-law
malice as significant arrows 662 in their proof-of-constitutional-malice
quiver.
Second, Harte-Hanks provided a veritable treasure trove of indicators
of what other evidence is relevant in determining whether defendants are
culpable of constitutional malice under St. Amant v. Thompson. 663 In
Harte-Hanks, this included evidence related to the unreliability of the
defamatory story’s source, 664 such as plaintiff’s unequivocal denials 665 and
658. Id. at 684. This could be viewed as “set[ting] the stage” for the
defamatory article. Id.
659. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:3.
660. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 667–68 n.7 (The Court affirmed the
trial court’s correct statement that constitutional malice may not be inferred
merely from common-law malice, but the trial court then made the erroneous
aside that constitutional malice “has nothing to do with bad motive or ill-will”;
the latter was inconsistent with and disavowed by the Court’s analysis as a
whole.).
661. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:3; Elder et al., supra note
618, at 377–97, 414–31 (detailing the use of common-law malice as part of a
presumption of constitutional malice in hidden camera cases).
662. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:3.
663. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1968). See supra text
accompanying notes 627–28.
664. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 682–92.
665. Id. at 677 (categorical denials as to any intent to confront the incumbent
and his director of court services to extort a withdrawal by the incumbent); id. at
691 (denial of source’s charges generally); id. at 693 n.39. The Court conceded
that the media was not required to accept a plaintiff’s denial, however vociferous.
See id. at 692 n.37. Such were “so commonplace in the world of polemical charge
and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter
to the likelihood of error.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d
113, 121 (2d Cir. 1977)). This was the only aspect of Edwards the Court adopted.
It did not adopt neutral reportage. See infra text accompanying notes 794–98.
However, the Court found the respondent’s denials quite relevant, noting
sarcastically that it was “extraordinarily unlikely” reporters had missed plaintiff-
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the fact that every separately interviewed witness to the interview,
including two known to be reliable, 666 “consistently and categorically” 667
rejected the source’s charges of impropriety. Other evidence suggested
that the source’s most significant and defamatory charge—that plaintiff
intended to confront the incumbent with the inculpatory tapes and scare
him into resigning but not otherwise disclose them—was both highly
improbable 668 and inconsistent with actions to the contrary known to
defendants. 669 Other significant evidence included testimonial
inconsistencies 670 and denials 671 by petitioner’s employees suggesting a
“deliberate effort to avoid the truth” 672 and the known, devastating impact
of the charges on respondent’s candidacy as well as their personal and
professional reputation. 673 Equally importantly, the Court gave extremely
short shrift to, if it did not implicitly disavow, evidence the petitionernewspaper adduced of the facial accuracy of the source’s charges and
plaintiff-respondent’s denials. 674
Third, the Court powerfully delineated the difference between its
negligence-is-never-enough doctrine and the importance of petitionerdefendant’s twofold failure to either interview the source’s sister—despite
having expended considerable resources to interview every other witness
respondent’s denials merely because they partially confirmed some aspects of the
source’s story. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 691–92.
666. Id. at 682–83, 691.
667. Id. (“[Y]et the [petitioner] chose not to interview the one witness that both
[sources] and [respondent] claimed would verify their conflicting accounts . . . .”).
668. Id. at 691.
669. Id. (i.e., that respondent-plaintiff had subjected the source’s sister to a lie
detector test and then delivered the tapes to law enforcement).
670. Id. at 684–85.
671. Id. at 690–91.
672. Id. at 684–85.
673. Id. at 689–90 n.36; id. at 693 n.39 (The media defendant in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts “proceeded on its reckless course with full knowledge of
the harm that would likely result from publication of the article.” Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
674. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 677, 680–81, 692; id. at 695–96
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (conceding that the majority had ignored prior
precedent that focused significantly on accurate reportage of source charges and
plaintiff denials and that the Court’s opinion had further ignored the “markedly
different” aspect of Curtis Publishing Co. in this respect, but concluding,
confidently, that such omissions were “in explanation, rather than in analysis”).
Based on all indications to the contrary, Justice Blackmun’s optimistic
interpretation appears to have been a pious hope. See infra text accompanying
notes 839–41.
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to the disputed interview at the candidate’s home 675—or to listen to the
tape of the sister’s interview previously supplied to the newspaper. 676 The
Court found the first scenario “utterly bewildering” 677 unless petitioner
had already committed itself to publishing the story since a denial by this
pivotal witness would have likely terminated the story. 678 The explanation
for the review-of-tape omission was equally implausible. 679 Both
anomalies allowed the jury and reviewing courts to find convincing
evidence of “a purposeful avoidance of the truth,” 680 i.e., a calculated
decision not to garner information that might ratify the probable falsity of
the source’s charges. 681
Fourth, the Stevens opinion unequivocally rejected petitioner’s
argument that the Rehnquist Era Court’s earlier decision in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union 682 contemplated and, in dicta, authorized rejection of
jury determinations of witness credibility in fulfilling its constitutional

675. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 682 (after having repeatedly asked
both the sister-source and plaintiff-respondent whether she could confirm the
source’s allegations).
676. Id. at 683. The sister of the source was the “most important witness” to
the bribery charges against the incumbent-municipal-judge-candidate’s director
of court services. Id. at 668. An interview with her occurred at plaintiffrespondent’s home. Id. at 668, 683. After she passed a lie detector test, plaintiffrespondent filed a report. The director was arrested and later convicted. Id. at 669.
677. Id. at 682.
678. Id. (distinguishing denials by plaintiff-respondent’s supporters); id. at 692.
679. Id. at 683, 692. This cast substantial doubt upon the editor’s credibility
and motivation. If he were “truly in equipoise” as to the forthcoming endorsement
as he contended, it was difficult to comprehend why mishandling of dozens of
cases before the incumbent’s court would not interest him. Id. at 683–84. This
could reasonably be construed as motivated by fear that the tapes would “raise
additional doubts” about their source’s veracity. Id.
680. Id. at 692.
681. Id. This scenario bore a “remarkable similarity” to the facts in Curtis
Publishing Co., which involved a similarly unreliable informant, where the media
defendant did not interview a witness with parallel access to the same information
and neither looked at the reporter’s notes nor viewed potentially refutatory game
films. Id. at 692–93. This met both the “highly unreasonable conduct” test of
Justice Harlan and the constitutional-malice test of Chief Justice Warren. Id. at
693 nn.38–39.
682. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). See supra text
accompanying notes 160–61. Bose involved a bench trial, so application of
independent appellate review of constitutional malice did not involve rejecting a
jury’s determination.
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mandate of independent review of constitutional malice. 683 The Stevens
opinion in Harte-Hanks applied the deference-to-jury assessment of
credibility as to only three crucial determinations the jury must have
made 684 in upholding the jury’s constitutional-malice finding. This
selectively arbitrary and schizophrenic approach 685 to jury deference was
castigated sharply by four concurring Court members, including Justice
Rehnquist, 686 who followed Justice Scalia’s lead in concluding that the
Stevens’ opinion was not inconsistent with their views. 687 In their view,
683. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 659, 662–64, 681, 689, 690. See
infra text accompanying notes 160–61. The Court disagreed with petitioner’s
suggestion that it had rejected a trial court’s credibility assessments in Bose.
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 689 n.35. In fact, the Court had accepted its
determination that the author in Bose lacked credibility as to his choice of
terminology and his comprehension of what “about the room” meant. Id. Unlike
the trial court, the Bose Court declined, however, to infer constitutional malice
merely from his refusal to concede his error and steadfast adherence to the view
that no such error had been made. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 689 n.39.
684. Id. at 690. For an excellent analysis of Bose and Harte-Hanks on point,
see Nathan Chapman, The Jury’s Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV.189,
230–35 (2015), where the author points out that plaintiff Connaughton pursued
the argument that applying the independent-appellate-review standard to jury
determinations would raise troubling, Seventh Amendment issues. The media
defendant “did an about-face” and agreed without citation in its brief. Id. at 232.
The author emphasizes that the opinion by Justice Stevens, also the author of
Bose, “offers no express contradiction or response” to Justice Scalia. Id. at 234.
Nor did Justice Stevens confront or respond to the argument that failing to defer
to the jury’s application of the controlling constitutional standard would run afoul
of the Seventh Amendment. Id. Thus, the “best reading” of the Court’s
independent-appellate-review cases “strongly suggests” that “insofar as those
doctrines require de novo review of a trial court’s application of constitutional law
to the facts of a case, they do not extend to a jury verdict.” Id. at 235.
685. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(characterizing the majority’s selection as a resolution in a “peculiar manner”);
id. at 698–99 (questioning the must-have-determined conclusion, suggesting the
selection was arbitrary and otherwise finding proof of constitutional malice even
absent such).
686. Id. at 694 (White, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that
credibility determinations were reviewable only under the clearly erroneous
standard, that the majority opinion was consistent with this view, and joining in
Justice Scalia’s concurrence); id. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining in the
Court’s opinion, which he viewed as entirely consistent with Justice Scalia’s
concurrence); id. at 696–700 (Scalia, J., concurring).
687. See supra text accompanying notes 685–86; infra text accompanying
notes 688–90.
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Justice Stevens had adopted the “most significant element” 688 of the Sixth
Circuit opinion—rejecting any responsibility of reviewing courts to
engage in independent assessment of conflicting testimony in favor of the
“critical point” 689 of deference-to-jury findings. Justice Scalia would have
assumed the jury had in fact made all supporting findings of fact it could
reasonably have made, which is what common-law courts have
traditionally done and to which there is no viable alternative. 690
IX. ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
Building on the Court’s rejection of First Amendment-based special
rules for summary judgment 691 and discovery in libel cases, 692 the Court,
in two powerful and unanimous opinions by Justice Rehnquist, rejected an
infusion of “invisible radiations” 693 of First Amendment values into
jurisdictional issues. Reintroduction of First Amendment-induced
chilling-effect-self-censorship values in this context would unnecessarily
complicate already difficult jurisdictional issues 694 and constitute a “form
of double counting.” 695 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, the Court upheld

688. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
689. Id. at 700.
690. Id. at 697–700. See also the elegant analysis in Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co.,
801 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Ky. 1990) (Adopting the Scalia view, the court said: “We
accept the jury’s finding as to disputed facts when there is supporting evidence
because we claim no superior ability to divine the truth by reason of judicial
office, and we question the good judgment of any judge who thinks he has such
special powers.”).
691. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (Burger, C.J., with
Rehnquist joining) (dictum expressing “some doubt” about the “so-called ‘rule’”
that summary judgment would be the “rule,” not the “exception” in libel cases);
Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 161 n.3 (1979).
692. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See infra text accompanying
notes 710–23.
693. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 771, 780 n.12 (1984).
694. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790–91 (1984) (rejecting special
procedural advantages to defendants in defamation in addition to the substantive
protections theretofore imposed); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
256 n.7 (1986). Compare the “procedural neutrality” discussion of Liberty Lobby,
supra text accompanying notes 155–59.
695. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790–91 (citing Herbert, 441 U.S. 153; Hutchinson,
443 U.S. 111).
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application of the great majority single-publication rule 696 with its
efficiency-based corollary of nationwide damages 697 in a case involving
an atypically long, six-year statute of limitations 698 and a non-resident, 699
forum-shopping, 700 public-figure plaintiff with a small but untainted
reputation in the forum state. 701 Citing and relying on New Hampshire’s
criminal-defamation statute, 702 the Court eloquently recognized the state’s
dual interests in compensating and vindicating plaintiffs 703 and
safeguarding the citizenry from deception and falsehood. 704 In the
companion case, Calder v. Jones, 705 the Court refused to require the
plaintiff, a well-known California actress, 706 to travel to Florida to sue
primarily culpable participants—the writer and editor 707—of an article
intentionally aimed or directed 708 at plaintiff and which individual
codefendants knew would cause debilitating injury to her in her domicile
state. 709
In Herbert v. Lando, 710 alluded to above, 711 Justice White, with Justice
Rehnquist joining, issued a powerful rejection of the media’s attempt to
endow both the state of mind and the editorial process with an absolute
696. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74, 777. Defendant was charged with knowledge
of the single-publication rule. Id. at 779, 781.
697. Id. at 773 n.2, 777.
698. Id. at 773, 775, 779. New Hampshire was the only state where the action
was not time-barred. Id. at 772 n.1, 773.
699. Id. at 773, 776–77, 777 n.5, 779–80.
700. Id. at 779. This was no different from innumerable other plaintiffs.
701. Id. at 777, 777 n.5.
702. Id. at 777.
703. Id. at 776–77.
704. Id. (The Court emphasized that “[f]alse statements of fact harm both the
subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement” and affirmed that states
“may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens.”
(first emphasis added)). For further discussions of the purpose of this broadened
function of state defamation law, see infra notes 78, 111–12, 124, 453, 463, 508,
702–03, 767, 870–81, 907, 973, 1017–81. For discussion of the impact of United
States v. Alvarez, the Court’s “stolen valor” decision, see supra note 112.
705. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
706. Id. at 784, 788–89. The “brunt” of the harm occurred in California, which
was the focus of the story. Id. at 788–89.
707. Id. at 785–86, 789, 790.
708. Id. at 789, 790 (This was not “mere untargeted negligence”).
709. Id. at 789–91. California was the state of largest circulation—over
600,000 copies. Id. at 785, 790.
710. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
711. See supra text accompanying notes 692, 695.
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privilege from pretrial scrutiny 712 under the Court’s “broad and liberal” 713
discovery jurisprudence. This proposed evidentiary rule would add

712. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155–77. The Court rejected Justice Brennan’s
proposal, id. at 181, 190–99 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part), for a plaintiff
requirement of a prima facie case of falsity before inquiry into “predecisional
communication among editors,” but not their “mental processes,” as
contemplating (1) either a bifurcated trial—which would precipitate burdensome
complexities and unacceptable delay—or (2) as mandating “credible assertions”
by plaintiff, an easily met formalism the Court declined to impose. Id. at 174 n.23,
174–75. The Court also implicitly rejected Justice Powell’s suggestion that a
supervising court had a “duty to consider” and “weigh[] carefully” First
Amendment interests in “striking a proper balance.” Id. at 177–80 (Powell, J.,
concurring). The Court likewise rejected Justice Stewart’s inane position that
inquiry into the editorial process is “simply not relevant” to the constitutionalmalice inquiry. Id. at 200–02 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra text
accompanying notes 644–46. The Court also tacitly disavowed Justice Marshall’s
two-part, First Amendment-based constraints: (1) his suggestion that the Court’s
broad discovery precedent was inappropriate in libel litigation because of the
possible “in terrorem” use by alleged victims “animated by something more than
a rational calculus” of recovery possibilities and the concomitant need for
assessing discovery requests under a “strict standard of relevance”; and (2) a
proposed prohibition on discovery related to prepublication communications and
editorial decision-making—but not for the “state-of-mind inquiry”—for fear of
“muffl[ing] expression[s] of uncertainty.” Id. at 202–10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist was also with the Court majority in explicitly or implicitly
affirming common-law standards as to allocating burden of proof. See, e.g., the
Court’s affirmation of a trial judge’s instruction using a preponderance standard
for requirements that the statement be: (1) defamatory and (2) defamatory “toward
the plaintiff.” Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2
(1989). By contrast, in Herbert the Court specifically did not resolve use of a
preponderance standard as to falsity, noting the dispute on this issue as compared
to the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement as to constitutional malice. Id.
Compare Justice Stewart’s impliedly rejected attempt in dissent to also impose a
clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement as to: (1) publication by defendant;
(2) that the particular statement defamed plaintiff; (3) that it was false. Herbert,
441 U.S. at 199–200 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in the
majority opinion in Herbert rejecting this trio. Id. at 155.
713. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.
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safeguards beyond those in New York Times, 714 “substantially enhance” 715
plaintiff’s burden as to a “critical element(s)” 716 of his or her claim and
run afoul of broad rules of relevance 717 supported by the Court’s
jurisprudence 718 and “deeply rooted” 719 in the common-law tradition. If
fear of damage liability for knowing, reckless, or other falsity-culpability
standards under Gertz 720 proved by such direct evidence resulted, this was
exactly what the Court’s jurisprudence held to be fully consistent with the

714. Id. at 169–77. Herbert has been criticized as “discourag[ing] reporters
and editors from revealing their doubts as to the accuracy of a story and [as]
generally encourag[ing] a lack of communication between them” and also
deterring them from keeping written notes or records “that can later be used
against them.” Barron, supra note 172, at 86–87. Cf. Ashdown, supra note 172,
at 747 (“Herbert can be seen as procedurally reinstating some of the restraint
eliminated by the adoption of the substantive standard of recovery in New York
Times. Fifteen years after New York Times the Court was already realigning the
interests.”).
715. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169–70. Such an impenetrable barrier was
significant in light of defendants’ proneness to assert good faith and the fact that
the outer boundaries as to where the editorial process began and terminated were
difficult to perceive. Id. at 170.
716. Id. at 155, 160, 169–70.
717. Id. at 165 (noting courts have “traditionally admitted any direct or indirect
evidence relevant to . . . state of mind”).
718. Id. at 163–64 (citing the Court’s common-law jurisprudence regarding
forfeiture of common-law privileges by malice); id. at 169 noting (petitioners
were attempting to constrict “firmly established constitutional doctrine”). See id.
at 166–68, where the Court rejected any suggestion Miami Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 414 U.S. 1142 (1974) (invalidating Florida’s mandatory candidate-rightof-reply statute) or Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holding that neither the Federal Communications
Act “Fairness Doctrine” nor the First Amendment required broadcasters to accept
paid commercial advertising), had any relevance to the discovery issue related to
the editorial process. These cases involved advance-of-publication attempts to
control editorial content, deemed as impermissible as prior restraints. The Court
stated it was incredible to suggest that either case silently affected a substantial
contraction of plaintiff rights recognized by the Court's jurisprudence. Herbert,
441 U.S. at 167 n.15.
719. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 161, 163 (citing the Court’s common-law libel
decisions).
720. Although the technical issue before the Court was discovery relating to
proof of constitutional malice, the Court’s analyses repeatedly referenced
interchangeably the minimal-fault or culpability standard applicable under Gertz.
Id. at 159–60, 166–67, 171–74, 176.
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First Amendment. 721 Any enhanced use of discovery was not unique to
libel litigation. 722 In any event, federal courts had ample authority to
prevent abuse thereof. 723
Justice Rehnquist’s attempts to “hold[] the balance true” also
supported criminal-defamation liability 724 under the New York TimesGarrison v. Louisiana 725 standard of calculated falsehood, 726
acknowledging that such deliberate falsehoods have been historically
utilized 727 and could be modernly used 728 to pollute public discourse and
negatively impact public affairs. 729 For the same reasons, he also joined
721. Id. at 171–72.
722. Id. at 176–77. The Court noted that the media-proposed constitutional
privilege to eliminate the discovery-related costs and burdens would not cure this
problem: “Only complete immunity from liability for defamation would effect
this result, and the Court has regularly found this to be an untenable construction
of the First Amendment.” Id. at 176.
723. Id. at 176–77 (discussing courts’ broad authority under the federal rules).
Compare Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29–37 (1984), in which the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell for seven members of the Court, including
Justice Rehnquist, rejected heightened First Amendment scrutiny of pretrial
discovery protective orders in pending libel litigation imposed to protect
reputation, privacy, petitioning activity, and religious associational interests from
intrusive distribution by defendant of matters of public interest acquired pursuant
to coercive discovery orders. Id. The Court rejected treatment of such as classic
prior restraints subject to exacting scrutiny, i.e., compelling government interest
and narrow-tailoring requirements. Id. at 31. This case reflects the Court’s parallel
concern in providing a viable remedy for publication of true information
tortiously, criminally, or otherwise wrongfully acquired by the publisher and the
Court’s cases that provide no First Amendment protection to defendants that
publish such information even where it is of public concern. See generally id. See
supra notes 93, 113, 406, 409; infra notes 947, 964 for discussions of Bartnicki v.
Vopper and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
724. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 158–59; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
334 n.6, 334–35 (1974). See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
See also supra text accompanying notes 702–04.
725. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes
873–76.
726. This term connotes knowing or reckless disregard of falsity or
constitutional malice, the term generally used herein. See supra text
accompanying notes 620–21.
727. See infra text accompanying notes 873–76.
728. Id.
729. Id. On the pollution-of-public-discourse issue, see supra text
accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 141, 453, 462, 508, 702–04; infra text
accompanying notes 767, 870–81, 907, 973, 1017–81.
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the Gertz majority’s rejection 730 of Justice Marshall’s proposed First
Amendment-based repudiation of punitive damages 731—damages
appropriate and permissible to deter future misconduct 732 and to punish
past reprehensible conduct 733 where the New York Times standard is
met. 734 Justice Rehnquist also joined Justice Stewart’s opinion in Cantrell
v. Forest City Publishing Co., 735 which tacitly deferred to state wisdom in
imposing a common-law malice requirement in addition to the
constitutional-malice threshold. 736 He further joined in the Court’s
decisions imposing due-process restraints on excessive punitive damage
awards while sometimes disagreeing with the Court majority’s intrusive
superintendence in reviewing jury awards. 737
Justice Rehnquist also joined in the Gertz majority’s determination
that its concerns—parallel to those about punitive damages 738—about the
inhibiting effect of common-law presumed damages 739 no longer prevail
once the New York Times’s beyond-the-pale-of-the-First Amendment
730. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974).
731. Id. at 339 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 82–86 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
732. Id. at 350.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 349–50. For other decisions where Justice Rehnquist concurred in
affirming the appropriateness and propriety of punitive damages, see Milkovich v.
Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16, 21 n.8 (1990); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989) (upholding an award of $195,000 in
punitive damages); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 161–62 n.7, 167; id. at 354
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Note that Justice Rehnquist was a pivotal player behind
the scenes in retaining punitive damages in defamation cases in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. See supra text accompanying notes 446, 451.
735. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
736. See id. at 248–54. Of course, this will almost invariably be found where
constitutional malice has been proved. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129,
at 575–76 n.181; Bezanson, supra note 479, at 546.
737. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW
of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607–14 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., with Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); Honda Motor Corp. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 436–51 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the state’s procedures
were adequate to meet due-process standards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
738. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47, 730–34.
739. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349–50 (Presumed damages are a historical oddity of
tort law with largely uncontrolled jury discretion which “unnecessarily
compounds the potential of any system of liability or defamatory falsehood to
inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms” and “invites juries to
punish unpopular opinion.”).
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standard is met. 740 In such cases, the state’s interest in protecting against
the common-law-acknowledged difficulties of proving compensable
injury become paramount. 741 Furthermore, the New York Times standard
does not bar either presumed or punitive damages in the purely privateconcern sector under the five-member coalition joined by Justice
Rehnquist in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. 742
Additionally, in cases brought by private plaintiffs as to matters of
public concern, 743 where Gertz’s negligence standard controls, 744 plaintiffs
could seek and collect compensation for broadly defined damages for
actual injury 745 based on competent evidence. 746 This includes, but is not
limited to, economic losses, mental distress, humiliation, embarrassment,
and reputational injury. 747 Such actual-injury damages do not require a

740. Id. at 349–50; id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 462 n.7 (1976).
741. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 373 n.4, 376, 393–94 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing
the impossibility of proving reputational and other harm and the historically
recognized efficacy of presumed damages). See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (citing the rationale for
presumed damages, i.e., “the experience and judgment of history” that actual
damages will be impossible to demonstrate in a large number of cases where
serious harm is substantially certain to have occurred).
742. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755, 760–61, 763 (Powell, with
Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 763–64 (Burger, C.J., concurring);
id. at 774 (White, J., concurring). On the broader impact of the purely private-concern
limitation on First Amendment protection, see supra text accompanying notes 88,
402–511, 580; infra text accompanying notes 938–68, 1026.
743. See supra notes and text accompanied by notes 37–45, 413, 415, 447–50.
744. See supra notes and text accompanied by notes 39–42.
745. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349–50.
746. Id. (noting the wide experience of trial courts in drafting limiting jury
instruction); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459–61, 462 n.7 (1976). The
Firestone Court implicitly approved the trial court instructions authorizing
damages in an amount that would fairly and adequately compensate and were a
“direct and natural result” of the actionable libel, i.e., the divorce and adultery
charge. Id. at 460. The Court had no difficulty upholding the $100,000 damage
claim based on the limited evidence adduced. See id. at 461. Several witnesses
testified as to plaintiff-petitioner’s anxiety concerning the adultery imputation,
including a neighbor-doctor who had given her a sedative to mitigate discomfort
over the charge. Id. at 460–61 n.6. Respondent also testified as to her fears that
her young son would be negatively impacted by the false charge when he matured.
Id. at 461.
747. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349–50.
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constitutional threshold of reputational harm. 748 Most importantly, as to
presumed and compensatory damages at least, it suffices that the original
defamer—the author of the defamation—acts within his or her scope of
employment under the classical doctrine of respondeat superior. 749 In
other words, a defamation or false-light plaintiff is not constitutionally
required to demonstrate awareness or other culpability by those above the
author in the media’s chain of command. 750

748. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 449–50, 452, 460 (concluding that Florida had
determined to permit damages without measuring the impact of falsehood on
plaintiff’s reputation). Justice Brennan argued this refusal “subverted whatever
protective influence” Gertz had provided, equated to a resurrection of presumed
damages, and negated any use of summary judgment. Id. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Some jurisdictions have preconditioned the other general damages on
threshold proof of reputational damage as a matter of state law. See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 9:2. On the impact of this aspect of Firestone on
the fault standard in private-person, public-concern, false-light cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 759–61.
749. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 n.6 (1974). The
Court also tacitly affirmed the preponderance-of-evidence standard for proof
thereof. Id. at 253–54. See Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 501, 524
(1991) (leaving for resolution on remand issues of liability of the magazine and
book publisher “on the basis of their respective relations with [the author] or the
lack of any individual actual malice”). But cf. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 468 n.7
(Powell, J., with Stewart, J., joining, concurring) (citing the involvement of a
newspaper stringer and the question of whether any fault by the stringer could be
considered as imputable to Time under Cantrell). But cf. the sequel to Gertz on
remand. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 n.19 (7th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a solicited contributing author for a specific story line with extensive
contacts with the editor, who exerted “significant control . . . over the content and
focus” of the article established an agency relationship). Note that Cantrell did
not involve vicarious liability for punitive damages. See generally Cantrell, 419
U.S. 245. If state law so allows, there is no due-process bar to such. Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1991). There is no justification for a
different rule in First Amendment cases. As the Court said, imposing such when
a corporation’s agent “commits intentional fraud creates a strong incentive for
vigilance by those in a position ‘to guard substantially against the evil to be
prevented.’” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Note that the Court has analogized
constitutional malice to deceit. See supra text accompanying notes 625–26.
750. See generally ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:9; Cantrell, 419
U.S. at 253–54 n.6. This issue had been left ambiguous by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964) (dicta suggesting that constitutional malice
“would have to be brought home to the persons in the Times’ organization having
responsibility for the publication of the advertisement” at issue (emphasis added)).
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Importantly, the Court has emphasized the need to protect harmed
plaintiffs from all state-law-based material falsification, 751 regardless of
the form or label attached to the harmful matter. 752 This raises serious
arguments favorable to applying the minimal-fault standard of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 753 also to private-person, public-concern, false-light
cases, an issue noted but not resolved by the Court, 754 rather than retaining
the pre-Gertz decision of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 755 upon which the nowrepudiated Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 756 plurality decision relied on
in large part. 757 As Justice Powell noted, Gertz “calls into question the
conceptual basis” of Hill in light of the Court’s abandonment of
Rosenbloom. 758
751. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 248–49 (noting several significant
misrepresentations, reaffirming Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 (1967), and
its adoption of a material-and-substantial-falsification test in interpreting a falselight, appropriation claim under New York’s appropriation statute); Masson, 501
U.S. at 513–17 (adopting the “historical understanding” of material falsity in the
truth defense setting and incorporating it into plaintiff’s burden of proof). What
constituted a material falsification in the Time, Inc. case was broadly construed,
following state law. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 377–78. Time’s article on a play based
on a novel depicted the victims in a hostage situation erroneously in three ways—
the father was beaten, the son was “roughed up” by a “brutish convict,” and the
daughter was subjected to a “verbal sexual insult.” Id.
752. See supra text accompanying notes 112, 115, 134.
753. See supra text accompanying notes 350–57.
754. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 250–51 (concluding there was no occasion to reach
the Gertz simple-negligence issue since no objection to a New York Times
instruction had been made); Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 n.19
(1975). See supra text accompanying note 357.
755. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The five-member majority
applied the New York Times standard to “matters of public interest.” Id. at 387–
97. Two of the five did this as a fallback position to absolutism. Id. at 398–401
(Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 801–02 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Four members of the Court would have adopted a version of a negligence
standard. Id. at 405–11 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at
417–18 (Fortas, J., Warren, C.J., Clark, J., dissenting). Note that Rehnquist took
Harlan’s position on the Court. See discussion supra note 1.
756. See supra text accompanying notes 25–68.
757. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41–42, 45, 47–48, 50
(1971) (plurality opinion).
758. Cox, 420 U.S. at 498 n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
was the author of the Court’s opinion in Gertz. See supra text accompanying note
32. See also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 200, at 335–36 (concluding the
Court’s emphasis on voluntariness in Firestone indicated that Hill no longer
controls in private-person cases).
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Several other extremely important developments suggest that Hill no
longer remains controlling in the private-person, public-concern sphere
under the First Amendment. 759
First, as stated above, in Firestone, Justice Rehnquist, in writing for
the Court, rejected any First Amendment requirement for prefacing access
to the other broad components of Gertz-defined actual injury by a First
Amendment-mandated, threshold demonstration of reputational harm.
Florida’s refusal to so pre-condition liability did not convert defamation
claims into something else. 760 Indeed, the modern law of defamation has
clearly become predominantly focused on injurious falsehood and mental
distress, not reputation. 761
Second, the Court’s only appropriation, right-of-publicity case,
Zacchini v. Scripps Howard, 762 an opinion by Justice White in which
Justice Rehnquist joined, 763 described Hill as “hotly contested” by a
divided Court. 764 The Court then devastated a false-light-versusdefamation dichotomy, concluding that the interest protected in false light

759. The Hill standard would remain applicable in public-person, publicconcern cases. See ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, §§ 4:13A, 4:13B.
760. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (Respondent’s election
to forego her claim for reputational harm did not bar recovery for other
components of Gertz’s illustrative listing of harms caused by defamatory falsity.).
761. Bezanson, supra note 479, at 536, 541 (“Falsity is substituting for, if not
swallowing up, reputation.”); id. at 543 (“Today the tort protects against injurious
falsehood. [R]ecovery by any plaintiff is more likely to be the product of chance
than of any systematic pattern reflecting reputational interests.”); id. at 554
(“[T]he reputational protection actually achieved is the result of accident, force,
or the will of the plaintiff, and is in no measure a reasoned product of the legal
system itself.”); id. at 555–56 (“‘[R]eputation’ today means the individual’s
freedom from false assertion . . . . ‘Reputation’ . . . today means an individual’s
freedom from emotional distress caused by an intentionally false accusation.”).
Another opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, Paul v. Davis, found defamation
and privacy (false-light) actions insufficient for §1983 due process claims against
tortfeasor governmental defendants. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976);
supra text accompanying note 93. He assumed that such actions would be
generally available under state tort law. Paul, 424 U.S. at 699. There is not a hint
in his opinion that the two overlapping actions should or would be treated
dissimilarly due to First Amendment considerations. See the analyses of falselight in United States v. Alvarez at supra note 112; infra note 769.
762. Zacchini v. Scripps Howard, 433 U.S. 562, 565–79 (1977).
763. Id. at 563.
764. Id. at 571.
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is “clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as
in defamation.” 765
Third, the Court has specifically rejected any suggestion that what
constitutes libel is a matter of First Amendment concern. 766 In light of this,
it is exceedingly doubtful that the Court would superimpose enhanced
liability standards on otherwise materially false and harmful tortious
statements.
Fourth, the Court has co-equally adopted a two-fold focus for
defamation, only one of which is harm to the plaintiff. The co-equal
function is prevention of defamation-based harm to readers and pollution
of public discourse. 767
Fifth, constitutional concerns raised about the legitimacy of the tort as
a whole fly in the face of several Supreme Court decisions that tacitly or
expressly affirmed the viability of the tort 768 and the absence in any Court
opinion of a scintilla of a constitutional concern as to false light’s First
Amendment viability. 769 Indeed, given the substantial overlap between the
765. Id. at 573 (quoting William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 400
(1960) (delineating the differences between false-light privacy and appropriationright of publicity and comparing the relevant interests protected thereby)). See
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1967) (citing the same Prosser article
and noting that the primary protected interest in defamation is reputation, while
in false-light privacy the primary interest is mental distress, but also noting the
significant overlap between them). See also BLASI, supra note 243, at 6 (Hill and
Cantrell were “concerned more with misrepresentations of fact . . . more like
defamation . . . than pure invasion of privacy”).
766. See supra text accompanying note 134.
767. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 453, 462, 508, 702–
04, 724–29; infra text accompanying notes 870–81, 907, 973, 1017–81.
768. See ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, §§ 4:1, 4:13A.
769. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485–94 (1975) (citing as
authoritative Dean Prosser’s division of privacy into four torts, including falselight, and adopting Prosser’s Tentative Draft No. 13 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1977)); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245,
248 n.2, 249–51 (1974) (Citing both Prosser and the Tentative Draft, Justice
Stewart stated in a footnote: “Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye is generally recognized as one of the several distinct kinds of
invasions actionable under the privacy rubric.”); Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 382–95.
Most recently, every member of the Court referenced the false-light tort as outside
the protective First Amendment parameters of United States v. Alvarez. See
discussion supra note 112. Note that Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which helped
create the majority for invalidation of the stolen-valor statute, specifically
distinguished cases involving torts like defamation, false-light privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress-“outrage” “that tend to cause harm to
a specific victim of an emotional, dignitary, or privacy-related kind.” U.S. v.
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two, 770 any attempt to disaggregate the two and to: (1) constitutionally bar
false light; or (2) impose measurably enhanced requirements—i.e., the
New York Times-Hill rule for private-plaintiff, public-concern cases 771—
would, as to (1), constitute an attempt to accord de facto absolute
immunity for materially false and harmful statements, a view that the
Court has repeatedly rejected as untenable at every opportunity. 772 It
would also be inconsistent with the Court’s unanimous decision, authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 773 As to (2),
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2554 (2012) (Breyer, J., with Kagan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
770. See ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, §§ 4:1, 4:5, 4:13B. See also
supra text accompanying note 351. For example, in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991), the Court concluded defendant had portrayed
plaintiff in “a most unflattering light.” Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S.
496, 501 (1991). See also supra text accompanying note 115. All of the libelous
statements would have been actionable under false light. See supra text
accompanying note 765. See also Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 247 where some of the
false statements connoting poverty would be considered libelous in some
jurisdictions. See Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spectator, 38 N.E.2d 112 (N.Y. 1941).
However, another and the most conspicuous aspect of the case, the “same mask
of non-expression she wore at the funeral,” Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 248, was
actionable as false light but probably would not be libelous. See DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 1209 (2000) (construing the two aspects of Cantrell as
“[p]ossibly, but not certainly” a case in which defamation was unavailable).
Compare the false-victim portrayals in Time, Inc. v. Hill. See supra text
accompanying note 751. Of course, this vagueness concerning the boundaries
between defamation and false light would result in artificial, arbitrary, and
confusing jury instructions—negligence as to the libelous and false-light issues
related to poverty and the Hill standard regarding the false-light, non-libelous
mask reference—adding an additional stratum to an already complicated set of
First Amendment rules.
771. See supra text accompanying notes 352–57, 754–57.
772. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57, 112, 129–44, 339, 531, 722;
infra text accompanying notes 789–881.
773. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48–57 (1988). The libel count
had been dismissed because the jury did not view the charged matter as factually
false. Id. at 49, 57. The Court emphasized the necessity of proving (1) a false
statement with (2) knowing or reckless disregard of such falsity in public-figure
cases. Id. at 56–57. There is not a hint in its opinion that the material falsity must
be libelous. Id. at 50–57. Note that the false-light claim had been dismissed
because Virginia recognizes only the statutory appropriation tort, not the falselight tort. Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Va.
1981). One can view Falwell much more narrowly, as exclusively a parodycaricature case where, by definition, plaintiff cannot prove a materially false
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it would run afoul of the Court’s repeated rejection of subject-matter
classifications 774 for applying the New York Times criteria and the Court’s
imposition of a burden of compelling justification for extension of New
York Times beyond the public-person context. 775
Justice Rehnquist extended his fairness search also to non-traditional
remedies, 776 agreeing with Justice Brennan that the Court’s invalidation of
a candidate-right-to-reply statute in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo 777 did not necessarily bar a court-ordered retraction following
defamation litigation. 778 Justice Rehnquist also concurred in Justice
statement. This narrower focus was emphasized at the end of Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion: “[T]his claim cannot, consistently with the First
Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question
is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here.” Hustler
Mag., Inc., 485 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). See Justice White’s cryptic
conclusion New York Times had little to do with the case in light of the jury’s
conclusion the ad involved no factual assertion. He agreed with the Court because
the judgment penalized a parody and could not be “squared with the First
Amendment.” Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Note that in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16–17, 20 (1990), Chief Justice
Rehnquist viewed Falwell, together with Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Association, Inc. v. Bresler and National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
see supra text accompanying note 576, as providing protection for imaginative
expression or rhetorical hyperbole that cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as
stating actual facts about an individual.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (emphasis
added) (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50). See also Smolla, Emotional Distress,
supra note 165, at 425. Hustler was mandated at minimum on the “relatively
narrow ground” that parody was absolutely protected opinion. Id. at 448–50
(treating Hustler as indistinguishable from the Court’s rhetorical-hyperbole or
imaginative-expression cases); see supra text accompanying note 576. Note that
Rehnquist emphasized the important function of the jury in factual
determinations, a position he later continued to emphasize in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. See supra text accompanying notes 591–98.
774. See supra text accompanying notes 25–83, 162–240.
775. See supra text accompanying notes 93–104. On the use of a declaratory
judgment or equivalent to allow plaintiffs seeking no damages to vindicate their
reputations without proof of fault, see infra text accompanying notes 778, 995.
776. For an analysis of classical damage remedies, see supra text
accompanying notes 724–50. On Justice Rehnquist and the possibility of a
statutory declaratory judgment action, see supra text accompanying note 149;
infra text accompanying notes 778, 996.
777. Miami Herlad Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
778. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., with Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Court’s
unanimous invalidation of a candidate right-of-reply statute implies no view as
the constitutionality of a statutory action requiring publication of a retraction by
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Breyer’s reputation-sensitive opinion in Troy v. Cochran, 779 a case
involving a permanent injunction along with coercive, libelous, and
slanderous picketing 780 of the late Johnny Cochran. Justice Breyer
declined to declare that Cochran’s death necessary mooted the permanent
injunction 781 and did not reach the broad issues raised by petitioners. 782
Instead, Justice Breyer found that Cochran’s demise rendered the
injunction, as initially drafted, now too broad in its application. 783
Importantly, the Court granted substitution of Cochran’s spouse and
vacated for further proceedings by any appropriate party or parties, 784
presumably the spouse 785 and probably the law firm which had theretofore
been a non-party. 786 The Court’s narrow holding and remand to the
California courts suggested an openness to affirming carefully tuned
a plaintiff able to prove a defamatory falsehood. But compare Justice White’s
scathing criticism of Gertz and Tornillo, suggesting that plaintiffs are unable to
compel the media to tell their version of the story or print a retraction. Id. at 262
(White, J., concurring). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 368 n.3
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nothing in his opinion or the Court’s should be
considered to imply that a private plaintiff unable to show fault could never rely
on a statute providing for an action for retraction or for publication of a court’s
determination of falsity if plaintiff can demonstrate such falsity—Justice Brennan
did note that such statutes might pose constitutional issues. But compare id. at
401–02 n.43 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that mandated replies or judiciallycompelled retractions are equivalent to government coercion under Miami Herald
Publishing but that the Court had not considered Justice Brennan’s less drastic
alternative of a statute not requiring proof of fault but allowing a court
determination of falsity upon plaintiff proof thereof). See supra note 149; infra
note 996. Note also that no member of the Court intimated even the slightest
concern about the relatively commonplace Florida retraction statute discussed
briefly in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452 n.1 (1976) that made a request
for retraction a prerequisite to filing for libel. Without such, plaintiff was relegated
to compensatory damages. Id.
779. Troy v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 735 (2005). Compare the Rehnquist Era
Court’s refusal to treat constraints on dissemination of discovery matter as
classical prior restraints. See supra text accompanying note 723.
780. Troy, 544 U.S. at 735–36.
781. Id. at 736–37.
782. Id. at 737–38 (whether the First Amendment prohibited a permanent
injunction in a libel or slander case, at least in the case of plaintiff-public figure,
and whether the injunction in question violated First Amendment proper tailoring
requirements).
783. Id. at 738.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 740 (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., joining, dissenting).
786. Id.
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permanent injunctions in parallel coercive-tribute 787 cases or, equally
likely, in cases of previously adjudicated falsity with a penurious or
judgment-proof defendant and the unambiguous inadequacy of
substitutional relief. 788
X. NEUTRAL REPORTAGE AND THE REHNQUIST COURT—A PREDICTION
The Rehnquist Era Court never directly dealt with the doctrine of
neutral reportage that Judge Irving Kaufman 789 created through flagrant
misapplication of precedent in Edwards v. National Audubon Society. 790
Consequently, a libel scholar sorties into the issue of how that Court would
have resolved this highly controversial, 791 nebulous, 792 minority
doctrine 793 with some trepidation. The Court referenced the doctrine of
neutral reportage’s existence only in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton 794 but left the issue open, noting lower courts’ rejection
for non-compliance with one of its pivotal elements 795 and petitioner’s
non-pursuit of the issue before the Court. 796 A single Court member,
Justice Blackmun, characterized the case before the Court in exceptionally
787. Id.
788. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, 9:9.
789. For a detailed critique, see Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at
553, 640–55; id. at 644 (noting that “[p]art of the leaky heritage” of neutral
reportage is its dubious use of precedent in Edwards ); id. at 688 (characterizing
Edwards as intellectual quicksand).
790. Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, Edwards v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). As the Second Circuit
found no constitutional malice, the neutral-reportage aspect was and is extensive
dicta. Others have regularly so viewed Edwards. See Elder, Media Jabberwock,
supra note 129, at 641–42 n.654, 654 n.726.
791. For a detailed critique, see generally Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra
note 129, at 627–723.
792. Id. at 655 n.730 (noting “what is self-evident from reading almost three
decades of neutral reportage decisions: the ‘contours [are] rather ill-defined’ and
the ‘weight’ to be accorded each factor or qualification is left largely ‘undefined’”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
793. Id. at 553 (Neutral reportage encountered a largely unsympathetic
judiciary); id. at 685 (noting that respondents’ claim in Norton v. Glenn that
neutral reportage was contrary to the gross weight of authority was accurate).
794. Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 US. 657 (1989).
795. Id. at 660–61 n.1. The district court found that the source did not qualify
as a responsible, prominent source. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that the report was
“neither accurate nor disinterested . . . .” Connaughton v. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns,
Inc., 842 F.2d 825, 847 (6th Cir. 1988).
796. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 660–61 n.1.

254

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

broad terms—petitioner had accurately reported newsworthy allegations
of information of central focus in a political campaign 797—and then
gratuitously and unjustifiably criticized as unwise 798 counsel’s tactical
decision to eschew pursuit thereof before the Court.
As the author has suggested in elaborate detail elsewhere, 799 any
media lawyer or court relying on this doctrine, or other circumvention of
New York Times devices, has a tough constitutional row to hoe. 800
Although media absolutism had a trio of early absolutists—Justices Black,
Douglas and Goldberg 801—no member of the Court, with the possible
exception of Justice Blackmun in Harte-Hanks, has espoused any version
of media absolutism for underlying false matter in over four decades. 802

797. Id. at 694–95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
798. Id. The facts of the case “arguably might fit within” neutral reportage. Id.
at 695. Cf. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 598–99 (concluding that
counsels’ decision was “eminently logical” in view of non-compliance with basic
neutral reportage requirements, see supra text accompanying note 795, and that
Justice Blackmun was likely endeavoring “to resuscitate and possibly enhance his
strong pro-media position in Rosenbloom,” a position he had very reluctantly
disclaimed to help form a Gertz majority). For a discussion of media
commentaries on Justice Blackmun’s views during oral argument, see Elder,
Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 599 n.360.
799. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 551–830.
800. See infra text accompanying notes 801–02, 809–80; Elder, Media
Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 827 (“The Grand Canyon-esque obstacle to this
radical endeavor, insuperable as this author suggests, is the Court’s repeated
reaffirmation of Sullivan’s exceedingly generous protection as quite sufficient!”).
801. Three Court members in New York Times concurred on absolutist
grounds. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293–97 (Black, J., with
Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 297–305 (Goldberg, J. with Douglas, J.,
concurring). For a full listing, see Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at
613–14 nn.445–49.
802. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 613–14. The last two
absolutists, Justices Black and Douglas, retired from the Court on September 17,
1971, and November 12, 1975, respectively. KERMIT HALL, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1133 (2005). The
last absolutist opinion in a media-liability case was by Justice Douglas in a terse
opinion in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 500 n.*, 501 (1975)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (Citing a list of earlier opinions, he reaffirmed the “far
broader proposition” that the First Amendment barred all damage claims “for
merely discussing public affairs” (citations omitted)). Cox Broadcasting Corp.
was decided March 3, 1975. Justice Blackmun, the sole explicit supporter of
neutral reportage, see supra text accompanying notes 797–98, finished his term
on the Court August 3, 1994. HALL, supra note 802, at 1134.
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Even Justice Brennan, the author of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 803
and Garrison v. Louisiana 804 and the Court’s most persistent and effective
media-protective non-absolutist, 805 conceded that New York Times
provided “exceedingly generous” protection 806 for the media. It appears
impossible to deny that Court precedent has provided the most expansive
protection to false, injurious matter in the democratic constellation. 807
A review of the Court’s defamation and false-light precedent from
1964–1991 808 reaffirms that it repeatedly found arguments for absolute
protection “untenable” 809 or ill-advised. 810 Even in the context of political
campaigns—New York Times’s “fullest and most urgent application” 811—
the Rehnquist Era Court applied the New York Times qualified-privilege
rule in Harte-Hanks in the context of accurately republishing a source’s
charges and the defamed victim’s responses. 812 In the latter, the Court
reaffirmed its earlier decision in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 813 a case in
which the Court specifically rejected First Amendment absolutism 814 in
803. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254. See supra text accompanying notes 882–89.
804. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64 (1964). See infra text accompanying notes
874–76.
805. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 614.
806. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 192 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part). See supra text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104, 133; infra text
accompanying notes 807, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 918, 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–
48, 1073, 1077.
807. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 826 (New York Times
provides the media “protection unknown in the world or in history.”). See infra
text accompanying notes 867, 882.
808. The Court’s last major decision was Masson v. New Yorker Magazine in
1991. See supra text accompanying notes 125–44.
809. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
810. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (rejecting even
the “near absolute, constitutional protection” for rational interpretation of
quotations, see supra text accompanying notes 138–42, as “ill-serv[ing] the values
of the First Amendment”).
811. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Ocala-Star Banner
Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971) (“strongest possible case” for New York
Times).
812. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 461 U.S. 657, 686–88 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 649–90. As the author has suggested elsewhere,
the Court’s analysis in Harte-Hanks would indicate that, at the very minimum, the
version of neutral reportage involving irresponsible, non-prominent sources would be
rejected. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 591 n.296.
813. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. 265.
814. Two members of the Court, Justices Black and Douglas, reiterated their
absolutist positions. Id. at 277–78 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring in the
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favor of applying the New York Times qualified privilege. This case
involved
republisher
defendants—column
distributors
and
newspapers 815—of a verbatim column by a highly reputable author, 816
undoubtedly a “prominent, responsible” source, 817 about plaintiff-public
figure-candidate. 818 All the basic elements of Edwards-neutral
reportage 819 were met. Future adoption of the latter would require outright
repudiation of Monitor Patriot, a decision the Rehnquist Era Court
repeatedly affirmed. 820
The Rehnquist Era Court’s unanimous repudiation of absolutism in
the Petition Clause setting in McDonald v. Smith 821 similarly poses an
almost insuperable obstacle to proposed variations of media absolutism.
The Court’s opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 822 rejected special
protection for petitioning expression, concluding that all the free
judgment but dissenting in part). The large Court majority of seven specifically
rejected this position. Id. at 266, 272–77; id. at 277, 301 (White, J., concurring).
815. Id. at 266–67. A number of the Rehnquist Era Court’s decisions have
involved re-publisher defendants without a hint of absolute privilege. Masson,
501 U.S. at 525 (liability of a book publisher for issuance of a book based on a
reputable magazine’s articles); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
(defendant’s accurate republication of newsworthy criticism in a speech before or
inserted in the Congressional Record); see infra text accompanying notes 835–38;
Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 159 n.1 (1979) (litigation
regarding in part codefendant book club and paperback re-publisher of an
employee-authored book); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728–29, 733
(1968) (regarding a non-media republisher’s liability for republication of a unionsource’s questions and answers during a televised speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 327 (1974) (involving dissemination of defendant’s newspaper
at newsstands and published reprints in Chicago, where the trial at issue
purportedly took place). See also Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1184,
1230–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev’d in part, 781 F.2d 298, 307–08 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986)
(regarding a reputable magazine’s republication of an article based on a 60
Minutes broadcast written by the producer with its own streamer preface).
816. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 266–67 n.1 (Drew Pearson’s “MerryGo-Round”).
817. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 565–66, 601, 622–23
nn.494–97.
818. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 266–77.
819. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 565–66.
820. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686–88
(1989); Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51–52 (1988); Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45, 53, 61 (1982) (invalidating application of a state corrupt-practices
act as to a candidate pledge to reduce his salary).
821. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
822. Id. at 480.
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expression guarantees in the First Amendment were “cut from the same
cloth” 823 and “inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy.” 824 In
ringing language, the Court held that “[t]he right to petition is guaranteed;
the right to commit libel with impunity is not.” 825 Justice Brennan, writing
for the most media-protective wing of the Court, ratified this “essential
unity” 826 and drew a direct analogy between the political ad in New York
Times and the letter to President Reagan before the Court libeling a
candidate for U.S. Attorney. 827 This important analogy is “portentous, and
a thing of state” 828 for neutral reportage and its ilk. New York Times
involved a verbatim ad, “prominent, responsible” sources, nonconcurrence by the Times, and an issue of huge importance and legalpolitical-social controversy—attempts to desegregate and the Southern
oppositionist culture epitomized by L.B. Sullivan. Thus, New York Times
was a pre-Edwards exemplar for neutral reportage.829 But, the McDonald
Court unanimously and roundly rejected media absolutism.
A quartet of other decisions likewise augur exceedingly negatively for
media absolutism in cases involving material falsity. No member of the
Herbert v. Lando 830 Court bought the media’s eloquent plea for absolute
immunity from discovery of state-of-mind evidence. No member of the
Court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine 831 disagreed with the riveting
body blows accorded the media’s attempted circumvention of New York
Times to accord the media de facto forms of absolutism: that the First
Amendment superimposed constraints on what States could view as
defamatory; 832 mandated adoption of the incremental-harm subdivision of
the libel-proof-plaintiff doctrine; 833 barred imposition of liability for any
823. Id. at 482.
824. Id. at 485.
825. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Powell did not participate. Id. The Court’s
non-absolutism in Petition Clause cases has been strongly criticized. See supra
text accompanying note 399.
826. Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring).
827. Id. at 489 n.3.
828. Vachel Lindsay, Abraham Lincoln Walks at Midnight, in THE TOP 500
POEMS 918–19 (William Harmon ed., 1992).
829. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 555–56 n.40, 624–26. On
the background of the New York Times litigation, see Elder, Small Town, supra
note 260, at 884–91. See infra text accompanying notes 882, 1019–23, 1056.
830. For a more-detailed analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 710–23.
831. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 498, 518–23 (1991); id. at
525–27 (White, J., with Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
832. Masson, 501 U.S. at 509–10, 522–23.
833. Id. at 522–23.

258

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

rational interpretation imputing quoted matter to a public person. 834 No
member of the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire 835 raised a First
834. Id. at 518–20. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 594–98, 603.
835. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). There are other hints that
neutral reportage would be at odds with the Rehnquist Era Court’s libel
jurisprudence. First, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1990),
see supra text accompanying notes 569–619, the Court concluded that a
defendant’s bold statement, “I think Jones lied” could be actionable as implying
underlying facts that were incorrect, incomplete, or erroneously assessed. It seems
indubitable that the Court would not have treated the fault-regarding-substratalfalsity focus dependent on plaintiff’s status any differently had defendant been
quoted as saying that “X [e.g., a public official] thinks Jones lied.” See Elder,
Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 594 n.325. Secondly, in the same opinion,
the column’s author quoted an Ohio athletic association commissioner who had
attended the commission’s hearing and the ensuing judicial hearing. Id. at 592
n.313. The statement of this “purportedly neutral quasi-judicial expert”
suggesting perjury was a “particularly damning aspect” of the column. Id.
However, the Court gave “not the faintest hint that accurate reportage” thereof
immunized defendants from any otherwise substratally false defamatory
implication. Id. at 592–93 n.313 (emphasis added). The Court remanded for
further proceedings on the latter issue. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20–23. See
generally Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 603 (concluding that it
was highly doubtful that the Court would “countenance an absolute privilege for
demonstrable, defamatorily false statements under the guise of neutral reportage
(or reconstituted accuracy-pseudo-truth) after rejecting opinion protection for the
same where a knowingly or recklessly false statement of and concerning a public
person is implied . . . .” (alteration in original)). Third, the Court’s rejection of a
media-defendant’s right of rational interpretation of quotations, see supra text
accompanying notes 138–42, would not have resulted in any different conclusion
had the Court viewed the intellectual gigolo defamatory statement as accurately
emanating from respected senior psychoanalysts. The plaintiff therein was
deemed a public figure. Masson, 501 U.S. at 499. The cited sources were also
likely public figures and responsible, prominent sources under Edwards. The
requisites for neutral reportage were thus met. But, there is no indication the Court
would have analyzed this parallel situation in a different manner and every
indication to the contrary. “[M]isuse of purported quotations, whether by a third
person or by the plaintiff to defame plaintiff would not have been immune if
‘rationally interpreted’ or accurately reported if they conveyed a knowingly or
recklessly false implication.” Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 597
n.342. Fourth, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S.
376, 386 (1973), the Court compared the ad in New York Times to an ad violating
a local ordinance and, in an opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined, opined in
a provocative dictum: “Assuming the requisite state of mind [constitutional
malice], nothing in a newspaper’s editorial decision to accept an advertisement
changes the character of the falsely defamatory statements. The newspaper may
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Amendment-based absolutist, or even a New York Times-limited,
alternative to the Court’s rejection of speech-protective Speech and Debate
Clause absolute protection 836 for defendant-Senator as to accurate
republication—press releases, newsletters, television remarks 837—of
newsworthy criticisms initially published in a speech given before or
inserted in the Congressional Record. 838 Lastly, and quite significantly, the
Court majority in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 839
with Justice Rehnquist joining in the opinion, 840 ignored accurate
reportage as evidence refuting the qualified privilege of constitutional
malice. 841 A fortiori, it seems almost laughable to suggest this same Court
would have accorded absolute privilege to neutral reportage.
Yet, media defendants contend that such media “conduit”“messenger” functions 842 are necessary addenda to New York Times
because the public has a right to know information that the media
accurately reports even if it has “serious doubts” about or actually knows
that the information is a lie. 843 The national media “Jabberwockian
horde” 844 fought this issue with the considerable resources at its
command 845 before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Norton v.
Glenn, 846 involving a newspaper’s accurate reportage of codefendant-

not defend a libel suit on the ground that the falsely defamatory statements are
not its own.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court “came pregnantly close to rejecting
the underlying rationale for neutral reportage . . . .” Elder, Media Jabberwock,
supra note 129, at 625 n.521.
836. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 113–36; id. at 136 (Stewart, J., joining); id. at
136 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (solely on Speech and Debate Clause grounds).
837. Id. at 115–18, 130, 132–33. Note the Court did not accept the view that a
press release, “in a constitutional sense, was no different than would have been a
television or radio broadcast of his speech from the Senate floor.” Id. at 119.
838. Id. at 116 n.3.
839. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
840. Id. at 658–59.
841. Id. at 695–96 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying
note 674.
842. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 553, 631–40, 813–18.
843. Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977).
844. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 553.
845. Id. at 553, 627–40, 659 n.756, 660 n.763, 664 n.794; supra text
accompanying notes 570, 618–19; infra text accompanying notes 861–65, 916,
926–28, 982–85, 999, 1077.
846. Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004). See generally Elder, Media
Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 627–40.
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borough council member’s charges outside and after a council meeting 847
that plaintiffs, the council president and mayor, were gay and had engaged
in homosexual acts. 848 Defendant’s reporter had ample evidence
suggesting that the source was suspect and the charges were baseless 849—
information they did not disclose 850 and were not required to disclose
under Edwards. 851 In a powerful opinion, Chief Justice Cappy rejected
neutral reportage as a radical concept” 852 of “blanket immunity” 853 based
on the press’s purported “special role” 854 in American society. Such a
847. Norton, 860 A.2d at 50. The court rejected fair report, a doctrine distinct
from neutral reportage, as limited to governmental proceedings. Id. at 52–53 n.6.
This was undoubtedly correct. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at
630 n.562, 758–60.
848. Norton, 860 A.2d at 50.
849. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 628 nn.544–45.
850. Id. at 628 (This information at 592 n.313 “would have portrayed the
source as an unmitigated liar—the jury’s ultimate determination.”).
851. Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1997)
(protecting serious charges “regardless of the reporter’s private views regarding
their validity” and refusing to require the media to “take up cudgels against
dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of liability”); Elder, Media
Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 631–32, 669 (The case law “strongly weighs
against such,” citing the overweening philosophy of neutral reportage); id. at 670
(characterizing such non-disclosure as a bizarre and unconscionable scenario).
Unlike Edwards, the council-person source in Norton was not alleged to be
responsible, only prominent. Id. The author has synthesized this scenario
elsewhere:
This put [the media defendants] in the awkward position of defending a
double-layered lie: republishing matter from a very suspect source
without disclosing the bases for their suspicions. . . . They cited the need
to bring vital information to the electorate concerning the fitness of an
elected public officer [the source], and the censorship that would result
if source reliability were the focus.
Id. at 632 nn.575–77. Of course, the prominent, responsible source concept is
itself exceedingly strange, id. at 667, and poses major unanswered (perhaps
unanswerable) questions, id. at 671, including the threshold issue of why the very
information raising serious doubts does not forfeit such and connote
irresponsibility. Of course, it does not, or neutral reportage would be unnecessary.
But the cases “provide little or no guidance as to why a ‘responsible’ source can
and should be respected where the reporter has ‘serious doubts’ about the source’s
veracity or the information tendered.” Id. at 672.
852. Norton, 860 A.2d at 53.
853. Id. at 56–57.
854. Id. at 56 (“[T]he Court has not declared that a media defendant is owed
even a scintilla more protection than a private citizen-defendant.”). For other
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“sweeping privilege” 855 would effectively and unnecessarily eviscerate
state defamation law. 856 There was no First Amendment justification for
such. New York Times provided sufficient protection by the minimal 857
burden imposed on the media, i.e., abstaining from knowing or reckless
disregard of falsity. 858
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Norton less than
six months before Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death. 859 No member of the
discussions of the media, non-media defendant dichotomy, see supra text
accompanying notes 389–511.
855. Norton, 860 A.2d at 56.
856. Id. at 56–57.
857. Id. at 57. See also supra text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73, 104,
130, 139, 806-07; infra text accompanying notes 858, 867, 869, 882, 918, 994,
1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
858. Norton, 860 A.2d at 57 (projecting that the Court “would not so sharply tilt
the balance” against reputation as to “jettison” the New York Times constitutionalmalice standard in favor of neutral reportage). The court found the First Amendment
standards to likewise be the “outer boundaries” of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Id. at 58 (citing the explicit recognition of reputation in the Pennsylvania
Constitution and that precedent emphasized reputation was not inferior to but equal
to free expression and included in the “same category with life, liberty and
property”). For discussions of reputation, see supra notes 14, 30, 44–45, 93–94,
102–03, 168–69, 257, 450, 507, 565, 599–600; infra text accompanying notes 868–
903, 972–73, 1023, 1041. Compare one author’s argument that journalists are
“savvy enough to understand that ‘truth’ is a messy concept that sometimes simply
means ‘accuracy.’” Ashley Messenger, Reflections on New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 50 Years Later, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 423, 423 (2014). Thus, New
York Times fails the needs of “high quality journalism” by adopting a “marketplace
of ideas” approach that “place[s] a high value in the truth-seeking function of
speech” and finds publication of knowing falsehoods unprotected. Such a “spotty
and narrow” perspective fails “to protect the one thing that reporters generally agree
is a crucial part of their function—to convey what was said.” Id. at 424, 430, 446.
This purported failure of New York Times and its progeny does not provide
protection “that well reflects the realities of the world and the way humans
communicate.” Id. at 446. This argument is made in defense of a different result in
Norton v. Glenn. Id. at 424–46. Messenger is senior associate general counsel for
National Public Radio. See Ashley Messenger, LINKEDIN, https://www.linked
in.com/in/ashley-messenger-646839b/ [https://perma.cc/N948-Z7KX] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2022). Interestingly, the author neither cites to nor attempts to respond to
the compelling arguments against “neutral reportage” made in the Media
Jabberwock article discussed in this section.
859. Chief Justice Rehnquist died September 3, 2005. Bradley, supra note 1,
at 418. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 28, 2005. See Troy Publ’g
Co. v. Norton, 544 U.S. 956 (2005).
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Court dissented from the denial of certiorari 860 despite the vigorous and
elegant efforts of defendant and amici curiae. 861 In a metaphorical sense,
this was a symbolic but lasting memorial to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
continuing attempt to “hold[] the balance true.” 862 The havoc neutral
reportage would have wrought, if adopted, is amply evidenced by the
breadth of potential re-publisher defendants who signed on in the amici
briefs 863 and the mindbogglingly creative endeavors to ground neutral
reportage in First Amendment theory, 864 including a breathtaking but

860. Id.
861. See the extended discussion in Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129,
at 631–40; see supra text accompanying notes 618–19; infra text accompanying
notes 863–66, 926–28, 982. See generally Halpern, supra note 50, at 288 (noting
“a strong and experienced ‘defendant’s lobby,’ vigilant and articulate” and
bemoaning the absence of a “plaintiff’s lobby”). For a modest proposal to alleviate
the latter, see generally infra the text about enhanced opportunities for a plaintiffs’
bar. For discussions of the gross imbalance in resources, see supra text
accompanying notes 570, 618–19, 845; infra text accompanying notes 867, 916,
926–28, 982–85, 999, 1077.
862. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
863. Brief of Amici Curiae the Associated Press et. al. in Support of
Petitioners, Troy Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Norton, 2005 WL 1349954 (U.S. 2005) (No.
04-979) (The introductory statement made an exceptionally important admission
about the broad swath of parties who might claim neutral reportage protection:
“Amici curiae and their members are publishers, broadcasters, wire services,
editors and reporters working [in Pennsylvania, and throughout the United States]
to disseminate news and information to the public by, among other means,
reporting newsworthy statements made by public officials and other public
persons about those in positions of power and influence . . . .”). Compare the
inconsistency of neutral reportage and its conduit-messenger functions with a
wide swath of comparable defamation scenarios and the inevitable, volcanic
domino effect such would have despite any foundation in the Court’s precedent,
public policy, or logic. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 813–18.
864. Id. at 554–55 (Summarizing the briefs, the author lists the arguments
raised for “the future battle over [neutral reportage’s] equally capricious
surrogates . . . foreshadowed” in the Norton v. Glenn briefs and demonstrates how
the media Jabberwock engaged in hyperbolic interpretation of Court precedent
and “manipulated [such] creatively in its attempts to expand First Amendment
protection far beyond that envisioned by the Court. . . . accuracy as pseudo-truth,
fair report as extending to informal governmental investigations and unofficial
statements, neutrality as per se negating constitutional malice, accurate recitation
of charges with teaser protestations of innocence as non-defamatory, and
Sullivan’s proscription of reckless journalism as contemplating, countenancing
and authorizing dissemination of calculated falsehood under the rubric of so-
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intellectually dishonest attempt to equate truth with accuracy. 865 An
unenamoured Court seemed to agree with respondents that neutral
reportage was “ill-reasoned and unwieldy” and the Court should “signal
[its] demise.” 866
The Norton decision reflects and affirms the Rehnquist Era Court’s
New York Times culture in public-person libel cases, which provides what
is tantamount to neo-absolute immunity 867 to media defendants in cases
called responsible journalism”). For a detailed critique, see id. at 627–55, 723–
813, 818–26.
865. Id. at 603–05 (sarcastically terming the Court’s three decades of Cox
Broadcasting privacy precedent as “a miraculous new ‘source’ of supporting
‘authority’” that “cavalierly equates or conflates apples and oranges—or should I
say apples and elephants”). Reliance on its privacy jurisprudence as a basis for
protecting false matter
would impute to the Court a type of jurisprudential schizophrenia: with
calculated falsehood enveloped in the subterfuge of accuracy-pseudotruth backdoored as the absolute protection the Court has uniformly
disavowed through the front door. This is a tough position for the media
and its allies to propose and defend. Doubtless, it is an argument they
will make with considerable vigor and aplomb.
Id. at 613. An analysis of Court precedent suggests that the Court sometimes has
confusingly used truth and accuracy interchangeably but nonetheless
convincingly demonstrates that its New York Times-generated focus is on
substratal falsity not facial accuracy and that the Court has repeatedly affirmed
that its defamation and public-disclosure-of-private-facts privacy precedents are
separate and distinct. See id. at 555–627.
866. Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 5, 20, Troy Publ’g Co. v. Norton, 544
U.S. 956 (2005) (No. 04-979), 2005 WL 438008; Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra
note 129, at 555 (concluding that “Edwards’ ‘rendezvous with Death’ no longer
remains a ‘disputed barricade,’ and that its surrogates similarly lack precedential
value as either common law, public policy or constitutional doctrine”).
867. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 552 (“[T]he calculated
falsehood standard is so difficult to satisfy that often none but the impulsive, the
intrepid or the naive will contemplate suing for libel. However, Sullivan does
allow for rare victories by public persons, and may impose a degree of caution on
at least some media defendants.”); Elder et al., supra note 618, at 363 (“As any
libel plaintiff or lawyer knows, media lawyers engage in Shermanesque attrition
tactics that make the march across Georgia look like kindergarten play banter.
Cases are rarely settled and are invariably appealed to the court of last resort and
tactical maneuvers are used to financially, emotionally, and psychologically
exhaust the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel—all under the purported panoply of
the First Amendment.”); Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 615–16
(citing extensive citations for the near desuetude of libel as an effective tool under
New York Times); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL:
DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 246 (2006) (New York Times has
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involving false reports about such public persons. But, the Court has also
repeatedly recognized the other side of the constitutional equation868—the
interest of the states in protecting an individual’s quasi-constitutional
interest in reputation 869 and its equally valid interest in protecting against
defamatory pollution of public discourse and deception of its citizenry. 870
The Rehnquist Era Court 871 and Justice Rehnquist himself 872 explicitly
prized these values.
In a decision and in language the Rehnquist Era Court repeatedly cited
as reflecting its consensus view, 873 Justice Brennan disparaged calculated
effectively stifled defamation suits by public persons and most private persons,
providing little protection for reputation and a remarkable platform for free
expression). The constitutional-malice rule “leaves vast numbers of people—
perhaps most of the victims of media defamation—with no legal remedy for
damage to reputation . . . . [N]o major legal system in the world provides as little
protection for reputation as the United States now provides.” Anderson, Is Libel
Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 525–26 (emphasis added); id. at 545
(“[M]edia defendants, as a class, have the means and the incentive to spend what
it takes to make sure libel does not become an effective remedy.”); Ashdown,
supra note 172, at 751 (First Amendment requirements “afford the press a virtual
absolute privilege to publish and broadcast false stories” and citing the “virtual
impossibility of plaintiff recover[y]”). Under New York Times and Gertz, the
media has “something approaching an absolute privilege to defame; a reasonable
publisher should worry about having to pay substantial libel damages as much as
she worries about being struck by lightning.” David A. Logan, Libel Law in the
Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503,
520 (2001). The Court has repeatedly recognized this neo-absolute immunity. See,
e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 192 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
(emphasizing New York Times’s “exceedingly generous” protection); id. at 157–
58 (Court) (“already heavy burden of proof”); id. at 169 (“widely perceived as
essentially protective of press freedoms”). See also supra text accompanying
notes 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104, 130, 133, 806–07, 857–58; infra text accompanying
notes 869, 882, 917–18, 924–25, 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073, 1077.
868. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
869. Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 600 n.405. See supra text
accompanying notes 14, 30, 43–44, 69, 93–94, 102–03, 108, 135, 154, 168–69,
257, 450, 507, 565, 599–600, 858, 870–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041, 1017–81.
870. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 453, 462, 508–11,
702–04, 724–29, 767; infra text accompanying notes 871–81, 907, 925, 973,
1017–81.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. For a sampling of references to Garrison, see Harte-Hanks Commc’ns
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687, n. 34 (1991); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 778 (1985); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484
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falsehood as beyond the constitutional pale in upholding the constitutional
validity in general of criminal-defamation prosecutions against public
officials in Garrison v. Louisiana. 874 He concluded that the Founders did
not intend, and modern society does not require, publication of such
calculated defamatory falsehoods, acknowledging that some are
“unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless
falsehood as an effective political tool to unseat the public servant or even
topple an administration.” 875 Citing the McCarthy Era, Justice Stevens,
(1985); id. at 487 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., joining, concurring); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 156 n.1. See also Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129,
at 552–55, 600 (summarizing New York Times and its progeny as both required
by and “provid[ing] sufficient protection for media and non-media defamers”).
874. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). Calculated falsehood is
synonymous with knowing or reckless disregard of falsehood or constitutional
malice. Id.
875. Id. at 75 (“[T]he known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises
of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social,
or political change is to be effected.”). Justice Brennan cited to David Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
1085, 1088–1011 (1942). In critiquing the German law and legal system during
the Nazi period, Professor Reisman said:
Thus, defamation, like political assassination, served both to remove
from the arena certain key enemies and to plunge the country into
turmoil, and in the judicial sequel to demonstrate the power and justice
of the rightist cause and the weakness of the Republic. For if one can,
with impunity and even with the blessing of the courts, call the
authorities names and defame them, one removes whatever magic they
possess as authorities. . . . abuse of officials who are selected by the
democratic process can easily serve anti-democratic ends.
Id. at 1098–99. In only one majority opinion did the Rehnquist Era Court
fleetingly refer to absolute protection in a dictum in the fair-report setting. In
rejecting New York Times level protection for inaccurate reports of judicial
proceedings without regard to status as a version of a revived Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., see text accompanying notes 99–101, 196–97, Justice
Rehnquist opined that “[t]he public interest in accurate reports of judicial
proceedings is substantially protected by Cox Broadcasting . . . .” Time Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (emphasis added); Wolston v. Reader’s Dig.
Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 169 (1979). This unexplained, ambiguous dictum was
a quantum leap beyond Cox Broadcasting, which involved only accurate
accounts of underlying true matter. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at
581–82. The Firestone Court also stated that the specific details of “many, if not
most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward advancing the
uninhibited debate on public issues thought to provide principal support” for New
York Times. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457. This comment was made in the context
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with Justice Rehnquist joining, similarly decried in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps how “the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie
can infect and degrade a whole society.” 876 The latter concern seems
particularly relevant today.
As others have suggested, litigation victories for the media under the
calculated falsehood-negligence-is-never-enough doctrine are themselves
“truly Pyrrhic.” 877 One can only imagine the additional negative impact on
contemporary media credibility, already abysmally low in the polls,878 of
a doctrine like neutral reportage, which countenances, condones, and
exalts media publication of multi-layered lies. 879 Luckily, neutral
of according only the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. level of protection in inaccuratereport, private-person settings and would not necessarily control in fair report
settings involving fairness and accuracy mandates and fair report’s public
supervisory functions. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 579–82
n.225.
876. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 781–82 (1986) (Stevens,
J., with Burger, C.J., White, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). See supra text
accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 141, 453, 462, 508, 702–04, 724–25, 767,
870–75; infra text accompanying notes 877–81, 907, 973, 1017–81.
877. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, 619–20 n.481 (A corollary of
non-liability under the calculated-falsehood standard is that “media credibility and
the public’s willingness to credit what they say take major hits” when they are
victorious.); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 523
(noting that in such cases a jury is assessing whether the media defendant is “a
liar or merely incompetent”); id. at 548 (“Such a victory may not strike the public
as a ‘fair’ win on the merits.”).
878. See generally sources cited in Elder et al., supra note 618, at 423 n.577.
See also Pew Research Center, Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and
Traditional Sources, PEW RESCH. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2008), https://www.pewre
search.org/politics/2008/08/17/key-news-audiences-now-blend-online-and-tradit
ional-sources/ [https://perma.cc/48AH-MC4M]; U.S. Media Consumption trends:
Tectonic shifts emerge, WHAT’S NEW IN PUBL’G (Sept. 23, 2021), https://whatsnew
inpublishing.com/us-media-consumption-trends-tectonic-shifts-emerge/ [https://pe
rma.cc/7WDB-9XMB] (Using a variety of sources, the report states that 67% of
the consuming public does not have a paid subscription for news media, that there
has been “a collapse” in TV news viewing, with just 32% regularly viewing news
content in 2021, and that there is a worrying “new low point,” with a majority
“not trusting major TV outlets”). See also infra text accompanying note 1071.
879. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 669–70 (“Even as to a socalled ‘responsible source,’ the matter remains a calculated falsehood, a lie. Yet,
defendants have no responsibility as journalists or publishers to inform the reader
or viewer why they know or have serious doubts about the truth of the matter
reported. Non-disclosure results in the reader or viewer not knowing what the
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reportage does not meet the Court’s exceptionally tough burden for
proponents of absolute immunity, as evidenced by nearly six decades of
unbending Court rejection of such absolute immunity, 880 a burden
measurably higher than the one the Rehnquist Era Court has imposed in
its New York Times qualified privilege scenarios. 881
CONCLUSION
The almost religious veneration First Amendment enthusiasts have for
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan reflects its “perfect storm” 882 status at a
publisher knows or suspects. In addition, the republisher’s imprimatur and
credibility envelop the lie (whether or not the defendants specifically ‘endorse’ or
‘concur’) in a magical fog of pseudo-credibility . . . the reader or viewer who does
not know it is a calculated falsehood reasonably believes that a normally credible
republisher wouldn’t republish a lie, at least without disclosing the grounds for
knowing or suspecting falsity. Plus, the republisher retains its ‘credibility’ by not
disclosing the non-meritorious nature of what it is republishing.” Another layer of
deceit is added if the source is merely prominent but not responsible.).
880. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 801–02. Justice Douglas, the last
absolutist, retired in 1975. See discussion supra note 802.
881. See supra text accompanying notes 92–124.
882. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1477. See also RonNell Andersen Jones,
What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV.
253, 259–61 (2014) (The New York Times “ode” during the court’s “Glory Days”
of the First Amendment protection reflected a picture of “an overwhelmingly
generous, sweepingly sentimentalized, almost uniformly affirmative
characterization of the press as a critically important, positively contributing
social entity that is worthy of protection and uniquely valuable to the polity.”);
Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 901–02
n.79 (2006) (Professor Schauer notes that the Alabama public officials’ “desire to
punish what were perceived to be so-called Northern agitators” was “at the
forefront of the Court’s thinking,” and “thus it is useful to ask whether, if none of
these idiosyncratic features had existed, the extraordinarily press-protective and
plaintiff-restrictive ‘actual malice’ rule, a rule endorsed by no country in the world
in the ensuing forty years, would have been adopted.” He concludes that “the
particular facts of the case produced a rule almost certainly different from what
the same justices of the same Court would otherwise have done were they asked
simply to make a public figure libel rule, and different from what every other open
liberal democracy in the world has subsequently decided to do. Sullivan may be a
fortuitously distorted decision but the distortion seems nevertheless plain.”)
[hereinafter Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?]; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303–10 (2000); Elena Kagan, A Libel
Story: Sullivan Then and Now (reviewing Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The
Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991)), 18 L. & SOC. INQ. 197, 197
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pivotal point in the civil rights struggle to disestablish segregation in the
South and elsewhere. This volatile environment encountered the Warren
Court’s deep and abiding conviction that the Court majority as collective
philosopher-kings-“fathers-know-best” intuitively knew what was good
for the law and society. 883 In the Court’s elitist view, 884 the specter of
chilling-effect-self-censorship became the mantric paramount concern, 885
and free expression became the preferred value. 886 The interest in
reputation, nowhere discussed in New York Times, was largely ignored.
What became known as the “New York Times rule” soon seemed to have
an inexorable quality to it with the dominoes falling in an orderly
progression under the authorship of Justice Brennan, the New York Times
author, 887 with its zenith his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 888 which extended the demanding New York Times
standard to all matters of public interest or concern. 889

(1993) (New York Times is “one of those rare cases . . . in which the heroes are
heroes, the villains are villains, and everyone can be characterized as one or the
other. . . . There is a beautiful simplicity about the case—a stark clarity—that
lends itself to a certain brand of storytelling.”); Epstein, supra note 50, at 787.
883. TUCKER, supra note 20, at 8–9 (noting that judicial conservatives reject
the view that they are “appointed to impose their moral beliefs on the rest of the
community”); FRIED, supra note 20, at 16 (“[T]he left-liberal orthodoxies
embraced the premise that the federal judiciary should be the engine for realizing
their values.”); Garnett, supra note 20, at 28 (“[O]ne implication of the freespeech takeover is that difficult political decisions depend increasingly on judges’
evaluation of the abstract weight or worthiness of the government’s interests
rather than on deliberation, compromise, and trial and error in the public and
political areas. . . . Rehnquist’s reasonably consistent aversion to this result is of
a piece with a theory of the First Amendment specifically, and of the Constitution
generally, that is coherent, plausible, and normatively attractive.”).
884. Id. By contrast, Justice Rehnquist wrote not for the media or legal academia
but for the lawyers and judges who had to rely on and apply Court opinions. See
Robert J. Guiffra, In Memory of William H. Rehnquist: A Tribute to Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1675, 1677 (2006); James E. Ryan, The
Chief as Teacher, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1687, 1687–88 (2006) (noting that this
orientation resulted in his “remarkable intelligence” being “downplayed”).
885. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
886. Id. For critiques of the chilling-effect-self-censorship rationale, see supra
text accompanying notes 50–52, 167, 339, 453, 880–85; infra text accompanying
notes 887–903, 925, 1019–36, 1056–57, 1060, 1067.
887. See supra text accompanying note 26.
888. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
889. See id.
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Some members of the Warren Court had misgivings about this abstract,
non-empirically based, chilling-effect-self-censorship890 fixation—a rightsbased focus891 that by its terms was uni-focused 892 and allowed for little
consideration for abuse 893 of free expression, correlative responsibilities, 894
and its impact on individuals and society.895 Changes in the Court left
Rosenbloom eminently and imminently vulnerable, 896 with opportunity for
a new, more pragmatic, less ethereal majority to orchestrate a sane
reordering that would evaluate the actual costs897 of New York Times.
Justice Rehnquist became the pivotal vote, voice, and intellectual force 898 in
the resulting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. initiated counter-revolution, 899
which reversed free expression’s status as a preferred value 900 and focused
on the actual impact of free-expression restrictions. 901 As one conservative
890. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
891. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DICOURSE 12 (1991) (“[R]ights, in our standard formulations, tend to
be presented as absolute, individual, and independent of any necessary relation to
responsibilit[y].”).
892. Epstein, supra note 50, at 798 (emphasizing that the chilling-effect
argument “recognizes only the error costs that run in one direction” and reduces
the amount of speech).
893. See supra the discussions of the state constitutional limitation for
protection of reputation and “abuse” of free expression in the text accompanying
notes 14–15, 428, 464, 564–65, 615, 858.
894. See GLENDON, supra note 891, at 15 (“A refined rhetoric of rights would
promote public conversation about the ends toward which our political life is
directed. It would keep competing rights and responsibilities in view, helping to
assure that none would achieve undue prominence and that none would be unduly
obscured.”).
895. The totality of Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence reflects such concerns
implicitly and sometimes explicitly.
896. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 28, 31–32.
897. See supra text accompanying note 20; infra text accompanying notes
901–02.
898. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 12, 17–20, 31–32, 69–161. Recent
access to some Justices’ notes and records demonstrates that Justice Rehnquist
viewed his Gertz vote as a compromise, he regretted so voting, and he fought
aggressively to forestall its extension and to limit its range of applicability. See
supra text accompanying notes 39, 446, 451, 474, 734.
899. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12, 17–20, 25–250.
900. BLASI, supra note 243, at 5 (citing the Court’s defamation jurisprudence
and concluding the Burger Court had “largely abandoned the approach of the
Warren Court” and returned to a balancing approach that allowed it to “march[]
down the hill through the gaps left open by its predecessor[]”).
901. Id.
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insider suggests, the movement’s intent was to implement a “quiet change
of direction,” letting landmark precedent remain but moving the Court
“backward in short but firm steps . . . .” 902 This was the legacy of Justice
Harlan that Justice Rehnquist inherited in the defamation context, together
with Justice Harlan’s seat on the Court, 903 and implemented with
impressive political acumen, deep legal wisdom, and uncommon
intellectual rigor.
Above, the author analyzed the three dominant foci in Justice
Rehnquist’s elegant jurisprudence: (1) reputation as a basic interest 904
equivalent to free expression 905 in the constitutional hierarchy; (2) the
heavy burden of justification the Court imposed on defendants to justify
any proposed extension or expansion of New York Times’s realm of
application; 906 and (3) the Court’s broadening of state-defamation law’s
protective swath to encompass deception of the reader and viewer and
pollution of public discourse. 907 Yet, Justice Rehnquist was not a purist.
He was a pragmatist who was willing to take “half a loaf” 908 rather than
none. He left the holding of New York Times largely alone 909 after a single,
brief public challenge 910 but then energetically sought to limit its sphere
of influence and leaven the playing field 911 by giving plaintiffs the legal
tools to spar competitively with their resource-rich media foes—and
maybe even win occasionally. In ways big and small, he sought to “hold[]

902. TUCKER, supra note 20, at 74.
903. See supra text accompanying note 1.
904. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12, 30, 44–45, 93–94, 102–03,
135, 154, 450, 565, 570, 599–600, 761, 858, 868–903, 972–73, 1023, 1041.
905. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12, 14–15, 44–45, 93–94.
906. See supra text accompanying notes 95–144.
907. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–12, 124, 453, 462, 508, 702–
74, 724–29, 767, 870–81l; infra text accompanying notes 907, 973, 1017–81.
908. Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, THE ATL. MONTHLY (Apr. 2005),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/rehnquist-thegreat/303820/ [https://perma.cc/E49L-6D3H].
909. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83.
910. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78. He also expressed private
views in conference that New York Times was a “‘mistake.’” See supra text
accompanying note 446.
911. Michael K. Young, Croquet, Competition, and the Rules: A More
Personal Reflection on the Jurisprudence of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 499 (2006) (“[P]recisely because he valued competition
so highly, he had a particularly well-developed appreciation for the importance of
the rules and a level playing field.”). See also supra text accompanying notes 10–
12, 14–15, 17–19, 25–881.
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the balance true” 912 given the awesome constraints New York Times
initiated and imposed. 913
Whether Justice Rehnquist’s legacy ultimately succeeded or will
succeed posthumously is another question. Almost no one says anything
nice about the state of existing defamation-First Amendment law. 914
Leading critics, including Professors David Logan and David Anderson,
have excoriated the modern law as “not worth saving” 915 and have made a
compelling case for reform. In their view, the constitutional-malice realm
is operative in almost all cases—even private-figure cases 916—and few
912. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
913. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 78, 104, 130, 133, 806–07, 857–
58, 867, 869; infra text accompanying notes 924–25, 1017–81.
914. Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1519 (describing
defamation law as “dripping with contradictions and confusion . . . vivid
testimony to the sometimes perverse ingenuity of the legal mind”); Bezanson, The
Libel Tort Today, supra note 761, at 556 (concluding modern libel-First
Amendment law is “profoundly and fundamentally disquieting in a society that
attempts to strike a balance between reputation and freedom of expression”).
915. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 489
(concurring in Professor Logan’s analysis). See also infra text accompanying
notes 1017–81.
916. David Elder & Neville Johnson, Maybe America needs more Peter Thiels,
S.F. DAILY, Aug. 8, 2016, at 8 (“The $10 million Thiel paid for Bollea’s [Hulk
Hogan’s] lawsuit [against Gawker] raises the question of who exactly can afford
libel litigation these days? Plaintiffs must expect tactics to drain and oppress them
and their lawyers, who are often on contingent fee contracts and a restricted
budget. This includes all manner of onerous motions, expensive and demanding
discovery, a never-settle-and-appeal-to-the-highest-court mentality—all abetted
by a highly organized media bar that shares strategies and expertise and often
overwhelms the other side (and the courts) with legal briefs.”); Robert D. Richards
& Clay Calvert, Suing the News Media in the Age of Tabloid Journalism: L. Lin
Wood and the Battle for Accountability, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 467, 501–02 (2005) (noting the David-versus-Goliath nature of media
litigation and concluding that only in “extremely high-profile” cases is the
expense of litigating a defamation case justifiable when balanced against chances
of succeeding); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 492,
502–03, 524 (citing the financial requirements and vagaries of libel litigation,
which precipitate almost all plaintiffs to litigate at the constitutional-malice level).
Professor Anderson notes that this focus is misplaced. See id. at 522. The public
has a significant interest in truth or falsity, not constitutional malice. Id. Yet, if
such constitutional malice is proved, punitive damages are a “foregone
conclusion.” Id. at 523. On the disparity in resources issue, see supra text
accompanying notes 570, 618–19, 845, 861–65, 867; infra text accompanying
notes 926–28, 982–85, 999, 1077.
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succeed, 917 even after the expensive and intrusive discovery the
constitutional-malice standard necessitated and encouraged. 918 Indeed, the
underlying intuitive assumption—that public persons would be deterred
by this exalted standard—has proved fallacious. 919 Public persons
instinctively feel that their only mode of vindication is to sue, i.e., that the
mere filing of a libel suit itself provides redress.920
Professor Anderson 921 and many others 922 have discussed reform
alternatives but have acknowledged the existing Sisyphean quagmire
where the rock-pusher reformer takes only a few steps up the reform hill
before being felled by the obstructionist-reformer opposition—the media

917. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 489, 510
(describing current defamation litigation under the constitutional-malice regime
as “a general scheme of nonliability that permits a remedy only in exceptional
cases”); id. at 523–24, 542, 550. See also Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in
Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789,
792 (1986) [hereinafter, Bezanson, The Libel Suit] (noting the “dramatic odds”
against winning). See supra text accompanying notes 56, 78, 104, 130, 133, 806–
07, 857–58, 867, 882; infra text accompanying notes 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–
48, 1073, 1077.
918. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 489, 513,
515–16, 536 (noting that extensive discovery is required before plaintiffs’ counsel
has the information to make reasoned decisions regarding litigation); id. at 550.
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN
ACTION 688 (1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 994–95, 1037–38,
1053–59,1073. On the problems of discovery presented by state anti-SLAAP
statutes, see discussion infra note 928.
919. SCHWARTZ, supra note 918, at 688; Bezanson, The Libel Suit, supra note
917, at 797 n.24.
920. Bezanson, The Libel Suit, supra note 917, at 791–98, 799–800, 808. See
also SCHWARTZ, supra note 918, at 679–80, 685 n.4, 688 (citing Bezanson’s work
and noting the “symbolically significant” function of litigation as the only way of
“destigmatizing, of restoring the plaintiff’s dignity” even if plaintiff loses on
constitutional-malice grounds).
921. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 550
(suggesting the “route to reform is obvious . . . a remedy that will simplify
litigation and reduce the threat of windfall verdicts . . . a perilous one, fraught with
political difficulty, empirical uncertainties, and dangers for freedom of speech”).
See also infra text accompanying note 994.
922. For articles critical of the once proposed declaratory judgment-judicial
declaration of falsity proposals, see Randal Bezanson & Brian C. Murchison, The
Three Voices of Libel, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213 (1990); Sheldon W. Halpern,
Values and Value: An Essay on Libel Reform, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227
(1990) [hereinafter, Halpern, Values].
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and their lawyers. 923 Why? As has been shown, the constitutional-malice
standard operates in an overwhelming favorable way for the media 924 and
lets it camouflage its faults, falsities, and the polluting effect on public
discourse in the chest-thumping metaphor about First Amendment
chilling-effect-self-censorship. 925
Properly viewed and interpreted, the Rehnquist Era Court’s
jurisprudence—at the theoretical level, at least—is much more plaintifforiented than the media and their lawyers—and many academics—like to
recognize. But courts, largely dependent on the media’s expertise and
often, although not invariably, swayed 926 by its collective “herd
mentality” 927 and vastly superior resources, 928 side with the media far too
923. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 491, 546,
550, 552 (noting that the Court’s present jurisprudence “protects media
imperfectly, but enough to keep them from espousing serious reforms”).
924. Id. at 489, 510, 523–24, 542, 548, 549.
925. Bezanson, The Libel Suit, supra note 479, at 553 (concluding the
constitutional-malice standard does not address the issue of falsity, allowing the
issue “to be reformulated by the media into the safer environment of press
freedom”); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 546
(noting that for all their exaggerated claims about speech self-censorship, it is
“entirely possible” that media fear more “the chill of more frequent
accountability”). For criticisms of chilling-effect-self-censorship, see supra text
accompanying notes 50–52, 167, 453, 880–903; infra text accompanying notes
1019–36, 1056–57, 1060. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
1017–81, the impact of the constitutional-malice standard on democracy is
pervasive and hugely harmful.
926. Richards & Calvert, supra note 916, at 482 (noting that judges grow up
with a pro-media defendant bias and accept the chilling-effect phenomenon).
927. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129, at 552–55, 827–40, 826–
30. See the provocative recent comments of Judge Laurence Silberman discussed
infra text accompanying notes 1025–36.
928. See supra text accompanying notes 570, 618–19, 845, 861–65, 867, 916,
926–27; infra text accompanying notes 982–85, 999, 1077. See also Anderson, Is
Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 545 (noting that, as a collective,
media defendants have “the means and the incentive to spend what it takes to
make sure libel does not become an effective remedy”); Anderson, Rethinking
Defamation, supra note 93, at 1051–52 (detailing the many state-law hurdles
impeding plaintiffs’ recovery, including media defendants’ aggressive use of antiSLAAP statutes in many states, such as California, that mandate that plaintiffs
demonstrate probability of success on the merits before plaintiffs are allowed to
engage in major discovery efforts and with potential liability for attorney fees if
they fail to make such a showing); Richards & Calvert, supra note 916, at 500
(quoting L. Lin Wood that libel litigation “often turns out to be a Herculean effort
against the well-heeled defense bar and the resource-rich clients it represents”);
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frequently in the face of clear, but often unappreciated, signals from the
Rehnquist Era Court that the lower courts should back away from some of
their more egregious interpretations of its jurisprudence.
Let the author present a few illustrations. Several opinions retain the
oxymoronic and indefensible, involuntary-public-figure concept. 929 Many
more adopt standards for vortex or limited-purpose public figuredom
based on a highly generalized form of assumption of risk or the centrality
of the plaintiff to the public controversy. 930 As the author has suggested
elsewhere, these misinterpretations of the Court’s precedent constitute
indefensible and unprincipled partial revivifications of Rosenbloom that
Justice Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Era Court, which issued the Four
Horsemen—Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.; Time, Inc. v. Firestone;
Hutchinson v. Proxmire; Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association 931—
would hardly recognize as within the legal ballpark.
In addition, many courts 932 continue to define public officialdom to
include many public-paycheck recipients that are largely indistinguishable
from the night-watchman security guard or clerk-typist scenarios
Rosenblatt v. Baer 933 rejected—a restrictive view Hutchinson’s famous
footnote eight dictum repudiated. 934 Lastly, despite Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s masterful opinion, 935 courts
continue to engage in Orwellian psychobabble and find nonactionable
statements that the common person, common sense, and the common use

Roundtable: First Amendment on Trial—The Libel Lawyer’s Perspective, 23
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 855–57 (2000) (quoting libel-plaintiffs’ lawyer John
Shaeffer that “the decks are about as stacked against a plaintiff as they possibly
could ever be” and how such suits are “very, very expensive from the plaintiff’s
perspective,” and quoting Federal Judge Robert S. Lasnick that “if you pick a fight
with any media organization you should expect to have a nuclear war on your
hands.”).
929. See supra text accompanying notes 162–250, 302–49, 358–88.
930. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:12 (criticizing the “central
figure” and “course of conduct” lines of cases). For other critical discussions of
the problems underlying and problems posed by the assumption-of-risk rationale,
see supra text accompanying notes 61, 66–67, 92, 173–74, 227–40, 262, 313,
339–40, 344, 348–49, 363, 365–88; infra text accompanying notes 963–68, 993,
1061–68.
931. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:12.
932. Id. §5:1.
933. See supra text accompanying note 259.
934. See supra text accompanying notes 266–67; infra text accompanying
notes 988–92.
935. See supra text accompanying notes 569–611.
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of language would view as decidedly factual, refutable, defamatory,
damning, and damaging. 936
The less-developed but potentially resource-rich field for enhanced
plaintiff opportunities for success is the Court’s clear and unequivocal
focus on falsehood’s injuriousness 937 and its unambiguous, but largely
ignored, signals over three decades ago of a new, two-tiered and
cumulative-constitutional construct—public-versus-private status and
public-concern versus purely private-concern subject matter. 938 Under this
inchoate regime, the much derided present law would be dramatically
simplified. Public persons, narrowly construed as suggested above,
defamed as to matters with a genuine nexus to their public personalities
would remain subject to a circumscribed New York Times regime. 939
Private persons defamed as to matters of genuine public concern would be
subject to the Gertz regime—simple negligence at minimum for actual
damages and constitutional malice for presumed or punitive damages. 940
Matters of purely private concern—even those published by the media or
on the internet—would be subject to the full panoply of common-law
liability and protection. 941
Much has been written about the inability of judges to define what
public concern means. Some have disparaged the very notion as
standardless and fraught with uncertainty for the media. 942 Of course, one
never hears the multi-factor, opinion-fact dichotomy that apparently

936. See supra text accompanying notes 611–19. For a proposed “broad”
opinion rule for internet publications, see discussion supra note 588.
937. See supra text accompanying notes 111–12, 351–57, 702–04, 762–65, 767.
938. See supra text accompanying notes 88, 402–511, 580, 742; infra text
accompanying note 1026. One commentator suggested just after Philadelphia
Newspapers that this case might become “a watershed” in the Court’s libel-First
Amendment jurisprudence and the public-person, non-public concern “the next
great battleground.” Tofel, supra note 483, at 16.
939. See supra text accompanying notes 162–388.
940. See supra text accompanying notes 37–47, 720–21, 730–34, 739–50.
941. See supra text accompanying notes 88, 402–511, 580, 742, 938–40; infra
text accompanying note 1026. On the unconscionable § 230 absolute immunity,
see infra text accompanying notes 1049–52.
942. Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public
Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U.
PITT. L. REV. 91, 126–28, 140–42 (1977) (noting that the term is “enshrouded in
a fog of uncertainty” and seems to have a Jacobellisian judicial “know-it-whenthey-see-it” meaning and advocating a plaintiff fault-based inquiry only); King,
supra note 371, at 701 (“a dangerously subjective model” involving “a process
and outcomes that are unpredictable and subjective”).
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largely survived Milkovich 943 and became “as variable as the length of the
foot” 944 of the deciding judge described as nebulous and monumentally
unfair to plaintiffs. The unanswerable rejoinder is that of Justice
Brennan—determination of what is or is not within the realm of public
concern is a task chargeable to judges and eminently performable by
them. 945 It needs be repeated in this respect that a wealth of decisional
law 946 dating back to the Warren and Branders’ famous 1890 privacy
piece 947 has delineated in considerable detail the parameters of just such a
limitation. Likewise, courts have a significant volume of other
precedent—the Court’s own precedent, cases interpreting the now extinct
Rosenbloom rule, 948 the particular-controversy aspect of vortex
figuredom 949 case law interpreting Gertz 950 and its state-law, higher-thanGertz standards, 951 and case law interpreting Dun & Bradstreet 952—
providing direction.
The Court’s purely private-concern intimations regarding public
personage have reverberated throughout the literature. Some have
suggested that the broad criteria the Court has developed for public
officials and candidates for public office 953 render such an inquiry
meaningless or counterproductive. 954 The author disagrees. The Rehnquist
943. See supra text accompanying notes 611–19, 936–37.
944. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (CP 1837). Cf. supra text
accompanying notes 554–66.
945. See supra text accompanying notes 422–23; infra text accompanying
notes 1017–81.
946. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, supra note 351, §§ 3:16–3:18.
947. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 214–16 (1890) (proscribing privacy actions in cases involving
matters of “public or general interest”). First Amendment protection applies only
to true matters of public concern gathered lawfully. See discussion supra notes
93, 113, 409, 723; discussion infra note 964.
948. See supra text accompanying note 423; Eaton, supra note 30, at 1394–
1403.
949. ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:11.
950. Id. §§ 6:1, 6:8.
951. Id. §§ 6:9, 6:10.
952. Id. § 6:11 nn.31, 33–36.
953. See infra text accompanying note 955.
954. Langvardt, supra note 942, at 137–38 (concluding that public officials
and candidates “effectively abandon” any right to claim matters are purely private
and that anything relevant to “some members of the public” is covered by New
York Times; conceding the Court could develop such a non-relevance-as-toprivate-conduct set of rules but concluding that this is not an appropriate function
for courts, only for the citizenry); see also Tofel, supra note 483, at 16 (as to
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Era Court’s defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence seems to be a
brooding, omnipresent reminder to plaintiffs’ lawyers, the media, and
media lawyers that relevance-regarding-fitness determinations require
some type of genuine connection, not merely tangential, sensational, or
salacious, illegitimate newsworthiness. Clearly, the standards for public
officials and candidates are extraordinarily broad, particularly where he or
she has implicitly or explicitly opened for scrutiny a particular aspect of
character. 955 Does that mean there are no boundaries? No.
Let the author provide an example. A decorated but disabled Iraqi war
veteran runs for city council. The local media receives election-eve copies
of what appear to be military medical records indicating that war wounds
rendered him impotent and that he can only achieve an erection by
prosthetic device or Viagra. The media publishes this information. The
elected public officials or an actual or prospective candidate, such a private sphere
is “exceedingly small, if not actual non-existent”); but compare the thoughtful
analysis by Post, supra note 483, at 667–84 where the author concludes:
We need to establish a domain of public discourse that is amply sufficient
to the needs of democratic self-governance, but that is also reasonably
sensitive to competing value commitments, to the pre-existing social
norms that define the genre of public speech, and to the social
consequences implied by the paradox of public discourse. Doctrinal
formulation should assist courts in the evaluation of these considerations,
rather than making them under phrases and tests.
Id. at 683.
955. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964) (finding
allegations of police misconduct, if applicable to respondent-elected
commissioner at all, were relevant to performance of his official responsibilities);
Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 76–77 (1964) (concluding that “anything which
might touch on an official’s fitness” was relevant and that this included
“dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these
characteristics may also affect the official’s private character”); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274–75 (1971) (finding criminal charges per se
relevant, including a 37-year-old bootlegging charge and noting: “The principal
activity of a candidate . . . his ‘office,’ so to speak, consists in putting before the
voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks may
lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him. A candidate who . . . seeks
to further his cause through the prominent display of his wife and children can
hardly argue that his qualities as a husband or father remain of ‘purely private’
concern. And the candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity
cannot convincingly cry ‘Foul!’ when an opponent or an industrious reporter
attempts to demonstrate the contrary.”). For a somewhat parallel view, see Smolla,
New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1543 (noting that this is “arguably not a
very significant problem,” as such matters will almost always be a matter of public
concern regarding public officials).
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candidate loses despite his war-hero, front-runner status for an open seat.
The matter is totally false. He becomes a laughing stock in some quarters,
the subject of ridicule or obloquy in others. 956 The media may not have
been reckless under the demanding negligence-is-never-enough rule. 957
Under New York Times, is there any justification for not treating this matter
as one that lacks any legitimate nexus to his fitness for office and making
the publisher liable under the common-law strict liability standard? As to
lower-ranking, non-elected public officials, the genuine nexus
requirement for public concern would likely be even tighter, reflecting the
Court’s controlling assumption-of-risk policy. 958
Similar reverberations may extend to vortex public figures. 959 The
Rehnquist Era Court may have signaled that a defendant will have to show
a genuine connection to a very narrowly constrained “particular public
controversy.” 960 The implicit changes as to general or all-purpose public
956. Such would be actionable as defamation and/or false-light privacy. See
supra text accompanying notes 115, 181, 751, 770.
957. See supra text accompanying notes 629, 620–90, 994.
958. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:2 nn.60–62 (opining such
will be “more narrowly circumscribed” but cautioning against the “very limited
and dubious” case law that “effective disembowels” the public-official concept
via an “incestuous symbiosis” sliding scale that transforms low-level government
officers into public officials as to “restricted matters appertaining directly to
fitness” for such position); Elder, Public Officialdom, supra note 251, at 653–54
n.387. But cf. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 26 (concluding that public officialdom
“embraces virtually all persons affiliated with the government,” including
teachers and police officers, but suggesting that fewer matters will be relevant “as
one moves lower and lower in the government hierarchy”).
959. See supra text accompanying notes 162–250. The Court has narrowly
construed the “particular public controversy” concept. See supra text
accompanying notes 198–99, 205–06, 220–24.
960. The Court imposed the burden of controversy identification on the
defendant. See supra text accompanying note 220. But note that one well-known
commentator has concluded that the Rehnquist Court—the Court after Chief
Justice Rehnquist took the helm in 1986—maintained “an almost seamless
continuity” with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence since 1964, retaining
the latter as a preferred value “trumping” any countervailing interest, and terming
the Court’s three decisions—Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton,
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.—as all
“true to the spirit” of New York Times. Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the
Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 399.
If “spirit” means New York Times was not overturned, Professor Neuborne is
accurate. However, a more nuanced look suggests none of them were unqualified
victories and all significantly circumscribed the impact of New York Times. See
respectively supra text accompanying notes 649–90, 125–44, and 569–611.
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figuredom may be even more dramatic. The Gertz test 961 seems to suggest,
rather mechanically and without further discussion, that all aspects of their
personalities are an open book. 962 However, the broader assumption-ofrisk policies of Gertz and other prominent aspects of the Court’s discussion
of public persons 963 suggest that public figuredom relates to ability to
impact or influence public affairs or issues. Both support some qualitative
limitations.
As others have asked, 964 would Carol Burnett now be considered a
public figure as to charges of public drunkenness in an escapade with

Viewed in the context of what the author views as the Rehnquist Court Era
defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole, Professor Neuborne’s
views reflect an oversimplified and overly optimistic view of modern First
Amendment protection.
961. See supra text following notes 96–97, 182–84.
962. Id.
963. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 97, 175, 178–79, 188, 409, 478–
80. For criticism of this rationale and the problems posed thereby, see supra text
accompanying notes 61, 66–67, 92, 173–74, 227–44, 262, 313, 339–40, 344, 348–
49, 363, 365–88; infra text accompanying notes 930, 963–68, 993, 1061–68.
964. See Tofel, supra note 483, at 17 (Citing Burnett, the author suggests that
courts might reflect “an unspoken sense that . . . defamation about people’s private
lives—even public figure’s private lives—deserves little constitutional protection
and that the Court might reject the constitutional-malice standard in favor of a
negligence standard.”); Post, supra note 483, at 673; Schauer, Public Figures,
supra note 207, at 917–35 (proposing reconsideration of public-figure status,
particularly of the all-purpose or general variety—this group of “personalities”
“[f]or the most part . . . however public they may be, have little, if any effect on
questions of politics, public policy, or the organization and determination of
societal affairs”). Compare the thoughtful concurrence by Justice Breyer in the
privacy case of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536–40 (2001) (Breyer, J., with
O’Connor, J., joining, concurring), where he found that the two complainants in
the case before the Court—the president of a teachers’ union and its chief
negotiator—were limited-purpose public figures as to a “matter of unusual public
concern,” “a threat of potential physical harm to others.” Id. at 536–37. Justice
Breyer specifically distinguished the latter scenario as “far removed from that in
situations where the media publicizes truly private matters.” Id. at 540. As an
example of the latter, where no First Amendment protection would apply to true
matter lawfully acquired, Justice Breyer cited Michaels v. Internet Entertainment
Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841–42 (C.D. Cal. 1998), holding that broadcast
of a steamy videotape of sexual relations between two celebrities, a rock star and
a famous actress, was not a matter of legitimate public concern. Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., with O’Connor, J., joining, concurring). Note that the
Breyer-O’Connor opinion is widely thought to be the core holding of the Bartnicki
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Henry Kissinger? 965 Would Johnny Carson and/or his wife be considered
household-name public figures as to charges of adultery? 966 The Court’s
broad language discussed in detail above seems to reopen the meaning of
all-purpose public figure and require some type of genuine nexus to such
status. Absent such, strict liability may apply. 967 The Rehnquist Era
Court’s purely private-concern analysis appears to have implicitly
conveyed—quite pointedly—deep concern about the quality of much of
the media’s offerings, i.e., that they are so lacking in quality 968 that some
necessary firm lines need to be drawn in the sand.
In other words, maybe a partial answer to the critics is that courts are
too easily swayed by the media, their lawyers, their networking, and their
ability to avoid accountability by framing any legal contretemps in First
Amendment imagery—what the author has elsewhere called the “media
Jabberwock.” 969 The author suggests that the plaintiff success rate would
be measurably different if every plaintiff had access to the field-leveling
prowess, competence, and skill of, for example, a modern-day L. Lin
Wood like Tom A. Clare. 970 How does the legal system go about
developing or encouraging such a strong plaintiff’s bar? Everyone agrees

decision. As to the ramifications of Bartnicki as to matters of public concern the
publisher unlawfully acquired, see discussion supra notes 93, 113, 409, 723, 947.
965. See Burnett v. Nat’l Enquire, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
966. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). The status issue
was conceded. Id. at 209. The court nonetheless gratuitously termed Johnny
Carson an all-purpose public figure and that his co-plaintiff wife “more or less
automatically becomes at least a part-time public figure” by liaison to Carson. Id.
at 210. The status issue was unimportant in light of defendants’ fabrication of the
defamatory charges. Id. at 210–14.
967. Smolla, New Analytic Primer, supra note 151, at 1543–45 (suggesting
such is “arguably not a very significant problem” as such “will always” be a public
concern but recognizing the possibility of strict liability in such cases as in the
case of public officials).
968. See infra text accompanying notes 972–81.
969. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 129.
970. See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 916 (article-interview with
L. Lin Wood). Tom A. Clare’s firm, Clare Locke LLP, has a strong record of success
in representing high-profile clients. See the firm’s website. The firm is currently
suing a host of media and non-media defendants on behalf of Dominion Voting
Systems. Defendants in these cases have made it easier to sue them successfully by
continuing to repeat, parrot, and republish defamatory matter after being put on
notice of their false and defamatory character. See the discussion of the extensive
case law on point in ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 7:12.
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one does not currently exist. 971 Maybe major charitable foundations
concerned with the costs to both individuals 972 and the body politic 973 from
a media—and, increasingly non-media publishers—that appears to many

971. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 546;
Richards & Calvert, supra note 916, at 480. See generally discussion supra note
916.
972. See Schauer, Public Figures, supra note 207, at 925 (noting that “the
assumption that speech can have harmful consequences is well grounded in the
context of defamation”). For discussions of the right of reputation, see supra text
accompanying notes 10–12, 14, 44–45, 93–94, 102–03, 108, 135, 154, 166–69,
257, 450, 507, 565, 599–600, 858, 868–903; infra text accompanying notes 973,
1023, 1041.
973. These include the following overlapping concerns: deterring competent
individuals from public service. See Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2429
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[A]s they are applied today, it’s far from obvious whether
Sullivan’s rules do more to encourage people of goodwill to engage in democratic
self-governance or discourage them from risking even the slightest step toward
public life.”), Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society,
74 CAL. L. REV. 743, 745–46 (1986) (viewing public officials’ reputations as public
goods and that deterrence of public service is “a cost that a democratic society can
ill afford”); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 531, 533
(opining that the public arena may then be left to those of lower reputation and
possible character); Epstein, supra note 50, at 799 (undermining truth in public
discussions); Anderson, supra at 534; Richards & Calvert, supra note 916, at 477
(quoting the current First Amendment constitutional-malice standard as “literally
put[ting] a stamp of approval on negligent reporting” and suggesting that
“accountability for genuine wrongdoing . . . ultimately strengthens the First
Amendment”); FEIN, supra note 50, at 5 (negatively impacting the ability of the
citizenry to make intelligent use of the right to vote); id. at 12 (“encourage[ing] an
atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism” about government and generally corrupting
the readership-viewership); Elder et al., supra note 618, at 434 (excoriating hiddencamera and ambush journalism as savaging both individuals and “the collective soul
of the country . . . by massive entertainment fraud masquerading as ‘news’”); id.
(impairing government’s ability to implement “bold and decisive” action necessary
to resolve vexing issues); Epstein, supra note 50, at 800, 813 (harming media’s
credibility and trustworthiness) (concluding that media reputation harm appeared
greater under a constitutional-malice standard than under strict liability). On the
polluting effect on public discourse, see supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–
12, 124, 141, 453, 508, 702–04, 724–29, 767, 870–81, 907; infra text accompanying
notes 1017–81.
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as “rush-to-judgment” oriented, 974 arrogant, 975 partisan, 976 bottom-line
focused, 977 obsessed with and energized by scandal, 978 personality, 979
974. Elder et al., supra note 618, at 405 (characterizing hidden camera stories
as “the modern equivalent of the Star Chamber proceeding” with media judges
“function[ing] in a loose continuum as predetermined assessors of guilt and
balaclava-clad executioners of reputation”); Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note
375, at 101, 104, 178–79; Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 201 (comments of
Professor K.C. Johnson).
975. Jacques Steinberg, At College Graduations, Wit and Wisdom for the Price
of Airfare, N. Y. TIMES (May 28, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/28
/nyregion/at-college-graduations-wit-and-wisdom-for-the-price-of-airfare.html
[https://perma.cc/ER7K-GY9M] (quoting newsman Jim Lehrer as criticizing
modern journalism as based in part on a “most unjustified arrogance” that afflicts
some colleagues, as evidenced by “a stench of contempt in their approach, words,
sneers and body language that say loud and clear, ‘Only the journalists of America
are pure enough to judge all others’”); Halpern, Values, supra note 922, at 234
(noting how every possibility for plaintiff recovery is viewed by the media as “a
threat to fundamental liberty”).
976. Elder, Duke Lacrosse, supra note 375, at 99–104, 152–78; Coleman et
al., supra note 375, at 192–93 (comments of Professor K. C. Johnson
characterizing the New York Times coverage of the Duke lacrosse incident as
“extraordinarily bad and [how it] really shaped a kind of national agenda, based
on a Tom Wolfe novel”). This applies even to media scrutiny of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Two commentators have suggested “the media, which might
otherwise place some aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence under scrutiny, is
among the principal beneficiaries of this one-sidedness” in free-expression cases.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 51, at 441. See also Judge Laurence Silberman’s
scathing critique of the partisan media resulting from the New York Times
standard discussed infra text accompanying notes 1025–36.
977. Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless
Disregard for Truth in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 887, 890–91 (2005) (proposing a reformulated institutional-recklessness
standard for corporate liability when “bottom line” considerations cause a
sacrifice in journalistic quality); Elder et al., supra note 618, at 347–52
(“Television journalists, at least at the newsroom level, decry the dominance of
commercial over journalistic consideration in the newsroom, feeling that they are
‘caught in a self-defeating spiral’ from ‘a heightened, unseemly lust’ for great
profits with a concomitant diminution in quality.”); id. at 384–86; id. at 432
(noting that television news magazines are “engaged in a vicious war for ratings”
with viewership diminishing in competition with cable and satellite); id. at 437–
38 (noting the “deep and abiding” concerns of newsroom journalists that they are
“essentially powerless in the face of the profit monster”); id. at 438 (hoping that
courts will nudge the media into “a revitalized sense of the public interest rather
than the currently pervasive profit culture and its debilitating effects”); Hinerman
v. Daily Gazette, 423 S.E.2d 560, 575 (W. Va. 1992) (noting the “more sinister,

2022]

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

283

self-serving forces at work in both the print and broadcast media” and the public
recognition media are “in the entertainment business far more than they are in the
information business”); Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 197 (comments of
Professor Michael Gerhardt as to the media interest in such “high profile cases”—
the public is “just an audience” with the media “interested in market
share . . . almost from day one, everybody is speculating about what’s the
evidence . . . [t]here’s nothing at all about the facts . . . .”).
978. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 533–34
(discussing the “self-reinforcing” “journalism of scandal” and concluding that its
preexisting advantages are enhanced by the constitutional-malice standard’s
elimination of most of the risks, i.e., it “throws the weight of the law on the side
of the public appetite for scandal”); FEIN, supra note 50, at 6 (noting New York
Times incentivizes “the recipient of vivid, inflammatory, or lurid defamatory
allegations” about public officials not to verify); Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 575
(criticizing the return to “yellow journalism” and the fact that modern media
economics feed into “sensational or ‘entertaining’ standards” and mankind’s
“inveterate predilection to rejoice in the suffering and degradation of others”). See
also infra text accompanying note 979.
979. Bellah, supra note 973, at 746–56 (discussing the negative implications
of the “politics of personality” and corruption as the dominant focus in media
reporting “to an extent rare in the modern world” and how it deprives the citizenry
of the necessary information that a focus on performance and policy would
provide, i.e., information about “the enormous and invisible complexity of the
nation and world”); Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 204 (comments by
Professor Michael Gerhardt about the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections
and the mainstream media’s almost exclusive focus on personality and strategy
rather than substantive issues); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1039 (1984)
(Scalia, with Wald, J., and Edwards, J., concurring) (noting what some view as “a
distressing tendency for our political commentary to descend from discussion of
public issues to destruction of private reputations”).
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sensationalism, 980 and low-level stories and drivel programming 981 would
individually or collectively help fund one or more defamation-plaintifflitigation-resource groups 982 that would provide sophisticated training,
support services, continuing education, trial level litigation expertise, and
980. Elder et al., supra note 618, at 440–41 (calling for the courts to “help
reinvigorate American news and journalistic and ethical standards, reversing the
downward spiral into the miasma of tabloid journalism”); Elder, Duke Lacrosse,
supra note 375, at 99–104, 152–80; Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 190
(remarks by Professor Howard M. Wasserman about the “proliferation of soft
news [‘just speculation and opinion rather than hard facts’] everywhere”);
Ashdown, supra note 172, at 741 (noting the network news’ “inclination to
sensationalize, and simultaneously mislead,” citing the 473% increase in
homicide coverage between 1990 and 1998 despite a 33% reduction in
homicides); id. at 753–54 (characterizing the “current news climate” as
“essentially one of scandal, sensationalism, and blame” and citing as typical the
2001 coverage of the Chandra Levy disappearance); Kagan, supra note 882, at
207 (“[T]he Sullivan decision, although itself involving core political speech, may
have facilitated (which is not to say ‘caused’) both the rise of tabloids and the
‘tabloidization’ of the mainstream press. . . . To the extent that the speech
promoted makes little contribution to public dialogue, the relaxation of libel law
seems difficult to countenance.”)
981. Elder et al., supra note 618, at 438 (concluding that “[t]he resultant
blurring of the entertainment-news dichotomy and the downward spiral in the
content and quality of television news makes the ‘vast wasteland’ of American
television of four decades ago look like a Periclean Golden Age by comparison to
the sensationalist drivel that permeates and largely dominates the television
newsmagazines, much of network television and the media generally at the
dawning of the new millennium”); Coleman et al., supra note 375, at 197 (remarks
by Professor Michael Gerhardt about how the Duke lacrosse case became a
“media circus”); Ashdown, supra note 172, at 754 (noting the “self-propelling
and self-fulfilling” nature of coverage that “exalt[s] scandal and sensationalism
over substantive coverage of issues”); Steinberg, supra note 973 (characterizing
modern journalism as having “a tendency . . . to be something akin to professional
wrestling, something to watch rather than to believe” and discussing the “savagery
of some of the so-called new journalism, marked by predatory stake-outs, coarse
invasions of privacy, talk show shouting, no-source reporting and other
techniques, the stunning new blurring of the old lines between straight news
analysis and opinion”).
982. Compare the Libel Resource Defense Center referenced at supra text
accompanying note 618. Note that no one really questions the fact that “few
experienced lawyers will take a contingent-fee case when the odds of a successful
outcome are as poor as they are in modern defamation law.” Logan, Rescuing Our
Democracy, supra note 172, at 780. See also the discussion of the superior
resources issue supra text accompanying notes 570, 618–19, 845, 861–65, 916,
926–28; infra text accompanying notes 983–85, 999, 1077.
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file amici curiae briefs in important pending cases. In other words, such
entities would provide what the defense bar currently does and charges to
their clients.
If such a public service entity existed—perhaps, The William Hubbs
Rehnquist Center for the Study of Reputation, Public Discourse, and the
First Amendment—state and federal courts could solicit the filing of amici
curiae briefs on important questions to off-set in part the media’s awesome
ability to energize the Jabberwockian hordes in its defense. Maybe law
schools with their depth of expertise and under pressure from the bar and
accrediting associations to develop skills and advocacy programs 983 could
consider opening defamation clinics or advocacy centers that could train
future plaintiff advocates, provide in-depth expertise on complicated
issues of defamation-First Amendment law to both students and practicing
lawyers contemplating or enmeshed in a libel trial, and file amici curiae
briefs in important pending cases. In other words, they could provide what
the defense bar does as a collective, preemptive, and hugely successful
self-preservation tactic. Given the political predilections of law professors
and law schools, 984 protection of libel plaintiffs, unlike other plaintiffs, is
likely to fall upon politics-impacted, media-protective, deaf ears. But,
hope springs eternal! Or, maybe society just needs more motivated
investors like Peter Thiel, whether from politics or profit, to provide
funding to correct the record. 985
983. WILLIAM SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); ROY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). See, e.g., the leverage provided by 2021–22 ABA

Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, Standards 301–
05. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
2021–2022 r.301–05 (AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR 2021).
984. See David A. Elder, “Hostile Environment” Charges and the ABA/AALS
Accreditation/Membership Imbroglio, Post-Modernism’s “No Country for Old
Men”: Why Defamed Law Professors Should “Not Go Gentle into That Good
Night”, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 434 (2009) [hereinafter Elder, “No
Country”].
985. Elder & Johnson, supra note 916. But cf. Lili Levi, Real ‘Fake News’ and
Fake ‘Fake News’, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 282–83 (2018). The author
criticizes the “Gawker effect” as producing evidence of “increased timorousness
by news organizations regarding the publication of investigative stories . . .”
particularly as to stories regarding sexual misconduct, and concludes that “[t]he
possibility of ideologically motivated third party funding of lawsuits against the
press must be perceived by news organizations as particularly threatening in an
environment in which judges, juries and the public assess their processes with a
jaundiced eye.” Id.
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Professors David A. Logan and David Anderson and a host of others
have also thoughtfully suggested that the Court must itself consider
adopting the radical role of reformer. 986 This is quite a reasonable
suggestion. After all, the Court became a radical reformer in New York
Times and, only slightly less so, in Gertz. The idea is immensely appealing.
The Court could pick two or three of the libel cases that wend its way for
review. The very type of case selected might send feverish shivers through
the collective, media-Jabberwockian spine, as in the case of Street v.
National Broadcasting Co., the famous “Scottsboro Boys” case, which
then quickly and dramatically settled 987—an omnipresent danger that
might moot Court reform efforts. The Court could and should pick
sympathetic, borderline public-official cases—perhaps a grade school or
high school principal 988 or a low-level police officer 989—or a local
celebrity treated as an all-purpose public figure. 990 The Court could and
should frame precisely the questions to be briefed. As to the principal or
police officer, the Court might ask: Does the Rosenblatt v. Baer 991 publicofficial regime or the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. private-person regime 992
apply? Should Rosenblatt be limited to elected officials and non-elected
986. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 553–54; see
also infra text accompanying notes 1017–81.
987. See supra text accompanying notes 317–58.
988. The cases on point are divided. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92,
§ 5:1, at 5 nn.114, 135–37, 184–85.
989. Id. at nn.120, 170–76. As stated above, the courts overwhelmingly and
quite unjustifiably treat all police officers, regardless of rank, as public officials.
See supra text accompanying note 77; the unconscionable result in Coughlin v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187 (1986). Cf. supra text
accompanying notes 295–301.
990. See generally ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:6.
991. See supra text accompanying notes 251–61.
992. See supra text accompanying notes 36–47. Justice Gorscuh seems to
suggest that this is an unfortunate corollary of New York Times. Berisha v.
Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2429 (“Rules intended to ensure a robust debate over
actions taken by high public officials carrying out the public’s business
increasingly seem to leave even ordinary Americans without recourse for
grievous defamations.” (emphasis added)). In a post-Berisha podcast, Professor
David Logan doubts a Court majority exists for overturning New York Times but
suggests that the Court might limit it to “high public officials” and not extend it
to “cops on the beat,” firefighters, schoolteachers, or to “every person who works
in government.” We The People Podcast, Should the Supreme Court Reconsider
NYT v. Sullivan?, AM. CONST. CTR. (July 22, 2021), https://constitutioncenter
.org/news-debate/podcasts//should-the-supreme-court-reconsider-nyt-v-sullivan
[https://perma.cc/J7Q4-UGCB].
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officials in ranking positions of government, thereby tightening the
Court’s Rosenblatt criteria? Under either standard, what matters are within
and without the public concern criterion? What standards should the Court
develop for such determinations?
As to the local celebrity, the Court might pose the following: Do the
Gertz criteria for all-purpose public figures apply? Should the Court retain
this category, which often involves little more than a very generalized
application of the Court’s pivotal assumption-of-risk policy? 993 If retained,
should the Court limit such status to matters with a genuine connection to
matters of public significance to the prominent status sought and
achieved? The Court might also wish to add a truly revolutionary, twopart question: Should the New York Times rule for public persons be
abrogated in favor of a uniform negligence, reasonable-person standard
with limitations on permitted damages, 994 or should the Court return to the
993. See Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 538
(noting that the Court might well reconsider the constitutional-malice rule in cases
involving celebrities “and perhaps other public figures” not analogical to public
officials). On the latter, see supra text accompanying note 207, where this author
and others suggest Coach Butts may have been such an analogue. For other critical
discussions of the assumption-of-risk justification and the problems created
thereby, see supra notes 61, 66–67, 92, 173–74, 227–40, 262, 313, 339–40, 344,
348–49, 363, 365–88, 930, 963–68; infra text accompanying notes 1061–68.
994. Ashdown, supra note 172, at 739, 755–59 (Professor Ashdown
recommends retention of a plaintiff-proof-of-falsity-by-negligence standard for
all plaintiffs for compensatory damages and keeping the New York Times standard
for presumed and punitive damages: “Our system of freedom of expression . . . is
not benefited by a powerful, uncontrolled press with no mechanism available to
filter out misinformation. The time for the journalism police may have arrived.”);
Halpern, supra note 50, at 311–26 (proposing a professional negligenceregarding-proof-of-falsity threshold by clear-and-convincing-evidence for
compensatory damages in all cases regardless of plaintiff status, content or
publisher and retention of punitive damages based on common-law malice
standards); Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra note 51, at 552
(noting the abandonment of the constitutional-malice rule as one possible Courtgenerated illustration, which might generate enhanced interest in reform by the
media); FEIN, supra note 50, at 6, 12 (proposing adoption of a negligence
standard in public-official cases). See also the detailed proposal by Professor
Barron. Barron, supra note 172. Professor Barron proposes a summary procedure
whereby a defendant could demonstrate compliance with a “baseline standard of
responsible journalism,” which would “eliminate the chilling effect by
substantially reducing both overall litigation costs and the likelihood of damage
awards.” Moreover, such would deter negligent reporting, give defamation
victims “outlets for counter speech,” and strongly incentivize defendants to retract
once notified of a defamatory statement. “Most importantly,” it would “safeguard
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pre-New York Times common law with parallel damage limitations? 995
Lastly, if the present regime is retained, or even if modified, what reforms
in terms of fault and evidence would be constitutionally permitted if the
plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief, an issue raised but left open in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps? 996 Could they possibly include a
the fundamental constitutional interests driving” the Court’s jurisprudence “by
ensuring that public debate is founded on information that has been thoroughly
investigated and fact-checked.” Id. at 77–84, 91, 114–16, 125. For other
discussions of the New York Times standard as almost impossible to meet, see
supra text accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104, 130, 806–07, 857–58, 867,
869, 882, 917, 924–25; infra text accompanying notes 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48,
1073, 1077. But cf. King, supra note 371, at 659, 698, 713 (proposing a
constitutional-malice standard not limited by status or subject matter); Marc A.
Franklin, Public Officials and Libel: In Defense of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 66–75 (1986) (concluding that the
New York Times standard is preferable to a negligence standard, particularly as to
small media).
995. Epstein, supra note 50, at 802, 809–18 (applying risk-benefit analysis,
Professor Epstein makes a strong argument for a return to strict liability, with
“sensibly controlled” damages); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that Gertz and
New York Times had precipitated long and expensive discovery into the operation
and state of mind of reporters and publishers and opining that the media “would
be no worse off financially if the common-law rules were to apply” and courts
used care to ensure “damages awards be kept within bounds”). See infra text
accompanying notes 1019–23 for a synthesis of Justice Thomas’s recent
concurrence in McKee v. Cosby, proposing reconsideration of New York Times.
996. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986). The
Court’s specific reference to this possibility by either a public or private plaintiff
suggests that some member or members of the then Court may have had an interest
in this reform possibility. Without citing to it, the Court seemed to suggest
openness to Justice White’s strong suggestion in Dun & Bradstreet that a purely
name-clearing suit—replicating what a court could do by bifurcating
constitutional-malice and falsity issues—is not forbidden by the First
Amendment. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 768 n.2, 771–72 (1985) (White,
J., concurring). Justice White noted Gertz’s lack of interest in this name-clearingwithout-required-proof-of-fault option. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 391–92 (White J., dissenting). Although Justice Rehnquist was one of four
dissenters in Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 780 (Stevens, J., with Burger,
C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting), there is every reason to believe he, at least
among the dissenters, would have been receptive to any remedial measure
enhancing plaintiff chances for vindication. Note that in Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599
F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding sufficient evidence of constitutional malice
to go to trial), Federal Judge Abraham Sofaer bifurcated the jury issues of falsity
and constitutional malice. See id. at 582. Sharon lost on the latter but won on the
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court-authorized reasonable attorney fee award for adjudication of falsity
as part of a Court retooling of defamation-First Amendment doctrine?
Will the Court ever initiate any reform proposal? Skeptics might
suggest that it is really not the Court’s style and that its inactivity for over
30 years 997 suggests a pox-on-both-your-houses mentality, 998 or
institutional inertia, or a shrugging perspective that “it’s not perfect but at
least its largely settled law in its bold outlines.” Yet, such judicially
generated law reform proposals are not unknown, at least at the state level,
where courts have occasionally solicited contributions from the bar and
academic community when engaged in controversial law reform efforts. 999
But Supreme Court-generated reform has, until recently, seemed highly
unlikely, a type of hopeful law professors’ “ceremony of innocence.” 1000
The “half-a-loaf” circumscribed swath of New York Times by Gertz and
progeny—the counter-revolution—will likely remain. Of course, this is
vastly preferable to the Court’s pre-Gertz era. And the Gertz counterrevolution, at times often underdeveloped by or ignored by lower courts,
remains, as the author indicated earlier, as a potent, brooding
former. This judgment of falsity is widely viewed as resurrecting Sharon’s
political career. For a conclusion that the then recently resolved Sharon and
Westmoreland v. CBS cases were in the Court’s mind during its long and careful
analysis of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., see the analysis by Levine & Wermiel, supra
note 39 and supra text accompanying note 454.
997. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26.
998. Smolla, Emotional Distress, supra note 165, at 424–25 n.8 (quoting
Justice Rehnquist’s “A chill on both your houses” quip during oral arguments in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)); see supra text
accompanying notes 155–59.
999. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992)
(acknowledging the scholarly elucidation of the comparative negligence issue
before the court by amici curiae and the state’s “scholastic community”).
Sometimes scholars volunteer as amicus curiae in media cases of shared interest
on important defamation doctrines. For example, Dean Rodney A. Smolla and the
author submitted an amicus curiae brief in Burke v. Sparta Newspapers Ltd., 592
S.W.3d 116, 116 (Tenn. 2019), on the issue of extending the absolute privilege of
“fair report” to unofficial comments of public officials such as police officers. Id.
at 120–24. The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this radical extension
unanimously. Id. at 117. As is the norm, the media defendant received amicus
curiae support from both The Tennessee Association of Broadcasters and
separately from a wide array of national entities, including The Associated Press,
Cable News Network. Id. at 116. For other discussions of the disparity-ofresources issue, see supra text accompanying notes 570, 618–19, 845, 861–65,
867, 926–28, 982–85; infra text accompanying note 1077.
1000. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE TOP 500 POEMS, supra
note 828, at 853.
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omnipresence for further development by creative and courageous
plaintiff counsel and for revivification by the present or a future Court—
the highly important residual legacy of the Rehnquist Era Court.
In the context of this legacy, what is to be made of Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s unanimous opinion for the Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell 1001 rejecting the intentional infliction of emotional distress“outrage” tort in parody-caricature cases? As mentioned above, Professor
Stone cryptically and artificially disparaged Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion by eloquently repudiating an “outrageousness” 1002 standard as
based solely in his fascination with political cartoons. 1003 But, that is a
narrow, quarter-loaf-or-less interpretation that does not reflect the likely
truest motivation behind and intended impact of the opinion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was a well-read historian 1004 and astute critique of modern
society, 1005 aware of and concerned by the speech-code, political1001. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See supra text
accompanying notes 21–22, 576, 634–36. For excellent analyses, see RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL
(1988); Smolla, Emotional Distress, supra note 165.
1002. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55 (“‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury
to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An ‘outrageousness’ standard thus
runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because
the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”).
It is noteworthy that the first case to strike down a speech code cited Hustler. Doe
v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (“Nor could the
University proscribe speech simply because it was found to be offensive, even
gravely so, by large numbers of people.”).
1003. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
1004. Guiffra, supra note 884, at 1675, 1679–80 (noting that Justice Rehnquist
was an “accomplished historian” with four books to his credit and frequently
relied on history); Thompson, supra note 20.
1005. Ryan, supra note 884, at 1688 (“To his intellectual prowess the chief
married an unquenchable and endearing intellectual curiosity.”); Ronald J.
Tempas, Learning Life’s Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1691, 1692–93 (2006)
(discussing Rehnquist’s wide-ranging knowledge, interest, and erudition); John
G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam—William H. Rehnquist, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 487,
488 (2006) (noting Justice Rehnquist was “interested in just about everything,
which made him very interesting”); Kerri Martin Bartlett, Memories of a Modest
Man: A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 490
(2006) (concluding Rehnquist had a “razor sharp intellect” and “was better read
than anyone I have ever known”; there was “quite simply nothing that he couldn’t
discuss with knowledge and enthusiasm”); Craig Bradley et al., Hail to the Chief:
Former Law Clerks for William Rehnquist Recall What They Learned and How
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correctness crusade that engulfed college campuses in the 1980s 1006 and
which remains extraordinarily potent even today 1007 in the face of a nearly
unanimous stream of speech code invalidations 1008—an illiberal
movement that has burgeoned recently into pervasive, devastating, and
non-governmental exemplars of “cancel culture” that have induced
widespread self-censorship.
Hustler should be viewed as Chief Justice Rehnquist’s sage and
shrewd acknowledgement of a what’s-good-for-the-goose-is-good-forthe-gander pragmatism—i.e., that an “outrageousness” standard that
withstood the Court’s First Amendment scrutiny would gut the anti“political correctness” counter-crusade and provide an omnipotent
constitutional blunderbuss for equality supremacists in government to
trump free speech to protect poor, benighted, vulnerable students,
He Touched Their Lives, ABA J., Nov. 2005, at 43 (Rehnquist “was one of the
sharpest lawyers I’ve ever known. His command of the full range of constitutional
law was truly remarkable . . . .”); id. at 46 (“[H]e knew a massive amount of law,
seemingly by heart.”).
1006. See generally SPEAKING FREELY: THE CASE AGAINST SPEECH CODES xi
(Henry Mark Holzer ed., 1994) (noting how “shocking” it is that the origin of this
movement came from law professors, those whom one might expect to be “most
solicitous” of free expression and quoting from the “seminal” article in 1982 by
Richard Delgado that “gave birth to the ‘Hate Speech Movement’”—Richard
Delgato, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and NameCalling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982)).
1007. See the website for FIRE, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
a stalwart overseer of overly broad and abusive-speech-and-harassment codes on
college and university campuses. See FIRE, https://www.thefire.org [https://
perma.cc/A7Q6-XDQF] (last visited Sept. 23, 2022). See also GREG LUKIANOFF,
UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN
DEBATE (2014); Ronald L. Rychlak, Compassion, Hatred, and Free Expression,
27 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 407, 415–16 (2008) (noting that, despite constitutional
invalidation of many speech codes, university administrators are “not dumb”—
they write speech-code definitions into anti-harassment regulations).
1008. Rychlak, supra note 1006, at 415 n.41; Danny J. Boggs, Challenges to
the Rule of Law: Or, Quod Licet Jovi Non Licet Bovi, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2006–
07, at 12 (Such “rarely survive despite reams of academic writing attempting to
support them.”). Note that in a divided panel decision the Ninth Circuit held in
Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), that a
school district had a right to suspend a student wearing a t-shirt with a religious
message condemning homosexuality. The Supreme Court granted review and
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, remanding with directions to dismiss the
appeal as moot. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262
(2007). As Judge Boggs concludes, the Court’s vacating of the opinion is “at least
some indication” of the Court’s disapproval of it. Boggs, supra note 1008, at 12.
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employees, administrators, faculty, and a slew of others from perceived
offense. 1009 An “outrageousness” weapon could and would be utilized with
a vengeance by progressive university administrators and faculty
apparatchiks—the overwhelming majority presence on American college
and university campuses 1010—to further silence conservative and
moderate critics. In other words, Hustler should be viewed as a silent but
highly influential partner foreshadowing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 1011
1009. Note that the intentional infliction of emotional distress-“outrage” tort
analogy is viewed as one of the “principal conceptual bases” for proscribing racial
epithets. See Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1990) (discussing the impact of Hustler); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484,
514–17 (1990). Maybe this was what Professor Smolla was hinting at when he
concluded:
The most powerful challenges to the free speech tradition have always
come not from bad people but from good people—people who would
sanitize public discourse in order to elevate it, people who would have
our speech be less violent, less caustic, less racist, less sexist, less sexual.
. . . But in Hustler, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that no
such distinctions are possible when the only quarrel with the speech is
its emotionally disturbing quality. For that is what uninhibited robust and
wide-open speech is all about.
Smolla, Emotional Distress, supra note 165, at 474. The potential evisceration
effect of Hustler on speech codes is well-evidenced by Professor Smolla’s
retrenchment two years later in analyzing Hustler as involving a “general
marketplace of public discourse” type of speech with an “intellectual subtext” and
“redeeming undercurrents of protest.” Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First
Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 171, 172 n.3, 184–86 nn.51–52 (1990).
1010. See Elder, No Country, supra note 984, at 436–42, 596–622. See the
remarks by Chief Justice Rehnquist in a graduation address at George Mason
University two weeks after an appellate circuit had found unconstitutional the
university’s sanctions against a fraternity for having an ugly woman contest: “Ideas
with which we disagree—so long as they remain spoken ideas, and not conduct
which interferes with the rights of others—should be confronted with argument and
persuasion, not suppression.” Lorraine Adams, Rehnquist Talks on Free Speech in
GMU Address, WASH. POST (May 23, 1993), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/archive/local/1993/05/23/rehnquist-talks-on-free-speech-in-gmu-address/d
9b0a028-741b-49f7-b61a-86b96de1eef1/ [https://perma.cc/8J8P-V785]. An
apparatchik is “a blindly devoted official, follower, or member” of an organization
such as a corporation or a political party. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apparatchik [https://perma.cc/R278-2R6E] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2022).
1011. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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where Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
joining, is widely, and correctly, 1012 viewed as an attempt to eviscerate the
speech code-“political correctness” campus crusade. This is the decidedly
more impressive precedential value 1013 of Hustler that “trumps” its nonprovability-as-factually-false aspect, 1014 which, after all, only reflects and
builds upon the common law’s deep tradition of non-liability for mere
name-calling. 1015
So, the question posed above remains and is worth repeating. What is
the contemporary significance of the Rehnquist Era Court’s deep and
1012. This is clearly demonstrated by the briefs, Brief for Petitioner, R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675) (repeatedly citing Hustler, the
campus speech-code litigation, and the legal and other literature supporting and
criticizing speech codes and analogizing the City of St. Paul to the university
campus), and the oral arguments before the Court. See 208 PHILIP B. KURLAND &
GERHARD CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1991 TERM SUPP. 2, 3, 7
(1993) (including repeated references by counsel for Petitioner, Edward J. Cleary,
to Hustler and its “outrageousness” standard rejection).
1013. See Jaimin B. Raskin, The First Amendment: The High Ground and the
Low Road, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 115,
116–19, 128 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002) (The author notes that the Rehnquist
Court followed the “commanding theme” of protecting free expression, however
extreme or outrageous, because of the “ferocious right-wing backlash against”
speech codes and political correctness in the late 1980s and interprets Hustler as
the Court’s “epiphany” that the First Amendment “prohibits all speech against
purposeful government efforts to silence it;” he characterizes Justice Scalia’s
opinion in R.A.V. as directly targeted at speech codes; he views these
developments as part of Court conservatives’ “kind of wounded First Amendment
pride about standing up for unpopular speech” in a variety of other contexts,
including anti-abortion protests and campaign reform.). The importance of
Hustler Magazine is reflected in Chief Justice Roberts’s powerful defense of free
speech in the Court’s 8-1 picketing-of-military-funeral case, Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443 (2011), where the Court made a pointed, implicit jab at governmentsanctioned political correctness after several references to Hustler Magazine:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. . . . [W]e
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.
Id. at 460–01.
1014. See supra text accompanying notes 569–611.
1015. See Elder, Defamation, supra note 92, § 8:47; Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 566 cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1977); Elder, No Country, supra note 984, at
468–90.
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pervasive attempts to circumscribe New York Times—a case widely
viewed as based in a unique, idiosyncratic set of facts and a dynamic
political setting 1016—and its dominoing progeny if the Court desires to
mitigate the resulting damage both to individual reputations and public
discourse? After all, as indicated above, strong criticism of New York
Times and its progeny has been around for several decades. Is a hope for
renewed interest by the Court in taking a new and critical look at its
defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence just a retired law professor’s
tilting at Quixotean windmills?
As stated above, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Hustler
doubtlessly remains a core opinion reflecting an across-thejurisprudential-divide bulwark against governmental attempts to regulate
speech based on some type of offensiveness standard. 1017 But, what should
one make of the Rehnquist Era Court’s defamation-First Amendment
jurisprudence in general and the Court’s non-acceptance of a significant
defamation case in over three decades? Does that reflect a Court still
arguably satisfied with the framework it has wrought, complete with its
anomalies, conjectural premises about chilling-effect-self-censorship, and
the legal fictions underpinning many of its distinctions? Is a stable set of
largely arbitrary categorical rules a sufficiently compelling argument for
the Court to continue to adopt an even-if-it’s-broke-let’s-not-try-to-fix-it
approach? 1018 No one can predict what the Court will do with any degree
of certainty.
Yet, several factors cumulatively suggest—at least to the inveterate
optimist—that the Court may be willing at some point in the near future to
revisit its three-decade-plus-old jurisprudence. In his 2019 concurrence in
McKee v. Cosby, 1019 Justice Thomas called for reconsideration of the New
1016. See supra text accompanying note 882.
1017. See supra text accompanying notes 1000–16.
1018. See supra text accompanying notes 997–1000. Cf. Levine & Wermiel,
supra note 39, at 100 (concluding in 2012 that “the Court now appears largely
content with the shape of the constitutional law of defamation it crafted in Sullivan
and Gertz”).
1019. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in
applying New York Times to the vortex public figure before it but calling for
reconsideration of its extension to public figures “in an appropriate case.”). Justice
Thomas pointedly emphasized the importance of the Court’s alternative conclusion
in New York Times—that the ad in question constituted an “‘impersonal attack on
governmental operations’ and could not by ‘legal alchemy’ be transformed into ‘a
libel of an official responsible for those operations.’” Id. at 677 (quoting N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)). Justice Thomas concluded that “[t]his
holding was sufficient to resolve the case.” Id. at 677 (emphasis added). Justice
Thomas has provided a provocative invitation for an adventurous future Court
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majority to treat the remainder of New York Times as elegant, mellifluous, largely
anti-historical dicta. See Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 252, at 251
(concluding that “the opinion could have stopped there”—i.e., this “alternative
ground” of an impersonal attack on government as defamatory of an individual).
Alternatively, the Court could also have resolved the case before it by
constitutionalizing the majority substantial-truth defense under the common law.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 2:4. The Court later recognized and
affirmed this common-law, substantial-truth doctrine in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–18 (1991) (“The common law of libel takes but
one approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form of the
communication. . . . It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon
substantial truth. . . . Our definition of actual malice relies upon this historical
understanding.”). See also supra note 751. Clearly, the most damning defamatory
statements in New York Times as to police and police functions involved only minor
inaccuracies. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 289. The Alabama rule was much
narrower—and would have allowed liability for such minor inaccuracies—by
requiring defendants’ proof of “the truth of all his factual assertions” or “all its
factual particulars.” Id. 267, 278–79. The Court suggested such a state concept of
truth was violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it “dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.” Id. at 279. However, any
suggestion the Court invalidated the Alabama judgment on First Amendment
grounds based in this narrow interpretation of the truth defense may be technically
dicta. The Court specifically discussed the latter state defense later in its brief
analysis of the inextricably linked issue of the difference in impact such would have
on Sullivan’s reputation in resolving Sullivan’s attempt to base his “of and
concerning” case on the “‘impersonal attack on governmental operations’”
discussed above: “The ruling that these discrepancies between what was true and
what was asserted were sufficient to injure respondent’s reputation may itself raise
constitutional problems, but we need not consider them here.” Id. at 289. Clearly,
as stated above, the Court could have reversed the Alabama judgment based on a
constitutionalized substantial-truth doctrine, applying its newly discovered
independent-appellate-review-of-the-facts doctrine. However, the Court clearly had
“bigger fish to fry” and was intent on adopting a broader prophylactic rule—hence,
the constitutional malice or “actual malice” rule. Cf. Kagan, supra note 882, at 203
(“One of the great puzzles of Sullivan concerns why the Court adopted the actual
malice rule rather than decide the case on one of numerous available grounds based
on common law principles: that the established statements were not ‘of and
concerning’ Sullivan; that they were not substantially false; that they did not injure
his reputation.”). Professor, now Justice, Kagan cites Professor Epstein’s famous
critique, see generally Epstein, supra note 50, and noted that Justice Brennan’s
initial justification for reversing the Alabama Supreme Court paralleled that of
Professor Epstein by requiring clear-and-convincing proof of every common-law
element of a libel case in any claims involving public officials. Kagan, supra note
882, at 203.
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York Times constitutional-malice standard, characterizing it as “‘almost
impossible’” to meet. 1020 Justice Thomas excoriated the Court’s
1020. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 675 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771 (White, J., concurring)); Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. v. S. Poverty L. Ctr., 142 S. Ct. 2453 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (concluding that petitioner-public figure’s inability to
meet this standard as to the “blatant falsehood”—that petitioner was a “hate
group” based on its perspectives on sexuality, marriage, and homosexuality—left
it remediless as to financial losses from being barred from the Amazon Smile
donor program). Note that the federal district court in Coral Ridge Ministries
Media had also held alternatively that the term “hate group” was not provable as
factually false, as “hate group” has “a highly debatable mean and ambiguous
meaning.” Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. S. Poverty L. Ctr., 406 F. Supp.
3d 1258, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2019). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed solely
on the constitutional-malice issue. Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. S.
Poverty L. Ctr., 6 F.4th 1247, 1251–53 (11th Cir. 2021). Had the Court accepted
review, both issues would have been before the Court. By contrast, the commonlaw-fair-comment rule applied only where the underlying facts were true. McKee,
139 S. Ct. at 679. So, “[o]ne may in good faith publish the truth concerning a
public officer, but if he states that which is false and aspersive, he is liable therefor
however good his motives may be . . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted). The New
York Times opinion adopted the minority or liberal view, where fair comment
applied even where the underlying facts were false, following the leading case of
Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908). N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 280–82
nn.20–21. Justice Brennan emphasized that the Kansas Supreme Court “thus
sustained the trial court’s instruction [on actual malice] as a correct statement of
the law.” Id. at 281–82. A close reading of Coleman makes it compellingly clear
that the amorphous terms actual malice and good faith used therein were not
limited to the exceptionally circumscribed, extraordinarily press-protective
standard of knowing or reckless disregard of falsity that Justice Brennan’s opinion
ascribed to it. In fact, the Coleman opinion often used actual malice in the broader,
multiple meanings of the common law, including malice in fact, intent to do
injury, ill will, or evil mindedness. Coleman, 98 P. at 282, 288–89. Indeed,
Coleman cited the view of the “greater number of authorities,” the view it rejected
in favor of the liberal minority view, as adopting the view that the conditional
privilege was forfeited if the published matter was “untrue in fact, although made
in good faith, without malice, and under the honest belief that they are true.” Id.
at 286 (emphasis added). Coleman also quoted from the leading majority decision
rejecting the fair-comment privilege where the underlying factors are untrue. Post
Publ’g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893). In an opinion by Circuit Judge
William Howard Taft, the Sixth Circuit rejected the liberal rule because it would
provide a privilege as to untrue reports where the “accuser honestly believes the
charge upon reasonable grounds.” Coleman, 98 P. at 288 (emphasis added). Most
importantly, Justice Brennan emphasized that the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court instruction, which specifically limited application of the forfeiture-
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by-actual-malice, liberal view to situations where “defendant made all reasonable
effort to ascertain the facts before publishing the same. . . .’” Id. at 282 (emphasis
added). In other words, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted Hallam’s
interpretation of the requirements of the liberal view! Any even superficial
reading of the controlling instruction, and of Coleman as a whole—then or now—
suggests that negligence in investigating the facts forfeited the fair- comment
privilege, as did other forms of common-law malice. And this set of approved
instructions was viewed by the Coleman court as appropriate under the Kansas
Constitution’s responsible-for-the-abuse-of-freedom-of-expression limitation and
the Kansas Constitution’s treatment of “injury to reputation on the same plane as
injury to person or property.” Id. at 285 (citing KAN. CONST. §§ 11, 18). The latter
mandates that such an injured person “shall have remedy by due course of law,
and justice administered without delay.” Id. Maybe this gross misinterpretation of
or exceedingly cavalier and selective reading of Coleman occurred because the
Court’s focus was on “attempts by government to shut down criticism of
government policy.” Kagan, supra note 882, at 199–204. With this singular focus,
the Justices failed “during deliberation to criticize, debate, or question the
majority’s [puzzling] adoption of the actual malice standard.” Id. In other words,
“in hindsight, the most significant aspect of the opinion occasioned almost no
debate . . . silence reigned.” Id. See also Professor Anderson’s similarly masterful
analysis of Professor Herbert Wechsler’s “transformative advocacy” in New York
Times and his conclusion that one of the “mysteries of the case is why the Justices
raised so few questions about the limits of the new constitutional rule” of actual
malice and why it was “barely mentioned in the briefs or arguments.” Anderson,
Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 252, at 242–47. Not only Justice Brennan’s
“well-known skills as a negotiator, but also his colleagues’. . . respect for his
judgment” “may help explain the Court’s unquestioning acceptance” of the
“dubious claim” it was “just a constitutionalization of Coleman v. MacLennan.”
Id. Professor Anderson criticizes Brennan’s modification of the minority rule in
Coleman—which he interpreted as mandating knowing or reckless disregard of
falsity—as “a standard substantially more demanding than good faith”—
“Whether it was disingenuous or not his invocation of state cases made the new
rule seem less revolutionary, gave it a common-law pedigree, and implied that it
would do nothing that wasn’t already being done in a number of states.” Id. at
242. Indeed, the opinion of two of New York Times’s absolutist concurrers,
Justices Goldberg and Douglas, makes it clear that they viewed actual malice as
having a much broader—and less-protective—realm of application than knowing
or reckless disregard of falsity, as the concurrence repeatedly used a plethora of
terms reflective of actual malice’s broader common-law contours—“motivation,”
“non-malicious misstatements of fact,” “malicious,” “deliberately and
maliciously false statements,” “evaluation of the speaker’s state of mind,” “false
and malicious motivation,” “actual malice or reckless disregard,”
“malicious . . . state of mind,” “a concept of malice,” “the elusive concept of
malice.” Id. at 298–301 (Goldberg, J., and Douglas, J., concurring). Note that even
some strong defenders of New York Times concede that the actual malice alleged
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defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence generally as “policy-driven
decisions masquerading as constitutional law” 1021 that largely ignored the
Framers’ original intent 1022 and that, together with its progeny, “broke
sharply from the common law of libel.” 1023
in the Weschler brief was common-law malice in the sense of “intent to cause the
harm,” that the meaning of the term “widely varied” before the Court’s decision,
that Coleman used the term in the “evil mindedness” sense discussed above, that
the Court’s definition thereof “marked a significant departure from the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries minority rule,” and that the Coleman opinion’s
analysis was quite different from the more restrictive and protective definition of
actual malice ultimately adopted by the Court. John Bruce Lewis & Bruce L.
Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan at 50: Despite Criticism, the Actual Malice
Standard Still Provides “Breathing Space” for Communications in the Public
Interest, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2014).
1021. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 676; Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. S.
Poverty L. Ctr., 142 S. Ct. 2453, 2455 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (quoting McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 676). See Ronald A. Cass, Weighing
Constitutional Anchors: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the Misdirection of
First Amendment Doctrine, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 399, 400–06 (2014) (While
Professor Harry Kalven’s marked admiration for New York Times “remains the
dominant reaction” both in academia and the legal profession, the decision
involved “a marked departure from precedent” and wove together “bits and pieces
of precedent, public commentary, and academic analysis together in a way that is
tailored to reach a conclusion rather than to reflect more honest evaluation of the
state of the law”).
1022. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 681–82 (“[T]here appears to be little historical
evidence suggesting that the New York Times actual-malice rule flows from the
original understanding of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.”). See Berisha v.
Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2426 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“At the founding .
. . those exercising the freedom of the press had a responsibility to try to get the facts
right—or, like anyone else, answer in tort for the injuries they caused . . . . As a rule,
that mean all persons could recover damages for injuries they caused.”); Cass, supra
note 1021, at 420 (New York Times “rested on the soft ground of balancing and
abstraction rather than the firmer (though far from rock-solid) soil of history,
accepted textual understanding, and precedent. What follows this change in
interpretation method fit well Lord Macaulay’s prediction that the American
Constitution would turn out to be ‘all sail and no anchor.’” Professor Cass concludes
the speech at issue in the campaign-finance cases “fits the paradigm of core First
Amendment concerns far more readily than the class of speech that prompted Justice
Brennan’s flight of rhetorical fantasy in New York Times.”).
1023. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 678. Justice Thomas has twice noted that the
common law “deemed libels against public figures to be . . . more serious and
injurious than ordinary libels.” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (emphasis added)
(quoting McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 689). Indeed, “[t]he States are perfectly capable of
striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse and
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Frankly, it is not difficult to imagine two or more of the recent
appointees to the Court receptive to originalism arguments joining Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch—or maybe even Justice Kagan—in the near
future. 1024 In 2021, the late Judge Laurence H. Silberman of the United
providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm. We should reconsider our
jurisprudence in this arena.” McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 682. Justice Thomas
emphasized that whether a private plaintiff or a public plaintiff is involved, “lies
impose real harm,” citing numerous examples, and concluding that “[t]he
proliferation of falsehoods is, and always has been, a serious matter” from which
the First Amendment should not “continue to insulate those who perpetuate lies
from traditional remedies libel suits . . . .” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Note that one commentator emphasizes in a recent article that
states “had a rich history of (imperfectly) protecting political speech” in civil
litigation pre-New York Times, engaging in a value-balancing “delicate task that
states have performed for centuries.” James Maxwell Koffler, The Pre-Sullivan
Common Law Web of Protection Against Political Defamation Suits, 47 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 153, 227–28 (2018). He urges states to revive such if New York Times is
limited or overturned. Id. at 223–28. For discussions of state-constitutional
provisions that specifically protect reputation, limit free expression by imposing
responsibility for abuse thereof, and guarantee access to court for redressing
injury to reputation, see generally supra text accompanying notes 14–15, 428,
464, 564–65, 615, 858, 893, 1020. These state-constitutional provisions may be a
treasure trove for those trying to make an originalism argument favoring a return
to common-law protection and disfavoring the retention of New York Times Co.
and progeny.
1024. Justice Gorsuch’s added voice to that of Justice Thomas “send[s] a signal
to litigants to keep trying” to get the four votes necessary to reconsider New York
Times. Mark Walsh, Will the Supreme Court reconsider a landmark defamation
case?, ABA J. (July 22, 2021, 11:19 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/
article/will-the-supreme-court-reconsider-a-landmark-defamation-case [https://per
ma.cc/ZJ6L-8DEW] (quoting Sarah Matthews, senior staff attorney of the Lawyers
Committee for Freedom of the Press: “Seeing Gorsuch chime in with his dissent is
giving First Amendment lawyers agita . . . anxiety and stress”). Gorsuch’s dissent
specifically quoted from Justice Kagan’s 1993 article: “As Sullivan’s actual malice
standard has come to apply in our new world, it’s hard not to ask whether it now
even ‘cut[s] against the very values underlying the decision.’” Berisha, 141 S. Ct.
2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Kagan, supra note
882, at 207). Note that Gorsuch later detailed all the Court members who have
questioned New York Times and cited Lewis & Ottley, supra note 1020, at 35–36
(listing the multiple examples of Justice Scalia calling for its repudiation, including
stating that the Framers “would have been appalled” by the decision). Compare the
views of the Justices in a recent Fourth Amendment case dealing with the historic
meaning under the common law of what constituted a seizure, with the three
dissenters concluding that the majority had confused a battery with a seizure and an
attempted seizure as the completion thereof—“All this is miles from where the
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unloaded on
New York Times in his single-member panel dissent in Tah v. Global
Witness Publishing, Inc. 1025 Judge Silberman agreed with Justice Thomas
that the constitutional-malice criterion is “simply cut from whole cloth” 1026
and suggested that persuading the Court to revisit it will be an “uphill
battle.” 1027
Nonetheless, Judge Silberman threw down a flaming gauntlet. He
doubted that the Court would “invent the same rule” “[i]n light of today’s
very different challenges . . . .” 1028 He targeted the “ideological
consolidation of the press (helped by economic consolidation)”—i.e., that
the press is “very close to one-party control,” 1029 with the leading national
newspapers and their fellow travelers throughout the country functioning
as “virtually Democratic Party broadsheets.” 1030 In addition, almost all the
television entities are collectively “a Democratic Party trumpet.” 1031
Together with Silicon Valley’s “enormous influence over the distribution
of news” and its exercise of similar political “filter[ing]” policies, the net
result is an “ideological homogeneity” that “risks repressing certain ideas
standard principles of interpretation lead and just as far from the Constitution’s
original meaning.” Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 1017 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., with
Thomas, J., and Alito, J., joining, dissenting). Justice Barrett did not participate in
the decision.
1025. Tah v. Glob. Witness Publ’g Co., 991 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(Silberman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 427 (2021). Judge Silberman
also provided a scathing analysis of the panel majority’s application of the
constitutional-malice standard. Id. at 243–56.
1026. Id. at 251 (“The holding has no relation to the text, history, or structure of
the Constitution, and it baldly constitutionalized an area of law refined over
centuries of common law adjudication.”). This doctrine “allows the press to cast
false aspersion on public figures with near impunity.” Id. at 254. Judge Silberman
cited Justice White’s concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) (White, J., concurring). See Tah, 991 F.3d at 254 n.8.
See also Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(quoting the above language from Tah approvingly). For discussions of Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., see supra text accompanying notes 446–511.
1027. Tah, 991 F.3d at 252. (“[D]oing so would incur the wrath of press and
media.”).
1028. Id. at 254.
1029. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Silberman cited a “few notable exceptions to
Democratic Party ideological control” and that it “should be sobering that these
institutions are controlled by a single man and his son. Will a lone holdout remain
in what is otherwise a frighteningly orthodox media empire?” Id. at 255.
1030. Id. at 254.
1031. Id.
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from the public consciousness just as surely as if access were restricted by
the government.” 1032 This comes with “an enormous political impact”—
“the overwhelming uniformity of news bias.” 1033 Judge Silberman found
it “fair to conclude . . . that one-party control of the press and media is a
threat to a viable democracy.” 1034 In such a dire situation, “when the media
has proven its willingness—if not eagerness—to so distort, it is a profound
mistake to stand by unjustified legal rules [such as New York Times] that
serve only to enhance the press’ power.” 1035 Judge Silberman’s comments
were carefully calculated to be confrontational and provoke scholarly
discussion.
Observers can view his dissent as taunting the Court to revisit New
York Times. It would be exceptionally short-sighted, however, to treat the
critical lament of this distinguished jurist 1036 as that of an eccentric and
1032. Id. at 255. Judge Silberman took no position on “the legality of big tech’s
behavior”:
Some emphasize these companies are private and therefore not subject
to the First Amendment. Yet—even if correct—it is not an adequate
excuse for big tech’s bias. The First Amendment is more than just a legal
provision. It embodies the most important value of American
Democracy. Repression of political speech by large institutions with
market power therefore is—I say this advisedly—fundamentally unAmerican. As one who lived through the McCarthy era, it is hard to
fathom how honorable men and women can support such actions.
Id. at 255 n.11. Judge Silberman raised an important First Amendment issue
currently in litigation, i.e., whether government coercion of private actors
precipitates First Amendment analysis. See Deborah J. Saunders, What’s worse:
Big Government or Big Tech? Both., THE POST AND COURIER (Oct. 27, 2022),
https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/commentary/saunders-whats-worse-biggovernment-or-big-tech-both/article_4b062ce6-55ed-11ed-8fdb-8fc1c588d4fa
.html [https://perma.cc/32ZT-VZP3] (discussing fast-tracked discovery in a federal
case challenging alleged federal-government coercion of internet providers to
squelch criticism of COVID-19 polices and other political controversies and the
author’s response to one co-plaintiff’s inquiry as to why the major media have given
“‘shockingly little coverage’” to the suit: “No lie. Big Government has gotten into
bed with Big Tech, and their offspring likely will grow into Big Brother.”)
1033. Tah, 991 F.3d at 255.
1034. Id. at 255–56 (emphasis added) (“It may even give rise to countervailing
extremism.”).
1035. Id. at 256; id. at 251 (“[T]he New York Times decision [is] a threat to
American democracy. It must go.”). Although Judge Silberman noted that
“reasons for press bias are too complicated to address here[,] . . . they surely
related to bias at academic institutions.” Id. at 256 n.13.
1036. See Laurence Silberman, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Laurence Silberman [https://perma.cc/H4GA-JV3H] (last visited Nov. 4, 2022);
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purely partisan crank. His views largely reflect those of many leading
defamation-First Amendment scholars, albeit without Judge Silberman’s
heavy emphasis on press and media progressive orthodoxy. For example,
recent provocative, persuasive articles by two leading defamation-First
Amendment scholars, David A. Logan and David Anderson, 1037 with a
healthy assist from Justice Gorsuch, 1038 highlight in very sharp focus the
views of a wide swath of other scholars. 1039
Professor Logan concludes that the “hands-off approach to false
speech, at the heart of New York Times, has been weaponized, facilitating
a public square rife with ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts,’ which has led
to a dramatic decrease in trust in our government and leaders.” 1040 The
constitutional-malice standard’s “near immunity” from liability
constitutes “a license to publish falsehoods” 1041 and fails to deter
Paul Clement, America Loses a Judicial Giant, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2022, 8:33 PM
ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-loses-a-judicial-giant-laurence-silber
man-restraint-dc-circuit-constitution-judge-legacy-scalia-clerks-second-amendm
ent-11664750990 [https://perma.cc/E5RK-P9K2] (characterizing Judge Silberman
as a “national treasure” with “the enduring legacy of a happy warrior for judicial
restraint, personal character and professional courage”).
1037. See Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 759–814;
Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 23–29.
1038. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2427 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (quoting Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, see supra
note 172, 17 times).
1039. See Ashdown, supra note 172, at 739 (“[D]ue to New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and the matrix of Supreme Court decisions that followed, the press is
largely immune from any kind of accountability . . . [and] effectively eliminated
libel and privacy actions as a form of media control.”). See also supra text
accompanying notes 56, 68, 104, 130, 133, 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–
18, 924–25, 994, 1020, 1025–39; infra text accompanying notes 1040–48, 1073,
1077.
1040. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 762; id. at 761
(noting it is “now clear that the Court’s constraints on defamation law have
facilitated a miasma of misinformation that harms democracy by making it more
difficult for citizens to become informed voters”) (emphasis added).
1041. Id. at 778 (“This has resulted in little deterrence of liars and a systematic
under-protection of the right to an unsullied reputation.”); id. at 763 (The data
reflect “what amounts to an absolute immunity from damages actions for false
statements . . . this evisceration of the deterrent power of defamation law has
facilitated a torrent of false information entering our public square.”); Berisha,
141 S. Ct. at 2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Citing
Professor Logan’s detailed statistical analysis, Justice Gorsuch concluded that
“over time the actual malice standard has evolved from a high bar to recovery into
an effective immunity from liability.”); see We The People Podcast, supra note
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publication of falsehood. In fact, it incentivizes it. 1042 In other words,
“under an ‘actual malice’ regime, ignorance is bliss” 1043 and the

992 (Professor Logan is quoted: “[B]asically libel law is essentially dead in this
country.”). For discussions of reputation, see supra notes 14, 44–45, 93–94, 168–
69, 257, 507, 599–600, 858, 872–73, 868–903, 1023.
1042. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 778–79, 810 (“[T]he
threat that defendants today face from libel defendants is virtually nil.”). Note that
New York Times “incentivizes defendants . . . to pull out all the stops to avoid a
crushing award.” Id. at 779. See Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2428 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“If ensuring an informed democratic debate
is the goal, how well do we serve that interest with rules that no longer merely
tolerate but encourage falsehoods in quantities no one could have envisioned
almost 60 years ago?”). See also supra text accompanying note 916.
1043. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 778 (“[P]ublishing
without verification is the safest legal choice, as an attempt to verify that turns up
contrary information before publication can constitute reckless disregard for the
truth and support liability. As a result, publishers are incentivized to do little or
no fact-checking confident the more slipshod their investigation, the less likely
they were to be guilty of ‘actual malice’ . . . .”); Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2428
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Quoting extensively from
Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, Justice Gorsuch suggested
what seems to be the “bottom line:” “[P]ublishing without investigation, factchecking, or editing has become the optimal legal strategy. Combine this legal
incentive with the business incentives fostered by our new media world and the
deck seems to be stacked against those with traditional (and expensive)
journalistic standards—and in favor of those who can disseminate the most
sensational information as efficiently as possible without any particular concern
for truth” (emphasis added)); Barron, supra note 172, at 75 (“Sullivan incentivizes
practices that increase the likelihood that the press will publish injurious
falsehoods.”); id. at 85 (“By looking solely to journalists’ states-of-mind,
however, the only incentive provided by the actual malice standard is that they
report with clean consciences, regardless of whether they act reasonably or
comply with professional norms.”); id. at 85–86. Actual malice
provides reporters with a strong disincentive from investigating news
stories beyond the minimum necessary. The more a reporter investigates,
the more likely it is that the reporter will discover some information that
casts the veracity of the story into doubt, which would increase the
likelihood of liability. . . . Similarly, editors are discouraged from
extensively reviewing stories, checking the facts contained in them or
recommending that a reporter conduct additional investigation, as any of
these actions may be seen by a jury as evidence that the editor
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.”
Id. (alteration in original). For a discussion of the “negligence-is-never-enough”
rule, see supra text accompanying notes 620–90.
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irresponsibility engendered thereby 1044 has “contributed to a debased
public debate and harmed American democracy.” 1045 At this “critical
juncture, beset by falsehood and deep mutual distrust,” 1046 the Court that
“helped create the mess” must reconsider New York Times: “[O]ur
democracy hangs in the balance.” 1047
Professor Anderson concurs wholeheartedly with Professor Logan’s
courageous views, 1048 but he would start first with Section 230 of the
1044. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 778–84. See also
Barron, supra note 172, at 101–04 (An “irresponsible press [that] fails to fulfill
its role as the sole independent watchdog of government” may cause the public to
“lose confidence in the integrity of conclusions derived from the market place of
ideas” and thereby “impede democracy-enhancing and truth-seeking speech”);
Ashdown, supra note 172, at 742 (Unlike law enforcement, “the press is virtually
immune from liability . . . for those harmed by incomplete investigations and
premature reporting. Members of the news media, of course, are aware of this; the
lack of responsibility has created a self-propelled symbiosis between an
unsanctionable press and sloppiness, sensationalism, and exaggeration. It is the
public, and concomitantly the democratic process, which has suffered from this
phenomenon, both in the form of distortion of events and the development of
distrust of the news media”); id. at 750 (“In reality, libel law, is dead as a means
of accountability.”); id. at 751 (“Libel law is currently failing to accomplish
anything, except to completely insulate the media from any incentive to ensure
that they are effectively performing its constitutional role; reputations are
damaged, misinformation is distributed, media hysteria is encouraged, and the
press is immune from any recourse.”); id. at 753–54 (“Instead of libel law that
discourages the censorship of reliable material, we have a constitutional law of
libel that encourages dissemination of falsity. . . . The social cost of the New York
Times rule has been a dramatic impact on the market place of information by
polluting it with misinformation. . . . A news media that is undeterred by any form
of accountability ill serves the public and participatory democracy. . . . The public
misses the hard news it deserves, and the press loses the confidence of the public
because of the circus atmosphere and lack of substantive coverage.”).
1045. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 813.
1046. Id.
1047. Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
1048. Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 29 (Professor Logan’s
article is “perceptive, timely, and courageous. He will face some vituperation for
questioning a decision as iconic as [New York Times]. But he has initiated a much
needed conversation.”). See Barron, supra note 172, at 104 (“Because the
Supreme Court is the primary arbiter of constitutional meaning and dictates, it is
the obligation of the Court to create a new standard that eliminates the perverse
incentives spurred by the actual malice standard.”); Ashdown, supra note 172, at
755 (“It seems that the actual malice rule of New York Times has not withstood
the test of time and has outlived its usefulness.”). Professor Anderson emphasizes
that the independent-appellate-review requirement, together with the clear-and-
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Communications Decency Act of 1996. 1049 He agrees with Professor
Logan 1050 that the absolute immunity for internet services provided therein
makes “mass circulation of falsehoods virtually risk-free” 1051 and that the
convincing-evidence criterion, incentivize trial courts to resolve most cases at the
summary-judgment level. Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 25–26.
This combination, “more than anything else,” operates “to free media from the
chill of libel law, because it greatly reduced the cost of defending. And by
fostering a perception that suing for libel is futile, it exacerbated the debasement
of public debate that Professor Logan describes.” Id. at 27. See Justice Gorsuch’s
reference to the highly likely reversal on appeal of any libel verdict as attributable
“[p]erhaps in part because this Court’s jurisprudence has been understood to invite
appellate courts to engage in the unusual practice of revisiting a jury’s factual
determinations de novo . . . .” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. 2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
1049. Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 27–28. A compelling
article brutally critiques the courts’ general interpretation of § 230 as providing
immunity “far more sweeping than anything the law’s words, context, and history
support” and as providing protection “far in excess of what constitutes reasonable
public policy.” Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORD. L. REV. 401, 408
(2017). Thus, a statutory immunity not mandated by the First Amendment “gives
an irrational degree of free speech benefit to harassers and scofflaws but ignores
important free expression costs to victims.” Id. at 419–20. The authors provide
proposals for judicial and congressional intervention. Id. at 414–23. See the
Statement of Justice Thomas in the Court’s denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes,
Inc. v. Enigma Software Group. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) (quoting R.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:86 (2d ed. 2019) (“‘[C]ourts have extended
the immunity in § 230 far beyond anything that plausibly could have been
intended’” by Congress). And see Doe v. Facebook, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1087, 1088
(2022) (Following Malwarebytes, Inc., Justice Thomas noted that the lower
courts’ interpretation of [Sec.] 230 is this products liability setting “exemplifies”
the way they “‘confer[] sweeping immunity on some of the largest companies in
the world.’”). As Justice Gorsuch noted, the world has four billion active socialmedia users, citing Professor Logan’s statistics. Id. Consequently, “today virtually
anyone in this country can publish virtually anything for immediate consumption
virtually anywhere in the world.” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
1050. Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 27–28.
1051. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, 811–12 (and noting
Congress’s “crucial role” under § 230 in creating “a dysfunctional public
square”); id. at 805 (“The result of all of this [the Internet and social media] is a
political system under siege, since modern democracies need to identify and
circulate agreed-upon facts.”). The Supreme Court decided to grant review
October 3, 2022, in two cases testing the Sec. 230 immunity—Gonzalez v. Google
and Twitter v. Taamneh—that allege that the defendants provided material support
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internet, in particular social media, has “deeply eroded the influence of
traditional media.” 1052
As indicated above, and again worth repeating, the detailed analysis
herein of the Rehnquist Era Court’s defamation-First Amendment
to ISIS. WALL ST. J., High Court To Hear Challenge To Tech Immunity, Oct. 4,
2022, A1, (noting Justice Thomas’s influence in raising the issue and briefly
discussing a federal appellate court’s recent decision upholding a Texas statute
barring social-media platforms from viewpoint-based barring or blocking of
posters’ comments). And see Allysia Finley, Big Tech Has No Constitutional
Right to Censor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2022, A17 (discussing the Texas statute
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applying Justice
Thomas’s “common carrier” analysis and a case decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit invalidating a somewhat comparable
Florida anti-censorship statute, noting that the latter had been appealed by the state
to the Supreme Court).
1052. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 761. As a recent article
states, the § 230 immunity “ensures that platforms enjoy ‘power without
responsibility.’” Danielle K. Citron & Robert Chesney, Deep Fakes: A Looming
Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV.
1753, 1798 (2019) (internal citation omitted). The authors trenchantly and
powerfully synthesize the impact of the internet and social media:
Taken together, common cognitive biases and social media capabilities
are behind the viral spread of falsehoods and decay of truth. They have
helped entrench what amounts to information tribalism, and the results
plague public and private discourse. Information cascades, natural
attraction to negative and novel information, and filter bubbles provide
an all-too-welcoming environment as deep-fake capacities mature and
proliferate.
Id. at 1768. Although the poster-creator of the defamatory statement can
theoretically be sued for a defamatory “fake news report,” such litigation is
“unlikely to have much of a constraining effect on fake news . . . .” Levi, supra
note 985, at 303–04 n.341 (The author cites several factors—that such items are
likely to be “couched in language that would skirt liability” under state defamation
rules as to what is defamatory, that claims may be barred under the constitutionalmalice standard, that such claims may be deterred due to the expense of bringing
and pursuing litigation by individuals with limited assets (and that it “would be
unrealistic to expect individuals with limited means to serve as the front guard of
society’s efforts to stop the widespread problem of fake news”), and that “the true
harm of any item of fake news is accomplished by its dissemination and
amplification.”). Another equally important factor may be the concern common
to all defamation plaintiffs—i.e., whether the poster who caused the widespread
dissemination has assets or insurance that makes him or her worth suing. Also, a
libel plaintiff must overcome the significant hurdles that internet service providers
create in trying to identify and reach anonymous posters. See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 1:28.1.
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jurisprudence provides a highly important framework for reassessing New
York Times and its progeny by identifying many of the malleable soft spots
in the Court’s jurisprudence. This framework functions in several ways:
as a basis for continuing the Rehnquist Era Court’s counter-revolution by
implementing significant additional incremental changes; as a basis for
“retool[ing]” the system in place; 1053 or as a basis for finding that New
York Times and its emanations are constructed on a house of cards atop a
bed of constitutional quicksand and need to be shelved in toto—for
example, by adopting Justice Thomas’s originalism approach. 1054
What is clear is that, despite its concededly iconic status 1055 and its
likely stature as a constitutional and political necessity 1056 in 1964, this
1053. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 762. See also
Barron, supra note 172. Professor Barron proposes a summary procedure whereby
a defendant could demonstrate compliance with a “baseline standard of
responsible journalism,” which would “eliminate the chilling effect by
substantially reducing both overall litigation costs and the likelihood of damage
awards.” Id. at 75. Moreover, such would deter negligent reporting, give
defamation victims “outlets for counter speech,” strongly incentivize defendants
to retract once notified of a defamatory statement, and “[m]ost importantly,” it
would “safeguard the fundamental constitutional interests driving” the Court’s
jurisprudence “by ensuring that public debate is founded on information that has
been thoroughly investigated and fact-checked.” Id. Professor Ashdown
recommends a negligence standard in all cases, with presumed and punitive
damages available only if the New York Times standard is met: “Our system of
freedom of expression . . . is not benefited by a powerful, uncontrolled press with
no mechanism available to filter misinformation. The time for the journalism
police has arrived.” Ashdown, supra note 172, at 758–59.
1054. See supra text accompanying note 995; infra text accompanying notes
1018–22.
1055. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 761; Anderson,
Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 29.
1056. Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 23–25. New York Times
was “not wrongly decided” at the time, as any other conclusion “would have []
intimidated if not neutered” both the civil-rights movement and the media
coverage thereof that facilitated the movement’s success. Id. at 23. Professor
Anderson does not view Professor Logan as disagreeing on this point. See id. at
23–25. Professor Anderson suggests that “the time and context are very different
now, and what may have been right in 1964 may be wrong now.” Id. at 23. Some
recent scholarship views the threats from the Southern libel-litigation strategy—
both to the civil-rights movement and media coverage thereof—as having been
“largely ineffective in silencing press coverage” and as “not the catastrophe-inthe-making . . . tend[ing] toward the apocalyptic” it usually is portrayed to be.
Christopher W. Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on
the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 294–98, 304–06, 325–35 (2014).
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“deeply romanticized ode” 1057 has given rise to and occupies at present a
“dysfunctional public square” 1058 that would be “totally
unrecognizable” 1059 to the New York Times Court. This case gave rise to a
conjectural, non-empirically based doctrine of chilling-effect-selfcensorship 1060 and to the awkward, amorphous, and arbitrary Gertz-based
The author emphasizes that “[i]f the New York Times was intimidated by the threat
of libel suits, it was not particularly evident in its coverage,” which “actually
expanded,” as did that of the press generally, in “quite effectively” covering the
civil-rights movement during the case’s pendency. Id.
1057. Jones, supra note 882, at 259–61 (The New York Times “ode” during the
Court’s Glory Days of the First Amendment protected reflected a picture of “an
overwhelmingly generous, sweepingly sentimentalized, almost uniformly
affirmative characterization of the press as a critically important, positively
contributing social entity that is worthy of protection and uniquely valuable to the
polity.”). See supra text accompanying note 882.
1058. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 811–12.
1059. Id. at 803; Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 28 (Professor
Andersons agrees with Professor Logan that “we must recognize that the world of
[New York Times] no longer exists. Understanding how much politics, news, and
public discourse have changed is an essential prerequisite to reforming libel law.”).
See Justice Gorsuch’s cautious conclusion after detailing the changes in the media
elaborated analyzed by Professor Logan and others:
In adding my voice to theirs [he listed criticisms of New York Times by
other Court members], I do not profess any sure answers. I am not even
certain of all the questions we should be asking. But given the
momentous changes in the Nation’s media landscape since 1964, I
cannot help but think the Court would profit from returning its attention,
whether in this case or another, to a field so vital to the ‘safe deposit’ of
our liberties.
Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2430 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Note that both Professors Logan and Anderson are advisors to
the Restatement of Torts (Third) project on the revision of defamation and privacy
law. As Professor Logan says, “[w]e can only hope for fresh thinking” from that
effort, which “provides a unique opportunity to address” many of the concerns he
and others raise. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 813.
1060. Justice Gorsuch:
But if that justification [“the actual malice standard as necessary to ‘to
ensure that dissenting or critical voices are not crowded out of public
debate”’] had force in a world with comparatively few platforms for
speech, it’s less obvious what force it has in a world in which everyone
carries a soapbox in their hands.
Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In
other words, “[w]hat started in 1964 with a decision to tolerate the occasional
falsehood to ensure robust reporting by a comparative handful of print and
broadcast outlets has evolved into an ironclad subsidy for the protection of
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distinctions between categories of public persons and private persons. 1061
These dubious distinctions were excoriated then1062 and have been
excoriated since as founded on premises that are “severely flawed,” 1063 or
“illogical and fallacious,” 1064 or which “seem increasingly malleable and

falsehoods by means and on a scale previously unimaginable.” Id. See supra text
accompanying notes 50–52, 167, 339, 453, 880–903, 925, 1919–36, 1051–52;
infra text accompanying note 1067.
1061. Professor, now Justice, Kagan delineates the nature of the problem under
the Court’s public-figure precedent: “A more informal definition [of public
figure] might go something like: Everyone the reader has heard of before and a
great many people he hasn’t. The vast majority of those likely to attract media
attention fall within the category.” See Kagan, supra note 882, at 210. Justice
Gorsuch expressed similar views on the impact of the Gertz criteria: “In many
ways, it seems we have arrived in a world that dissenters proposed but majorities
rejected in the Sullivan line of cases—one in which, ‘voluntarily or not, we are all
public [figures] to some degree.’” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (alteration in original). Then-Professor Kagan
criticizes some of the broader extensions of the actual-malice standard to cases
unrelated to democratic government. Kagan, supra note 882, at 214.
In such cases, the law insulates powerful institutional actors—possessing
both a great capacity to harm individuals and a far-reaching influence
over society are large—from charges of irresponsibility made by persons
with little societal influence and few avenues of self-protection. If part
of the point of Sullivan was to check the abuse of power and to ensure
the accountability of those wielding it, then these cases suggest that the
Court’s constitutionalization of libel law has gone askew.
Id. See the concession of Sandra S. Baron of Libel Defense Resource Center that
“who is a public figure and who is not . . . is one of the messiest and murkiest” issues
in libel law. See Roundtable, supra note 928, at 882. As early post-Gertz precedent
suggested, the difficulties in discerning what public-figure status includes remains
“much like trying to nail a jellyfish to a wall,” Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), or as the Fifth Circuit remarked on appeal,
public-figure status “falls within that class of legal abstractions where ‘I know it
when I see it’” applies. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th
Cir. 1978) (quoting Justice Stewart’s famous non-definition of obscenity in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
1062. See supra text accompanying notes 170–74.
1063. Barron, A Proposal, supra note 172, at 87–88.
1064. Ashdown, supra note 172, at 755–58 (agreeing that the public-versusprivate distinction “never made any sense”). Others have made thoughtful reform
proposals. See discussion supra note 994–95, 1053.
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even archaic” 1065—access to the means of reply and assumption of risk.
Both may merit reconsideration in an internet-social media age. 1066
1065. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“[A]lmost anyone can attract some degree of public notoriety in some
media segment. Rules intended to ensure a robust debate over actions taken by high
public officials carrying out the public’s business increasingly seem to leave even
ordinary Americans without recourse for grievous defamation.” (emphasis added)).
Justice Thomas was equally pointed, stating that the Court had “provided scant
explanation” for the “new hurdle” for public figures “so long after the First
Amendment’s ratification.” Id. at 2425. He strongly criticized the assumption-ofrisk underpinnings of Gertz, concluding “it is unclear why exposing oneself to an
increased risk of becoming a victim necessarily means forfeiting the remedies
legislatures put in place for such victims.” Id. And, “even assuming that it is
sometimes fair to blame the victim, it is less clear why the rule still applies when
the public figure ‘has not voluntarily sought attention . . . .’” Id. (quoting Berisha v.
Dawson, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1158 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861
(“It is no answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to say, truthfully, that
one doesn’t choose to be.”)). Two cases Justice Thomas referenced are illustrative
of the problems Gertz’s nebulous and manipulable criteria have created. In
Rosanova, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the difficulties of defining public-figure
status, see supra note 1061, but affirmed the trial court’s finding that it sufficed that
Rosanova “voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and
comment”—an association with mob figures that had generated prior media
attention. Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861 (quoting Rosanova, 411 F. Supp. at 445).
Berisha relied on parallel reasoning based on allegations of mob ties, relying on
Rosanova’s “course of conduct” approach, its incestuous twin—that plaintiff played
a “central role” in a public controversy and also that the matter was “germane”
thereto—and that he was “exactly the rare case” of an “involuntary public figure.”
Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1310–12. (11th Cir. 2020). None of these
rationales withstand scrutiny under a dispassionate analysis of the Court’s “Four
Horsemen of Public Figuredom.” See supra text accompanying notes 162–250,
302–88; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 92, §§ 5:8, 5:12. Justice Thomas also
renewed his criticism in McKee v. Cosby, concluding, “surely this Court should not
remove a woman’s right to defend her reputation in court simply because she
accuses a powerful man of rape.” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari). Justice Gorsuch shared this criticism of McKee and
comparable cases: “Other persons, such as victims of sexual assault seeking to
confront their assailants, might choose to enter the public square only reluctantly
and yet wind up treated as limited-purpose public figures.” Id. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Gorsuch also cited as illustrative
Hibdon v. Grawbowski, 195 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), which held that a
particular plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure in part because, as the court
stated, he had “entered into the jet ski business and voluntarily advertised on the
news group rec.sport.jetski, an Internet site that is accessible worldwide.” Id. at 59.
In other words, as Justice Gorsuch stated, “today’s world casts a new light on these
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What seems clear is that the Court’s documented “profound
cynicism” 1067 about claims of First Amendment media exceptionalism
makes it highly unlikely that the Court will either expand media rights 1068
or accept the jaded, open-ended, unprincipled proposition that in a “posttruth society” “objective facts—while perhaps always elusive—are now
an endangered species.” 1069 Maybe a Court intensely concerned about the
judgments as well,” as “[n]ow, private citizens can become ‘public figures’ on
social media overnight” and “[i]ndividuals can be deemed ‘famous’ because of
their notoriety in certain channels of our now-highly segmented media even as
they remain unknown in most.” Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). One can now receive such status “simply by
defending himself from a defamatory statement.” Id. at 7. As indicated in ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 92, § 5:25, it does not suffice for such public figure
status that plaintiff merely files a civil action or is a defendant in a criminal or
civil proceeding, but many courts have struggled to find persons to be limitedpurpose public figures where they engage in even modest affirmative acts in
addition thereto. Id. Some persuasive case law has found that proportionate, selfdefensive responses to protect reputation do not suffice for such status. Id. See
also supra note 385.
1066. For criticisms of the assumption-of-risk justification and the problems
posed thereby, see supra text accompanying notes 61, 66–67, 92, 173–74, 227–
40, 262, 313, 339–40, 344, 348–49, 363, 365–88, 930, 963–68, 993, 1061–65;
infra text accompanying notes 1067–68.
1067. This appears to reflect the views of the courts generally. See RonNell
Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the American Press, 112 NW.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 567, 580 (2017) (“All told, the courts have gone from an entity
solidly in the corner of the press to one that now looks upon the press with at least
skepticism and at worst animosity.”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press
Court?, BYU L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2012) (“[T]he Court appears to see the ‘Fourth
Estate’ as little more than a self-serving slogan bandied about by media
corporations.”). See also supra the text accompanying note 985.
1068. For examples of proposals the current Court is highly unlikely to accept,
see supra text accompanying note 363 (Professor Usman’s proposal for a modified
but extremely broad conception of involuntary public figure); supra text
accompanying note 994 (Professor King’s proposal to extend the New York Times
standard to all regardless of status or subject matter); supra text accompanying note
588 (Professors Lidsky and Andersen Jones’ proposal for a broad opinion privilege
for the internet and social media); supra text accompanying notes 789–881
(adoption of “neutral reportage,” a limited form of absolute immunity even where
plaintiff can demonstrate compliance with the New York Times standard).
1069. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 175 (2018) (“A mix of digital speed, social media, fractured
news, and party polarization has led to . . . a ‘post-truth’ society: a culture where
what is true matters less than what we want to be true.”); id. at 181 (“At the end of
the day, confirmation bias and echo chambers have led to what I call a ‘my team-
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future of our Republic 1070 will also take judicial note of the poll evidence
that trust in the media is at its nadir and that Americans are split as to
whether the media are the “enem[ies] of democracy” 1071 and feel
compelled to intervene. Maybe the Court will be motivated in part by how
“the defamatory story can be quickly spread across the internet” and the
“increasing the polarization within the United States . . . [that] is the
greatest threat to American democracy” 1072 in the eyes of many.
your team’ double set of facts . . . .”); id. at 184–85 (“[F]actual claims are ones that
can theoretically be falsified—meaning they can be tested as true or false . . . .
[F]actual claims are typically followed by evidence.”); id. at 191 (“The crux of the
problem is that social media creates an echo chamber where ‘facts’ from friends are
repeated, exacerbating confirmation bias and giving authenticity to claims based
simply on how often they are shared.”); id. at 224 (“[C]ourts have a greater capacity
to aspire to adhere to objectiveness—to catch the over-claims and cherry-picking
and falsification—than do democratically accountable counterparts.”); Citron &
Chesney, supra note 1052, at 1768 (“Taken together, common cognitive biases and
social media capabilities are behind the viral spread of falsehoods and decay of truth.
They have helped expand what amounts to information tribalism, and the results
plague public and private disclosures. Information cascades, natural attraction to
negative and novel information, and filter bubbles provide an all-too-welcoming
environment as deep-fake capabilities mature and proliferate.”). Professor David
Anderson provides a succinct, sharp, and irrefutable response to the “intellectually
fashionable view that truth is merely a social construct” and the corollary that “if
one person’s falsehood is another person’s truth, there is little room for a body of
law that insists that falsity can be proved. . . . However valid that view may be as a
cosmic matter, . . . it is nonsense: we distinguished between truth and falsity every
day of our lives.” Anderson, Second Thoughts, supra note 159, at 29.
1070. For one Justice’s detailed views, see NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF
YOU CAN KEEP IT (2019).
1071. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 797. See supra text
accompanying notes 1025–35, 1037–48.
1072. Erwin Chermerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA.
L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2018) (Professor Chermerinsky compares the twentieth century,
where “the media played an enormous unifying function,” with the internet media
that are “dividing, not unifying us as a nation.”). Professor Chermerinsky is
responding to Justice Kennedy’s gushing comments in Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017):
[S]ocial media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of
protected First Amendment activity on topics “as diverse as human
thought” . . . . [W]e cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast
potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we
want to be. The forces and direction of the Internet are so new, so
protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they
say today might be obsolete tomorrow.
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Professors Logan and Anderson provide compelling arguments for a
“retool[ing] New York Times 1073—arguments that have special weight
given their status as among the many advisors in the Restatement of the
Law, Third redrafting efforts on defamation and privacy. 1074 Others, 1075
including this author, 1076 suggest other options. One can only hope, with
Id. Compare the powerful critique of Robert D. Kaplan. See Robert D. Kaplan, The
Tyranny of the 21st-Century Crowd, WALL ST. J (Oct. 7, 2021, 6:09 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tyranny-crowd-identity-politics-globalization-socialmedia-twitter-mob-totalitarian-11633636189
[https://perma.cc/HRH2-MELK].
Modern media and social media have together become instruments of the “tyranny
of the crowd,” the aim of which is “to hunt down the insufficiently virtuous,” with
their goal “the destruction of the individual” by “intimidation of dissent through a
professed monopoly on virtue.” Id. “If you don’t agree with us, you are not only
wrong, but morally wrong, and as such, should be not only denounced but
destroyed.” Id. (emphasis added). Such “lust for purity, combined with the tyranny
of social media technology in the hands of the young,” “threatens to create an era of
the most fearsome mobs in history,” with “[t]he upshot of such crowd coercion . . .
widespread self-censorship: the cornerstone of all forms of totalitarianism.” Id.
(emphasis added).
1073. Professor Logan suggests that the “most significant step” the Court could
take would be to adopt a test mid-way between New York Times and a negligence
standard, i.e., “extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers,” the “gross irresponsibility”
standard adopted in private-person, public-concern cases by the New York Court of
Appeals. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy, supra note 172, at 783–84, 813. Such a
standard “would give publishers an incentive to take at least minimal steps to
confirm accuracy rather than publish first and (maybe) verify later.” Id. at 783–84.
For a discussion of the New York standard, see ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note
92, § 6:10. Compare Professor Logan’s proposal with that of Professors Bezanson
and Cranburg in supra note 977. For other indications of the exceptionally high
standard New York Times institutionalizes, see supra text accompanying notes 56,
68, 72–73, 78, 104, 130, 133, 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869, 882, 917–18, 924–25, 994,
1020, 1025–35, 1039–48; infra text accompanying note 1076.
1074. See Torts: Defamation and Privacy, THE AM. L. INST., https://www.ali
.org/projects/show/torts-defamation-and-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/EV26-AHHY]
(last visited Nov. 4, 2022). Many other scholars are critical of New York Times and
its progeny. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 994–95, 1053, 1073.
1075. Others have made thoughtful reform proposals. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 994–95, 1053, 1073.
1076. See supra text accompanying note 1017; infra text accompanying notes
1077–81 (discussing the polluting effect of falsehood on public discourse); supra
text accompanying notes 120, 251–301, 932–34, 988–89, 991–92 (retrenchment of
public-official status); supra text accompanying notes 177–250, 302–88, 929
(abolition of involuntary-public-figure status); supra text accompanying notes 302–
88, 987 (consideration of passage of time on public-person status); supra text
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considered optimism, 1077 that the deep fissures in the Justices’ support for
New York Times evidenced both publicly 1078 and privately in the internal
discussions of the Justices during deliberations about Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 1079—issued just two decades after New
York Times—continue in a Court much less deferential to the press than in
1985. Nothing in United States v. Alvarez 1080 bars such a “retool[ing]” by
the Court of its defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence to protect
against the dire risks to American democracy.1081
accompanying notes 112, 350–57, 751–75 (extension of Gertz criteria to private
plaintiffs in false-light privacy cases); supra text accompanying notes 512–619,
935–36, 943–44 (resuscitation of the Milkovich standards in opinion cases); supra
text accompanying notes 620–90 (continued amplification of more-relaxed
standards in defining and proving constitutional malice); supra text accompanying
notes 389–511, 938–68 (denying First Amendment protection in all purely privateconcern cases giving substantive content to the limitation); supra text
accompanying notes 96–98, 121, 930–31, 990, 993, 1061–66 (reconsideration of
the underlying justifications for the public-private person dichotomy and the
application thereof to all-purpose and vortex or limited-purpose public-figure
statuses); supra text accompanying notes 691–788 (building upon and expanding
access to and effective remedies in defamation and false-light privacy cases); supra
text accompanying notes 789–881 (rejection of “neutral reportage” as a First
Amendment doctrine).
1077. See Elder & Johnson, supra note 916 (“Why should [the Supreme Court]
(and the general public) not similarly reassess Sullivan and its progeny? Our sense
is that Sullivan’s provenance would safeguard its viability—but that a public
discourse might generate reform proposals (generally and effectively opposed by
the media in the past) that would give libel and privacy plaintiffs a fair chance, not
a stacked deck enveloped in self-righteous, self-interested hyperbole about avoiding
media self-censorship.”). On the stacked-deck phenomenon, see supra text
accompanying notes 56, 68, 72–73, 78, 104, 130, 133, 806–07, 857–58, 867, 869,
882, 917–18, 924–25, 994, 1020, 1025–35, 1039–48, 1073.
1078. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 77–78, 84, 453.
1079. See supra text accompanying notes 446, 474.
1080. See supra text accompanying note 112. For discussion of the Court’s
defamation-First Amendment jurisprudence and its capacity to mitigate pollution
of public discourse, see infra the citations in note 1081.
1081. Levi, supra note 985, at 244. Professor Levi eloquently identifies the
general problem facing American democracy: “The mass circulation of deliberate
falsehood, when joined with public distrust in infrastructural institutions, paints a
terrifyingly dystopian potential future.” Id. On this polluting effect, a major focus
of this paper, see supra text accompanying notes 78, 111–124, 141, 453, 462, 508,
702–04, 724–29, 870–81, 907, 973, 1017–80. See supra note 1073 for Robert D.
Kaplan’s discussion of the modern “tyranny of the majority.” Note that New York
Times still has its staunch defenders. See We The People Podcast, supra note 992
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(quoting Professor RonNell Andersen Jones as calling it “a high watermark or
First Amendment jurisprudence” and suggesting that there are “lots of reasons to
think that defamation is a sloppy tool for our societal problems of
disinformation”); Lewis & Ottley, supra note 1020; Floyd Abrams, The Supreme
Court Faces a Huge Test on Libel Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/opinion/supreme-court-libel-news-media
.html [https://perma.cc/VF3D-Q5Q6].

